Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2011

The Mexican Hydra: How Calderón's Pursuit of
Peace Led to the Bloodiest War in Mexican
History? Will the Mexican People Inherit a Failed
State in 2012?
Marco A. Pinon-Farah
Claremont McKenna College

Recommended Citation
Pinon-Farah, Marco A., "The Mexican Hydra: How Calderón's Pursuit of Peace Led to the Bloodiest War in Mexican History? Will the
Mexican People Inherit a Failed State in 2012?" (2011). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 200.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/200

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE
THE MEXICAN HYDRA: HOW CALDERÓN’S PURSUIT OF PEACE LED TO THE BLOODIEST
WAR IN MEXICAN HISTORY. WILL THE MEXICAN PEOPLE INHERIT A FAILED STATE
IN 2012?

SUBMITTED TO
PROFESSOR RODERIC AI CAMP
AND
DEAN GREGORY HESS
BY
MARCO ANTONIO PINON-FARAH

FOR
SENIOR THESIS
FALL 2010-SPRING 2011
4.25.11

“And she will have a son, and you are to name him Jesus, for he will
save his people from their sins.” – Matthew 1:21 (NIV).
To all those whose voices are all too often drowned out and forgotten.
May God Bless you and give you peace in the reality that one day we
will all live united as human beings.
A mi abuelo “Chuso” quien sigue vivo en mi mente y en mi corazon. Este
triunfo es suyo abuelito.
Jesus “Chuso” Piñon y Prieto.
To my uncle Nick Farah. Thank you for your constant love and support.
“Mexico lindo y querido, si muero lejos de ti, que digan que estoy
dormido, y que me traigan aqui…”
“Siete leguas, el caballo, que Villa tanto estimaba…”
“Que van a hacer para garantizarnos que 35 mil mas Mexicanos no mueran?
Que van a hacer para garantizar que Mexico sea libre otra vez? Que van
a hacer para decirle al narco que ya no tiene casa en nuestro pais?”
A mis hermanos y hermanas Mexicanos, cuanto mas vamos a tener que
sufrir? Que Dios nos bendiga, y que Mexico sea nuestro. Fuera con el
narcotrafico, fuera con la corrupcion, fuera con la violencia!
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Hypotheses:
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether or not the drug
war

in

current

Mexico

will

anti-narcotic

cease

as

a

operations

result
and

of

the

strategy.

Mexican

government‟s

Furthermore,

it

will

investigate the feasibility of maintaining the current strategy as is,
and if so, is this morally responsible to do? So long as the current
levels of violence show no signs of slowing, it does not appear that
any semblance of “victory” can or will be achieved

by the Mexican

government anytime in the foreseeable future. I propose that, if the
violence continues to escalate at its current rates, Mexico will become
a failed state by the end of President Felipe Calderón‟s term and the
next presidential transition of power, after the 2012 election. I will
argue that this is evidenced by increased death tolls, increases in
gruesome crimes, a blatant disregard for authority by the cartels1, as
well as the increase in diversification of criminal activity of these
organizations.2
increasingly

Furthermore,

“cross-border”

another
nature

area
of

of

the

alarm

is

violence.

that
That

of

the

is,

the

Mexican drug organizations are demonstrating an increased presence in
not only the Mexican trafficking industry, but also within the central
and Latin-American drug supply industry.3

1

This disregard for authority and consequences can be seen clearly in the organizations‟
pursuit of assassinations of government officials and cartel leaders, as reported
frequently in the press.
2
Such as extortion, kidnapping, assassination, as reported in STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug
Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence,” (December 11, 2008); 10.
3
STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels,” 2.
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In

order

to

determine

whether

or

not

Mexico

will,

by

my

definition, become a failed state, I will investigate to what extent
the

drug-trafficking

organizations

(DTOs)

have

infiltrated

Mexican

society. I will demonstrate that their domain extends well beyond the
political arena, intfo those of: 1) law-enforcement, 2) the religious
lives

of

Mexicans,

and

3)

the

mainstream

cultural

avenues

of

expression. I believe that such an extensive infiltration of Mexican
society effectively eliminates the government‟s ability to adequately
govern and protect its citizens.
The thesis will be divided into five chapters: 1) introduction
and background, 2) the military and its role in the conflict, 3) the
Catholic Church, its silence in regards to the violence, and religion‟s
role in the violence in general, 4) the “narcocorrido” as a cultural
expression

and

political

indicator

and

5)

initial

findings,

future

implications, and conclusions. Through these chapters, my hypotheses
will be investigated and tested based on the various research questions
I have posed in writing each chapter.
In
success

discussing
cannot

the

take

military,

place

under

I
a

have

determined

counter-drug

that

long-term

strategy

primarily

dependent on military might. Unfortunately, the Mexican military, I
believe, is entirely ill equipped and trained to pursue an all open
engagement

of

the

DTOs

in

a

conflict

that

more

closely

resembles

guerilla warfare than conventional war. In order to determine whether
or not this is the case there are several important questions that must
be asked as the driving force behind the research, for the military
these include: Is corruption an issue in the Mexican military and other
law enforcement agencies? How do their arsenals compare to those of the
cartels? Are the armed forces adequately financed for this type of
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conflict? What training are the soldiers receiving in anti-guerilla
warfare? Where are the

cartels‟ weapons coming from? How

will the

military phase itself out in order to prevent Mexico from becoming a
military

state?

What

role

should

the

United

States

play

in

the

conflict?
Alarmingly,

the

Catholic

Church

has

been

relatively

silent

throughout the violence, although they have become more vocal recently.
In my opinion, there could be tremendous progress if the Church were to
frequently speak out against the violence and encourage reconciliation
between the government and the cartels. When addressing this topic one
must

ask

why

they

have

remained

so

silent.

Furthermore,

are

they

obligated to speak out in the face of injustice and violence? Are they
violating

the

very

promises

they

made

in

both

conferences

of

the

Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano (CELAM) in Medellin and Puebla? What
role does religion play in the daily lives of Mexican people? What is
the appropriate role for the Church in the modern political sphere with
regards

to

the

drug

war?

What

is

the

current

state

of

Church-DTO

relations?
In the final chapter to be investigated, the issue of “narcocultura,” or drug culture, is the focus. I believe that the rise of the
“narco-corrido,” (drug song) has had a tremendous impact on the nature
of the drug war itself. As a result of the idolization and admiration
shown to the cartels and their members in this particular genre of
music, it is possible that the general population‟s opinion towards the
cartels has changed significantly. One cannot be too quick to dismiss
the power of such a widespread media outlet; the musical adoration
given to the cartels has certainly infiltrated the minds of Mexican
people and is potentially capable of creating a general feeling of
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indifference towards the drug trafficking organizations. That is not to
say that people outright support the industry, it simply suggests that
due to this combination of indifference and fear, “el pueblo” is not
necessarily vehemently opposed to the cartels either. The questions
that must be asked are then: Is it morally wrong for the government to
permit the playing of “narco-corrido” on the radio? Can one truly blame
violence on the music people listen to? Is it morally wrong to sing
about the “narco” in a positive light? How can the government provide
the protection necessary to its people in order to combat the effects
of “narco-cultura” in general? What role does the “narco-corrido,” have
in forming and expressing Mexican identity? How reliable of a source is
the genre for relating historical, and other factual occurrences,
The tragedy of the nature of the conflict in Mexico is that, when
the dust has settled, a desire for wealth and territory determines the
behavior and actions of the drug-trafficking organizations. That is,
money, property, and land are deemed of greater worth than human life.
It is in this tragic reality that one encounters the biggest obstacle
facing any chance of reconciliation or end to the current violence;
there can be no victory through moral accusations and pleas alone.
Finally, once the initial investigation and analysis has been
completed, potential solutions can be discussed. However, in order to
appropriately address potential strategies, or modifications to current
strategy, for combating the cartel warfare that continues in Mexico,
one must gain a certain understanding concerning the underlying causes
of the conflict. Reluctant to accept the majority of the blame for the
rise of the conflict, “the Mexican government [claims], the cartel wars
are not a result of corruption in Mexico or of economic and societal
dynamics…Instead, the cartel wars are due to the insatiable American
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appetite for narcotics and the endless stream of guns that flows from
the United States into Mexico and that results in Mexican violence.” 4
Whichever

of

these

two

accusations,

if

either,

prove

to

be

more

truthful is entirely immaterial given the fact that they do nothing to
promote reconciliation.
This statement demonstrates both the American and Mexican lack of
responsibility and willingness to accept their role in aggravating the
issue in the past decades. This is only worsened by the fact that the
war has grown to such an extent as to appear to some to be a lost
cause. Without question, there is truth in both elements; the Mexican
government is far from innocent in terms of its historical corruption
and gross economic inequality, while American demand for drugs and
relatively

loose

gun

regulation

laws

has

definitely

contributed

significantly to the growing violence. All of this is not to say that
understanding underlying causes and reasons for which the cartels grew
to such strengths is pointless. Quite the opposite, only by determining
what

flawed

regulations

and

unforeseen

circumstances

could

have

contributed to this situation, can a more complete understanding of the
history of the DTOs‟ rise be achieved. In so doing, one will be more
adequately prepared to develop and offer up potential solutions and
political compromises of policy in order to best address the cartel
violence.

What is a failed state?

4

Scott Stewart, Mexico’s Gun Supply and the 90 Percent Myth, February 10, 2011,
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110209-mexicos-gun-supply-and-90-percentmyth?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110210&utm_content=readmore&elq=90f
a42b6c4b24fa3afa8be1d2e1fe139. According to this STRATFOR report, the number of Americanmade weapons brought into Mexico is highly questionable.
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The definition I have chosen in order to prove my thesis that
Mexico is approaching “failed state” status at an alarming rate is the
following: A nation becomes a failed state once it loses the ability to
protect

its

constitution

citizens
from

and

foreign

the
or

rights

domestic

afforded
threats.

to

The

them
Fund

by

for

its
Peace

(FFP), the organization responsible for producing the “Failed States
Index,”

(FSI)

potential

uses

for

categories.5

In

several

failing,
the

characteristics

including

Fund’s

own

to

economic,
words,

determine

political,

“one

of

the

a

state‟s

and

social

most

common

[characteristics of a failed state] is the loss of physical control of
its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”6
According to FFP‟s index, Mexico received a score of 75.4 in
2010, earning it the 98th rank on the FSI.7 Of the 12 categories, the two
in which Mexico received their highest score were categories I-4 and I5,

Chronic

Development
scores

and

Sustained

along

received

in

Group

Human

Lines

Flight

(8.2),

“Criminalization

(7.0)

and

respectively.8

and/or

Uneven

Economic

Meanwhile,

Delegitimization

of

the
the

State,” (I-7) and “Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of
Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights,” (I-9) received two of
the lower scores for Mexico‟s total, 6.8 and 5.5 respectively.9 As seen
by Mexico‟s ranking of 98 on the FSI, these scores are not indicative
of the precarious situation that the Mexican government finds itself in
with regards to its ability to govern and maintain the confidence and

5

Foreign Policy, The Failed States Index 2010,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map
_and_rankings.
6
The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index FAQ,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=327#
3. For further explanation of the FSI see Appendix A-1.
7
Foreign Policy, The Failed States Index 2010. For a full breakdown of Mexico‟s scores on
each individual category see Appendix A-2.
8
The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index FAQ,
9
Ibid.
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trust of the general population. Furthermore, as per the focus of my
investigation, I believe that the scores given to economic categories
are far less indicative of a state failing than political and military
factors.
It is my expectation that the research will demonstrate that the
two scores on which I will focus (I-7 and I-9) are entirely too low and
therefore misrepresent the reality of the decaying security situation
in

Mexico

today.

Furthermore,

while

the

FFP

uses

a

total

of

12

categories, I have chosen to address the two mentioned above for the
reason that my definition of a failed state is one that focuses on
cases in which a state has suffered in terms of legitimacy and its
ability to maintain “the Rule of law,” category I-9. Furthermore, I
agree with Max Weber‟s understanding of a failed state, as mentioned by
José Antonio Ortega Sánchez, that a State can only remain a state if it
“successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force in the enforcement of its order.”10 Ortega Sánchez for
why this one particular criterion is so important in using the case of
Zimbabwe. He writes that Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe has been “a gross
violator of human rights,” however it cannot be considered a failed
state

because

“the

dictator

Mugabe

has

not

lost

the

monopoly

of

violence.”11 It is precisely this claim that demonstrates why Mexico is
rapidly approaching the status, if it does not already deserve it, of
being declared a “failed state.” That is not to imply that the Mexican
government and its efforts are futile and that the country is in total
anarchy,

10

but

rather

that

the

government

no

longer

possesses

the

Idea taken from José Antonio Ortega Sánchez, México: ¿Rumbo al Estado Fallido? (México,
D.F.: Editorial Planeta, 2010), 19. Quote taken from Max Weber, The Theory of Social and
Economic Organizations, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 154.
11
José Antonio Ortega Sánchez, México: ¿Rumbo al Estado Fallido? (México, D.F.: Editorial
Planeta, 2010), 18.
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necessary “monopoly of violence,” necessary to govern and protect its
citizens.
It

appears,

after

initial

investigations

that

the

Mexican

government has also lost the trust of a significant portion of its
citizenry and has ultimately become more “delegitimized,” category I-7.
Additionally,

there

have

been

several

reports

concerning

gross

violations of human rights, such as the femicide occurring in Juarez,
at the hands of the cartels and even some claims of military abuse of
citizens. If these claims prove to be substantiated, then one must
carefully look back at the methodology that the FFP uses in compiling
the Failed States Index. Furthermore, a revisiting of these scores
could alter Mexico‟s standing on the list and ultimately the way the
global community approached the violence in Mexico.

The Mexican Hydra
As with any policy formation and implementation, one must decide
the proper way to commence the process. The Mexican government had to
make a decision between three umbrella approaches to its anti-narcotics
policy: 1) top-down, 2) bottom-up, and 3) multi-tiered. Needless to
say, all three will have their own challenges and pitfalls, however it
is the responsibility of the host government to determine which one
carries the smallest risk to the lives and livelihood of its people. In
order to properly analyze and discuss Mexico‟s anti-drug policy under
President Felipe Calderón, one must understand what these three options
entail and what potential consequences each carry.
The first approach to be discussed is that of top-down, which
seems to most appropriately fit the current strategy under the PAN
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controlled presidency of Calderón. When operating under this strategy,
the

aim

is

to

dismantle

the

cartels

and

cripple

their

ability

to

operate by eliminating the head of the “beast”. While this certainly
has its strengths in that it weakens the organization by taking out the
primary shot-callers and planners, it is far from being an appropriate
strategy. In fact, I will argue later that this strategy is one of the
primary

reasons

for

the

staggering

death

toll

and

the

shocking

increases in violence in Mexico. The reasoning behind this is that it
inevitably creates a power vacuum, which can become more deadly and
problematic for the government than the initial enemy was. With several
individuals vying for supremacy within their own cartels, the violence
can

become

even

more

guerilla-like

and

difficult

to

combat

since

identification of cartels has become more complex. I believe that due
to

this

dynamic,

an

opportunity

for

Mexico

to

be

thrust

into

the

category of failed states presents itself.
To further illustrate this, I have developed the concept of the
“Mexican Hydra”. This refers to the creature from Greek mythology whose
defining characteristic was its ability to have its head cut off, only
to grow two in its place. The elimination of various cartel leaders by
the Mexican government is similar to the ancient story if one allow the
cartels to assume the role of the monster, and the government to be the
“hero” combating it. With this in hand, one can see the problem in two
steps: 1) the original monster has x heads (one for each cartel), and
2) the government tries to kill it by decapitating it. Unfortunately,
not only did they fail to consider the monster‟s special ability, but
over time they also chose to cut off multiple heads at once, resulting
in a doubling of the original number. The x-headed monster has now
become

the

2x-headed

monster.

David

Galula

echoes

my

thoughts

by
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writing that “guerrillas [DTOs in this case], like the heads of the
legendary hydra, have the special ability to grow again if not all
time.”12 Mexico

destroyed at the same

has failed to do

this, thus

allowing the beast to recover and grow stronger. I fear that this
deadly

trend

will

only

worsen

as

more

vacuums

are

created,

more

factions are formed, and more violence is carried out in Mexico.
Turning to a bottom-up approach for combating the Mexican DTOs,
the understanding is

that the government‟s

policy to eliminate the

cartels is by taking out foot soldiers and lower-ranking members of the
organization before pursuing the leaders themselves. Essentially, it is
an all-out attack on the lifeblood of the cartels. At first glance,
this approach appears to be more flawed than the top-down policy in
that it does nothing to debilitate the cartel‟s ability to conduct its
business.
“brain”

Low-ranking
of

the

Furthermore,

by

members

are

organization
only

easily

is

pursuing

replaced,

still

the

intact

so
and

lower-ranking

long

as

the

functioning.

members

of

the

organization, the leaders and directors are given ample time to defend
and

prepare

succession

themselves,

and

plan

of

as

well

action

as

to

should

establish

they

be

a

firm

killed

or

order

of

arrested.

Therefore, this policy does little to bring violence to a minimum; in
fact it is more of a façade of combating the cartels than anything
else. Ultimately, this approach would be futile since it would involve
the

government

pursuing

an

endless

stream

of

cartel

soldiers

with

little progress being made as to the weakening of the organizations as
a whole. Furthermore, it would likely do little to curb the increasing
death toll. This policy would allow the cartels to continue operating
as normal with little fear of retribution from the authorities since
12

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1965), 107.
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the

high-ranking

members

are

relatively

free

from

persecution

and

prosecution.
The final strategy involves a combination of the prior two and
will

be

referred

to

as

a

multi-tiered

approach.

This

strategy

is

necessary if any victory is to be achieved, however that is not to say
that it does not come laden with its own flaws. A multi-tiered approach
is perhaps the most complex strategy to develop and implement since no
blueprint

for

success

exists.

One

must

carefully

analyze

and

make

decisions on the following: a) when to commence attacks, b) where to
begin (top or bottom?), c) how much of each strategy to implement and
at what times to make necessary changes, among many other difficult
decisions. While this is the most needed umbrella strategy for the
Mexican government if they are to achieve victory over the drug trade
in

Mexico,

one

of

its

biggest

setbacks

appears

to

be

a

lack

of

resources available to the Mexican government, financial and military.
Further hindering the possibility of implementing a strategy of this
sort is that, “Mexican security institutions are often locked in a
zero-sum

competition

in

which

one

agency‟s

success

is

viewed

as

another‟s failure, information is closely guarded, and joint operations
are all but unheard of;” 13 the problem here is that the strategy depends
entirely on cooperation and “joint operations.” It would be difficult
to envision the Mexican government successfully carrying out such a
complex, expensive counter-strategy without the financial and military
assistance

of

the

United

States

or

another

major

global

power;

a

politically and ethically dangerous position for any of these powers to
enter into voluntarily.
13

Quote of “John Feeley, deputy chief of mission at the American Embassy and Mexico
City,” taken from Elisabeth Malkin, “U.S. Aided Mexican Drug War, With Frustration,” The
New York Times, December 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/americas/04wikileaks-mexico.html.
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What is a “drug-related death”? Definition and Statistics
Before

one

begins

to

analyze

and

understand

the

staggering

numbers linked to “drug-related” violence in Mexico, a clear definition
has to be reached as to what can be considered “drug-related”. As will
be shown below in the words of Reforma, one must be careful to ensure
that the numbers do not include all forms of violent crime, so that the
statistic actually provides relevant and pertinent data to the drug
industry and its conflict with the Mexican government.14 While there are
several ways of defining the term, the best overall definition comes
from

Reforma,

as

reported

by

the

Trans-Border

Institute

at

the

University of San Diego in the figure below:
In terms of methodology, Reforma attempts to avoid the conflation
of other homicides (e.g., those committed by drug users) that do
not reflect the kind of high impact violence associated with
organized
crime.
Instead,
Reforma
classifies
drug-related
killings as “narco-executions” (narcoejecuciones) based on a
combination of factors related to a given incident:
• use of high-caliber and automatic weapons typical of organized
crime groups (e.g.,.50 caliber, AK- and AR-type weapons);
• execution-style and mass casualty shootings;
• decapitation or dismemberment of corpses;
•
indicative
markings,
written
messages,
or
unusual
configurations of the body;
• presence of large quantities of illicit drugs, cash or weapons;
• official reports explicitly indicting the involvement of
organize crime.
Fig. 1 Characteristics of drug-related deaths as reported by
Reforma in Trans-Border Institute, “Drug Violence in Mexico.”15
Part of the difficulty in recording and compiling these numbers
is that there are several different figures being reported by varying
news sources. Therefore, one often has to deal with ranges of death

14

Trans-Border Institute, “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009,”
Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, January 2010, 3.
15
Ibid. See the article for graphs, charts, and data from The Trans-Border Institute‟s
findings.
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tolls, rather than exact numbers.16 However, even taking this potential
source of uncertainty into account, “from 2006 to the present [January
2010]: over 16,000 killings,”17 have resulted from the Mexican drug-war.
With information from 2010 coming to light, it is now a reality that
the

Mexican

people,”18

drug

with

war

“the

has

claimed

federal

the

attorney

lives

of

general‟s

“more
office

than

30,100

[reporting

that](my own modification) 12,456 people were killed through Nov. 30
[2010].”19
Another

statistic

demonstrative

of

the

extent

to

which

the

violence has gripped the nation in the past 5 years is found in the
list of cities with the top 10 murder rates in 2009. In that year,
three Mexican cities were included in this list: 1) Juarez, Chihuahua,
the murder capital of the world with a murder rate of 191 deaths per
100,000 inhabitants, 2) Culiacan, Sinaloa, home state of Sinaloa Cartel
leader Joaquin “El Chapo Guzman,” with a rate of 69 deaths/100,000, and
3) Chihuahua, Chihuahua, with a murder rate of 63 murders/100,000.20 Not
only have these murder rates skyrocketed, but another issue of note is
that of the percentage of murders that can be attributed to DTOs and
organized

crime.

Ortega

Sánchez

reports

that

in

2001

7.80%

(1,080/13,855) of murders in Mexico were listed under the “executions,”

16

These ranges and differing media reports can be seen in Trans-Border Institute, “Drug
Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009,” Joan B. Kroc School of Peace
Studies, University of San Diego, January 2010, 2.
17
Trans-Border Institute, “Drug Violence in Mexico,” 4.
18
CNN Wire Staff, “Mexican drug war deaths surpass 30,100,” CNN.com, December 17, 2010.
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/12/17/mexico.violence/.
19
Ken Ellingwood, “Mexico Under Siege: More than 12,000 killed in Mexican drug war this
year, officials say,” Los Angeles Times, December 16, 2010.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-death-toll20101217,0,3176872.story.
20
Data and rates provided by Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia
Penal A.C. in graph 4 found in José Antonio Ortega Sánchez, México: ¿Rumbo al Estado
Fallido? Propuestas para evitar el colapso del país (Mexico D.F.: Editorial Planeta,
2010), 61.
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or “organized crime,” category, while that percentage grew to 52.06%
(9,635/18,509) in 2009.21
Furthermore, Ortega Sánchez notes in relation to these rates,
“Juárez is also 3 times as violent as Medellín [Colombia], the city
that until now had the highest murder rates in the world for at least
the

past

Colombia
between

years.”22

30
has
its

only

The

significance

recently

government

and

emerged
its

of

from

this
a

comparison

long-standing

drug-producing

industry.

is

that

conflict
In

Juárez

alone, from 2007 to 2009 “there was an increase in murders by 1,284%.
What this means: there is no precedent of such an increase in Mexico or
even in the world.” 23 He points out that “not even Medellín [which
reached a murder rate of 347 deaths/100,000 inhabitants in 1991] comes
close to what has happened in Juárez.” 24 Despite the difference in the
increase of murder rates in these Mexican cities and those of Colombia,
perhaps Mexico could benefit from a discussion with those involved in
the Colombia victory over their drug cartels.
When analyzing this data it is important to note, as Beatriz
Paredes Rangel stated, that the drug conflict in Mexico is “regional,”
in nature25, given that the majority of the violence is concentrated in
these

regions

Instituto

(Chihuahua,

Ciudadano

de

Sinaloa).

Estudios

Furthermore,

Sobre

la

as

Inseguridad

noted

by

the

(ICESI)26,

a

majority of all murders in Mexico during 2010 took place in Chihuahua,

21

Table 5, “Porcentaje de las ejecuciones dolosas en total de homicidios dolosos en
México (1998-2009),” Ortega Sánchez compiled data from 1998-2009. Data from 2001-2009
taken by Ortega Sánchez from Procuraduría General de la Republica, Comisión Nacional de
Derechos Humanos, and the newspapers El Universal, Milenio, and Reforma and reported in
México: ¿Rumbo al Estado Fallido? 45, 47 and data on back cover.
22
Ortega Sánchez, México: ¿Rumbo al Estado Fallido?, 60.
23
Ibid., 40.
24
Ibid.
25
Beatriz Paredes Rangel, “The PRI in 21st Century Mexico,” talk given at Claremont
McKenna College, Marian Miner Cook Athenaeum, April 7, 2011.
26
Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad, Homepage,
http://www.icesi.org.mx/.
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Durango,

Guerrero,

and

Sinaloa. 27

One

must

be

careful

not

to

take

Paredes Rangel‟s statement as indicative of the conflict having no
impact on the rest of Mexico or that it is in any way less severe than
initially thought. In fact, it can be argued that such a high volume of
murders in so concentrated a section of the nation count as evidence of
the

extremity

and

severity

of

the

conflict.

It

would

be

far

less

troubling to many to imagine 30,000 murders over a period of four years
in all of Mexico‟s states combined, than it is to recognize that a
significant portion are taking place in three major cities and their
respective trade routes.
It should be noted that Mexico, despite the drug war, has a lower
homicide rate, at 18/100,00028, than Honduras, El Salvador, Venezuela,
Colombia, and Brazil.29 Interestingly, the countries mentioned are all
in Latin America; why is it that Latin American countries are trending
towards greater levels of violence in the past year? It seems that the
United

Nations

Office

on

Drugs

and

Crime

(UNODC)

is

correct

in

suggesting that there have been increasing homicide rates in the Latin
American region as a result of “increases in transnational organized
crime, drug trafficking and gang activity.”30 These findings demonstrate

27

Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad, “Homicidios Dolosos,”
http://www.icesi.org.mx/documentos/estadisticas/estadisticasOfi/denuncias_homicidio_dolos
o_1997_2010.pdf. From this table the total number of murders for these states is as
follows, Chihuahua: 3,514, Durango: 1,025, Guerrero: 1,500, and Sinaloa: 2,251.
28
ICESI, “Homicidios Dolosos,”
http://www.icesi.org.mx/documentos/estadisticas/estadisticasOfi/denuncias_homicidio_dolos
o_1997_2010.pdf.
29
The idea to discuss these differences and the initial list of countries obtained
through personal correspondence with Roderic Ai Camp on April 12, 2011. Homicide rates
for these countries compiled using the following sources: Honduras: 77/100,000
(http://m.elheraldo.hn/17128/show/5e096bbd956b10d363006f4970de4741&t=24d71aa81bef2b9f5da4
1043d25b5826) El Salvador: 69.9/100,000 (http://www.contrapunto.com.sv/ultimasnoticias/bajo-la-tasa-de-homicidios-en-2010) Venezuela: 48/100,000
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2011/02/110209_venezuela_asamblea_inseguridad_cifras
_jp.shtml) Colombia: 32/100,000 (http://www.americaeconomia.com/politicasociedad/politica/ministro-del-interior-reconoce-altas-tasas-de-homicidios-en-venezuela)
Brazil: 25.2/100,000 (http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1363697-la-extrana-violencia-carioca).
30
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global homicide rates stable or decreasing,
new UNODC report says, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/February/globalhomicide-rates-stable-or-decreasing-new-unodc-report-says.html.
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how despite the fact that the Mexican drug conflict may be “regional,”
in

many

ways,

it

certainly

carries

national

and

international

implications.

The Nature of the Beast, Initial Thoughts and Further Investigation
It

is

not

difficult

to

see

just

how

deadly

and

tragic

the

situation has become in Mexico as a result of cartel warfare. The sheer
number of deaths is enough to instill fear in most people, a fear that
is all too visible in Mexico today. Sadly, the conflict is not only
going to take a toll on the country in terms of bloodshed, but it will
also certainly extend into many other spheres. For example, one of
Mexico‟s primary sources of national revenue is tourism. However, with
the situation as it stands, it would not be surprising to continue
seeing fewer people travel and vacation to Mexico. As former American
Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual reported, “it is damaging Mexico‟s
international reputation, hurting foreign investment, and leading to a
sense of government impotence, Gutiérrez said.”31 The implications of a
phenomenon like this are quite damaging, in that it would significantly
decrease one of the nation‟s primary sources of income with which they
can invest, purchase, and otherwise stimulate their economic growth and
development.
Not only would their own ability to economically interact be
restricted, but also, as mentioned, there is the likely scenario that
other investors would be hesitant to enter into a business agreement

31

Elisabeth Malkin, “U.S. Aided Mexican Drug War, With Frustration,” The New York Times,
December 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/americas/04wikileaksmexico.html. According to Malkin‟s article, the Gutiérrez quoted is Mr. Gerónimo
Gutiérrez, a former “deputy secretary in the ministry [Department of Justice] in charge
of domestic security.”
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with a nation that is perceived to be in a state of chaos. New foreign
investment is unlikely, since it seems rational to assume that most
firms would be uncomfortable conducting business in a nation where they
are

vulnerable

to

extortion

and

violence.

In

the

case

of

firms

currently invested in Mexico, it is very possible that they would move
their business elsewhere, somewhere in which they don‟t run quite the
same risk to business and life.
These

are

very

real

threats

to

Mexican

stability,

and

they

demonstrate that the fight Calderón and his administration must fight
is not simply a physical one; they must continue to fight for the
hearts and minds of the Mexican people if they hope to achieve a true
victory over the cartels and the drug industry. How they are to do this
is, as they say, the million-dollar question? Mexico is verging on a
major collapse of government legitimacy if they do not quickly figure
out a way to deal the decisive blow to the DTOs.

Chapter 2: The Military

Opening Thoughts
This chapter‟s focus is on the political and military machine
involved in the war against the cartels. However, that is not to say
that its focus will only be on the government‟s side of the militant
nature of the conflict. In fact, the training and equipment of the
cartels and their army-like branches will be carefully analyzed and
discussed in contrast to that of the Mexican government. Hopefully,
this will produce a deeper understanding of the challenges facing the
government when developing and attempting to implement anti-narcotic
strategy and policy.

Guerrilla Warfare in Mexico?
Che Guevara‟s description of “guerilla warfare” requires that the
fight be defined as “a war of the masses, a war of the people. The
guerilla band is an armed nucleus.” 32 While the violence in Mexico is
certainly not a fight between “the people,” and their government, it
does appear that his description of the “guerilla band” is appropriate
for the Mexican cartels. The DTOs, herein referred to as insurgents and
guerillas

interchangeably,

are

concentrated

units

with

tremendous

military force. Furthermore, they are actively resisting the government
in order to engage in battle where the “struggle is a means to an

32

Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1998),
9-10.
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end.”33 As David Galula writes, first and foremost, if “the insurgent
ever

hope[s]

to

pry

the

population

away

from

the

counterinsurgent

[government]…the first basic need…is an attractive cause.”34 For the
DTOs the cause, or “end”, appears to be, quite simply, profit. While
they

do

crucial

not

necessarily

according

to

have

the

Guevara,

support

the

DTOs

of

the

people,

do

operate

as

which

is

guerrilla

fighters, and they certainly do have a cause that they subscribe to,
that of self preservation and power.
One would not say that the Mexican DTOs are operating a guerrilla
war for any ideological gain or Revolutionary ideals; however they have
adopted elements of the guerrilla movement in their resistance of the
Mexican government. When one thinks of guerrilla warfare, the first
thoughts that come to mind are usually small, contained conflict in
which the strength and numbers of the government‟s forces are relegated
to being non-factors based on the guerrilla‟s intimate relationship to
“the

surrounding

possibilities

countryside,

of

speedy

the

paths

maneuver,

of

good

entry
hiding

and

escape,

places.”35

the
This

relationship has demonstrated itself in the case of the Mexican DTOs
when, it is reported that “some of those gangs have responded with the
weaponry and strategies of war, including preemptive ambushes against
Mexican

forces

and

efforts

to

control

territory.”36

That

is,

the

guerrilla‟s strength is not in numbers, nor in firepower, but rather in
their ability to exploit the few advantages they do have over the

33

Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 142.
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 18.
35
Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 10-11.
36
Juan Forero, “Colombia stepping up anti-drug training of Mexico‟s army, police,” The
Washington Post, January 22, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012106325.html?nav=emailpage. The individual quoted
in the article is “Steven Dudley, co-director of InSight, a think tank that tracks
organized crime in Colombia and Mexico,” according to Forero.
34
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government. As will be discussed throughout this chapter, the DTOs in
Mexico have found ways in which to accomplish just that.
It should be noted that the government does have a “cause” that
it promotes as well, “to reinforce the state and so defeat the internal
threat.”37 However, David Kilcullen notes that “the nature of counterinsurgency

is

not

fixed,

but

shifting:

it

evolves

in

response

to

changes in insurgency.”38 That is, the role of the government as the
“counter-insurgent,” is extremely complex in that there is no perfect,
pre-determined solution to this form of war and conflict. Regardless,
the responsibility to protect citizens falls on the government, however
in the face of such powerful opposition, as is the case in Mexico, how
this is to be accomplished is unclear. Essentially, it seems then that
in order to successfully combat this insurgency, a government must be
fluid and adaptable to the changing complexion of the fight.
The situation in Mexico is further complicated by the reality
that it is one of a handful of Latin-American states to never have
succumbed

to

authoritarian

military

rule.

Given

this

reality

there

exists a precarious relationship between the military and the political
leadership.

Relegated

to

inferior

standing

after

the

Revolution

of

1910, David Ronfeldt writes that it was not until the:
“Revisionist

studies

of

the

1970s

thus

found

that

the

army-

largely because it could operate behind the scenes to facilitate
political communication and conflict resolution in favor of the
governing

37

elites-had

continued

to

fulfill

„residual

political

David Kilcullen, “Counter-insurgency Redux,” in The Use of Force, Seventh edition, ed.
Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2009), 487.
38
Ibid.
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roles,‟ which may be essential for preserving Mexico‟s political
system.”39
From his writing, it becomes apparent that the Mexican military has
slowly

been

reincorporating

itself

into

the

political

affairs

of

Mexico. However, their entry into this sphere of Mexican life must be
conducted carefully and privately, as seen in Ronfeldt‟s choice of the
phrase “behind the scenes,” in the quote above.
Furthermore, beginning in the “mid-1970s-particularly the large
counterinsurgency and anti-narcotics campaigns conducted in Guerrero
and other provincial areas,” 40 the Mexican military has slowly started
“becoming a more visible, respected, and modernized partner of Mexico‟s
ruling institutions.”41 Ultimately, the incorporation of the military
into a more active political role appears to stem from their increased
operations in maintaining order within Mexico as well as the increased
need for a military that can adequately respond to issues of “internal
security,”42
agrarian

such

as

“small-scale

disturbances.”43

To

this

electoral,
list

of

student,

issues

that

labor,
the

and

Mexican

government can rely on support from the military for, one must provide
support to the government one must add the violence and chaos that has
arisen as a result of the drug-war.
Ronfeldt argues that the relationship between the military and
the government is one in which “the military is more visibly active as
an instrument and symbol of the state‟s authority,” rather than a body

39

David Ronfeldt, “The Mexican Army and Political Order Since 1940,” Rand P-5089-1,
August 1975, reprinted in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Armies and Politics in Latin
America, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1976. As quoted in David Ronfeldt, “The Modern Mexican
Military,” in Armies and Politics in Latin America, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J.
Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 225.
40
David Ronfeldt, “The Modern Mexican Military,” in Armies and Politics in Latin America,
ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), 225.
41
Ronfeldt, “The Modern Mexican Military,” 225.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., 230.
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interested in “usurping civilian authority.”44 He ends his essay by
posing a question for future Mexican military-state relations: “will
the

modern

Mexican

development

roles

military

continue

responsibly

and

to
in

fulfill

its

subordination

security
to

and

civilian

authority?”45 This is precisely one of the issues that this chapter will
investigate, however it is clear at this point that 20 years after
Ronfeldt

posed

his

question,

the

military

has

certainly

remained

“subordinate,” to the state in that the ends it seeks are those of the
Mexican government, and by extension the Mexican people.

Calderón‟s Anti-DTO strategy
John Bailey‟s statement that

the drug

war in Mexico

is “the

greatest threat to its democratic governance from internal violence
since the Cristero Revolt,”46 is haunting; the catastrophic death rates
speak for themselves. Bailey claims that the threat is multiplied due
to

a

combination

hyper-violent

of

the

following

drug-trafficking

factors:

organizations

1)

“politically

(DTOs),”

2)

“a

savvy,
civic

culture marked by comparatively little confidence in the police-justice
system,” and 3) “a crisis of political legitimacy and state capacity.”47
In order to combat this long-standing problem of drug trafficking in
Mexico,

the

Mexican

government

under

President

Felipe

Calderón

formulated a strategy that involved a multi-stepped process.
According to Bailey‟s analysis of both the government‟s strategy
and operations the plan was as follows: first the government would
44

Ronfeldt, “The Modern Mexican Military,” 234.
Ibid., 249.
John Bailey, “Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico: What are
Mexican and U.S. Strategies? Are They Working?” Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Mexico Institute (April 2010): 3.
47
Combination compiled from 1st paragraph of Bailey, “Combating Organized Crime,” 3.
45
46
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deploy the Army to particular regions in order to openly combat and
“disrupt their [cartel] activities.”48 Then “at some undetermined point,
the armed forces would return to a secondary, back-up role in police
functions

and

the

reformed

police-justice

system

would

take

the

lead,”49; unfortunately police reforms have historically been difficult
to implement in Mexico. The major obstacle to this strategy is that
Calderón failed to adequately prepare instructions and orders for the
military

operations

that

were

desperately

needed

to

“buy

time

to

implement a long menu of institutional reforms,”50 which would allow the
police to take over the long-term strategy.
One

must

be

wary

of

the

challenge

facing

Calderón

when

implementing any long-term policy: it requires time that Mexico simply
does not have. Bailey, in regards to this strategy, states that “as a
result

we

should

expect

police

intelligence

a

system

hybrid
shaped

institutional
by

military

work-in-progress:

a

influences,

a

and

military that is adapting to police roles.”51 As mentioned, this type of
long-term institutional reform “requires decades, even in the best of
circumstances.”52

Given

the

increasing

death

tolls,

and

spreading

violence, this is simply too deadly an enterprise.
A security brief published by STRATFOR Global Intelligence in
2008

echoes

Bailey‟s

initial

explanation.

The

report

states

that

Calderón‟s strategy has been to depend “on the military only over the
short

term,”53

while

“target[ing]

only

one

cartel

at

a

time.”54

Unfortunately for the President, his hope of seeing “police reforms,”55

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Bailey, “Combating Organized Crime,” 4.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 4-5.
Ibid., 4.
STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels,” 2.
Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 2.
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that would facilitate military operations has not become a reality;
leaving many wondering whether or not the strategy is worth pursuing
any

further

as

“the

country‟s

security

situation

has

continued

to

deteriorate at what appears to be an unstoppable rate.”56

Fox vs. Calderón and beyond the 2012 elections
This conflict, this war, is a product of Calderón‟s desire to
establish himself as the authoritative leader of Mexico 57 after having
been elected by a mere difference of 0.56% of the overall vote.58 In
light of the close electoral results declared by la Tribunal Electoral
del Poder Judicial de la Federacion (TRIFE)of 14,916,927 votes in favor
of the PAN‟s Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa and 14,683,096 votes in
favor

of

without

the
a

PRD‟s

decisive

Manuel
victory

Lopez
or

Obrador,59
approval

Calderón

from

his

found

himself

fellow

Mexican

citizens. In a country with the political history such as Mexico‟s, it
seems that authority and commanding respect are crucial to maintaining
order; remnants of the PRI and its political succession system, the
“dedazo”.60 Therefore, it is no surprise that he chose to take on one of
Mexico‟s biggest problems head on in hopes of dealing it a lethal blow,
thus decisively winning the approval of the Mexican people not only for
himself, but also for the still young ruling party of Mexico, the PAN.

56

STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels,” 2.
Roderic Ai Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional
Challenges,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute (April
2010): 12. For Camp‟s brief discussion of this see footnote 31 in his article.
58
Alejandro Moreno, “The 2006 Mexican Presidential Election: The Economy, Oil Revenues,
and Ideology,” PS: Political Science and Politics (January, 2007): 15.
59
Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federacion, Dictamen Relativo al Computo
Final de la Eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Declaracion de
Validez de la Eleccion y de Presidente Electo, September 5, 2006, 35.
60
These opinions are my own, having formed them from various discussions and classes
taken with Professor Roderic Ai Camp at Claremont McKenna College from 2008-2010.
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Unfortunately, Calderón‟s pride and stubbornness have gotten in
the way of his ability to govern his country effectively through this
period of violent conflict. As STRATFOR states in its security report
“despite the costs, Calderón has shown no sign of letting up,” 61 even in
the face of a clearly flawed and failing national anti-drug strategy
that is leaving thousands of Mexicans dead every year. Calderón is
quickly

losing

sovereign

the

guarantors

legitimacy
of

the

of

the

Mexican

Mexican

government

Constitution,

a

as

the

score-receiving

category on the FSI. Furthermore, according to Pascual, “Mr. [Gerónimo]
Gutiérrez62
official‟]

and

Jorge

believed

Tello

“that

Peón

the

[„Calderón‟s

government

„must

top

intelligence

succeed

in

Juárez

because Calderón has staked so much of his reputation there, with a
major show of force that, to date, has not panned out.‟”63 Could a fear
of losing support be the motive behind his reluctance to concede that
his strategy has failed?
The anti-drug policy developed under the Calderón administration
is

described

by

Roderic

Camp

as

“aggressive,

pro-active

strategy,

temporarily reassigning large numbers of troops where the problems are
most intense…including Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.”64 Camp goes on to
discuss the results of such a strategy in terms of the effect it has on
the

levels

on

violence.

He

argues

that

“to

the

extent

that

this

strategy has been successful in capturing cartel leaders and their
lieutenants, the government has exacerbated the internal battles among

61

STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels,” 2.
Mr. Gutiérrez is a former “deputy secretary in the ministry [Department of Justice] in
charge of domestic security.” Information from Elisabeth Malkin, “U.S. Aided Mexican Drug
War, With Frustration,” The New York Times, December 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/americas.
63
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the cartels [emphasis added];”65 the Mexican Hydra. It is noteworthy
that Calderón‟s predecessor and first PAN President of Mexico, Vicente
Fox, advised his compatriot against the use of military force in the
war on drugs66, however as one can see, Calderón has disregarded this
warning. This serves as further evidence in favor of the argument that
Calderón‟s pursuit of this policy was politically driven and aimed at
building his credibility and authority, rather than being derived from
a desire to rid Mexico of DTOs.
While

Calderón

is

the

first

president

to

openly

combat

the

cartels and the drug-operations in Mexico, the situation before the PAN
assumed the presidency in 2000 seems to have been much worse in that
there are allegations of government and military tolerance, as well as
outright support for the cartels. Jorge Castañeda, the former “foreign
minister of Mexico,”67 under Vicente Fox, writes of “the modus vivendi
that the government, society, and the cartels had over the past 50
years.”68 He explains that “there was no explicit deal or negotiation,
but there was an understanding…followed by all sides.”69 Castañeda‟s
words provide an insider‟s confirmation of what many have suspected for
years, that the Mexican government had a peaceful coexistence with the
cartels, which is partially responsible for their having “reached a
level of power, wealth, violence, and penetration of the state that
made

the

situation

untenable.”70

Interestingly,

Castañeda

does

not

discuss the aforementioned “modus vivendi,” as simple a past reality,
rather, he believes and argues that “we need to go back to [it].” 71 Such

65
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an attitude towards the

cartels is

defeatist, and

it is

precisely

because of this mindset that the DTOs rose to such heights in the first
place.
Camp

provides

another

useful

example

of

the

government‟s

tolerance of cartels and the drug industry when he references the story
of

General

Jesús

Gutiérrez

Rebollo,

in

which

“the

general…openly

associated with drug traffickers for years.”72 What is so alarming about
these allegations is that General Gutiérrez Rebollo served as “drug
czar”

under

President

Ernesto

Zedillo,73

the

last

PRI

president

of

Mexico. Such revelations indicate that the cartels have infiltrated the
highest

levels

of

Mexican

authority.

One

must

agree

with

Camp‟s

reluctance to accept that “Mexican military and civilian intelligence,”
as well as “the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency,” were entirely blind to
these happenings.74 Such allegations raise the question of whether the
Mexican government tolerated, or even showed outright support, for the
drug industry and the DTOs.

Tolerance or Outright Support?
Some may say that Castañeda‟s words are not honest enough, and
that in fact there were times where the government not only tolerated
the

existence

of

the

cartels

but

also

supported

their

continued

existence. There have been several claims made against Vicente Fox and
his administration‟s relationship with certain cartels, including ones
later affirmed by American agencies. As reported by Anabel Hernández in
Los Señores del Narco, Guillermo Eduardo Ramirez Peyro, an insider of

72
73
74

Camp, “Armed Forces and Drugs,” 11.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Pinon-Farah 28

the Vicente Carillo Fuentes (VCF) cartel “before and during its time
with

the

Federation,”75

[Sinaloa]

confirmed

that

“the

government

of

Vicente Fox offered protection to the organization…when they were still
associated with Joaquin Guzman Loera.” 76 Ramirez Peyra, who became an
informant, also reports that “local authorities in Chihuahua, federal
[authorities], and the Mexican army…were involved in the transport [of
drugs]in Mexican naval ships or vehicles belonging to the PGR.”77
These claims are alarming to say the least, since they provide
evidence of direct involvement by members of a government agency in
drug

trafficking;

Furthermore,

the

Ramirez

reach
Peyro

of

the

also

cartels

became

power

aware

of

is
the

astounding.
fact

that

“Fox…consulted with the cartel de Juarez. He [Fox] was going to attack
the enemy cartels like the Tijuana and Gulf; that way, the Juárez
cartel would operate…without the government…on top of them.”78 If these
claims

proved

to

be

truthful,

there

are

serious

repercussions

for

Mexico. First, it further complicates the war on drugs since it will
have been shown that Mexican authorities have, in some extreme cases,
been

under

the

employ

of

the

cartels

themselves.

Second,

it

demonstrates just how enmeshed the cartels have made themselves within
the necessary Mexican agencies so as to facilitate their operations.
Ramirez

Peyro‟s

accusations

would

be

less

damaging

to

the

government had they not been “affirmed by the investigations of a DEA
agent in Mexico in May of 2006.”79 These findings provided the nail in
the

75

coffin,

so

to

speak,

of

Fox‟s

relations

with

the

cartels,

Anabel Hernández, Los Señores del Narco (Mexico D.F.: Grijalbo, 2010), 393.
Dallas Morning News, October 15, 2006 quoted in Anabel Hernández, Los Señores del Narco
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especially that of “El Chapo”. The agent confirmed that “the government
of

Vicente

Fox

gave

protetion

to

Joaquin

Guzman

Loera

and

his

associates.”80 Sadly, it seems to be the case that the Ramirez Peyro
accusation, as reported by the DEA agent, that “the Mexican government,
the police, the military…they are the cartel,” has been the reality in
Mexico for quite some time. 81 Hernández agrees with Ramirez Peyro and
adds her own damaging

claim that

“the public servants have

become

employees of the drug-traffickers.”82 It becomes a mystery how one can
then be surprised that the cartels became so powerful and influential
when

the

Mexican

government

pre-Calderón

was

supportive

of

their

operations. The question then becomes, was Calderón aware of this? Was
he prepared to face the beast that had already infiltrated his own
government?

Calderón‟s Decision
From 2003 until 2008, the two most prominent cartels active in
Mexico

were

the

Gulf

Cartel

and

the

Sinaloa

Federation.83

STRATFOR

reports that the “primary causes of the increasing violence in 2006 and
2007,” were violence between the two cartels clashing over territory
within Mexico.84 When Calderón assumed office in 2006, he chose the Gulf
Cartel and their paramilitary branch, Los Zetas, as his first major
target by “deploying large numbers of military troops,” in Tamaulipas.85
While this strategy may initially seem appealing, one can quickly see
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81
82
83
84
85

Hernández, Los Señores, 394.
Ibid.
Ibid.
STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels,” 2.
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its fatal flaw, the Sinaloa Federation “went relatively untouched.”86
This only served to provide more power, territory, and military might
to Forbes‟ 60th most powerful man in the world, Joaquin “El Chapo”
Guzman,87 the feared leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. To appreciate just
how powerful Guzman is, one must understand that he was ranked on the
same Forbes power list as Presidents Barack Obama (USA), Hu Jintao
(PRC), and Pope Benedict XVI.88
As a result of Calderón‟s pursuit of the Gulf cartel, there has
been an increase in “turf battles and power struggles.”89 Furthermore,
it has created “a vacuum of power,” 90 that, according to STRATFOR, has
led

to

“splits

within

these

organizations

and

a

resurgence

of

previously obsolete cartels.”91 Such developments are concrete examples
of the Mexican Hydra concept; Calderón pursued the beast and attempted
to cut off one of its heads (Gulf), later realizing that this single
act would lead to the growth, reappearance, and reawakening of many
others. This strategy is responsible for STRATFOR‟s earlier statement
that “the country‟s security situation continues to deteriorate at what
appears to be an unstoppable rate,” 92 due to the fact that “the violence
that so worried Mexican officials at the end of last year has spread,
becoming more entrenched than ever.”93 This “deterioration” can be seen
by: 1) a significant increase in death tolls each year from 2006-201094,
2) the increase in violence directed at both the police and military,
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3)

the

targeting

and

“assassinations

of

high-ranking

government

officials,” and 4) “an expansion of the cartels‟ arsenals.”95 These
realities force one to ask two questions: can this strategy remain in
place under a newly elected Mexican president, starting in 2012? Can
the Mexican people stomach more death?

La “Traicion”
While Calderón focused in on the Gulf cartel for his initial
anti-drug

operations,

the

Sinaloa

Federation

also

suffered

due

to

internal conflict, leading to increased intra-cartel violence within
Guzman‟s

organization.96

The

initial

composition

of

the

Sinaloa

Federation was an alliance of sorts, led by “El Chapo”, between a)
Guzman‟s

Sinaloa

Cartel,

b)Arturo

Beltran

Leyva‟s

Beltran

Leyva

Organization, and c) Vicente Carrillo Fuentes‟ Juarez Cartel (VCF).97 In
2008, the Juarez cartel separated from the federation, a move that may
have something to do with one of its leader‟s, Vicente Carillo Leyva 98,
ties to the Beltran Leyva cartel who had severed all formal ties with
Guzman in early 2008.99
In perhaps one of the most storied acts of the cartel conflict,
“el Chapo” established himself not only as “the most wanted drug lord
in Mexico,”100 but also as the single most hated cartel leader “as he has
come under attack from

95

nearly every other cartel…[and] the Mexican

The reasons for the continued worsening of Mexico‟s “security situation” were compiled
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government.”101

With

tensions

between

Guzman

and

the

Beltran

Leyva

organization running extremely high, Guzman committed “la traicion”, or
the betrayal, in which he facilitated the capture of his former ally
Alfredo

Beltran

authorities.”102

Leyva,
Guzman

by

his

having

however,

did

“provided
not

information

escape

this

to

the

allegation

unscathed; on January 9, 2008, the Beltran Leyva family ordered the
murder of Guzman‟s son, Édgar Guzmán López.103 These betrayals and acts
of violence would only be the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, of the
increasing violence and disregard for human life taking place today in
Mexico between DTOs. As STRATFOR summarizes, “the increased turbulence
in intercartel relations has produced unprecedented levels of violence
that show no sign of abating.”104 Such realities call Calderón and the
Mexican government‟s legitimacy into question given the fact that such
statistics demonstrate how “human rights,” are frequently violated and
“rule

of

law”

is

slowly

becoming

more

theoretical

and

less

of

a

reality. Just one example of the “unprecedented levels of violence” is
the violence occurring between the VCF and Sinaloa cartels, which “has
left

more

than

2,000

dead

in

Chihuahua

state

so

far

this

year

(2008),”105; roughly 5 Sinaloa-VCF cartel related deaths per day.
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Passing of the Guard
As mentioned, until 2008 the Gulf Cartel and Sinaloa Federation
were the two most prominent drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico. 106
However, since Calderón‟s offensive against the Gulf cartel, it now
remains unclear as to “whether[or not] the cartel is even intact,”
anymore.107 Perhaps one of the reasons for their decline in power and
relevance

in

separation

the

from

drug-trafficking

former

allies,

industry

los

Zetas,

could
after

be

due

Gulf

to

their

leader

Osiel

Cardenas Guillen was extradited in 2007.108 STRATFOR analysis goes so far
as

to

suggest

that

“Los

Zetas

were

the

primary

reason

for

Gulf‟s

power.”109 Such an observation indicates that the government has begun to
lose its grip on

the “monopoly

Ortega Sánchez. Since the

of violence,” mentioned earlier by

decline of

the Gulf cartel,

the Sinaloa

cartel has been swift to capitalize on their counterparts‟ misfortune.
It is said that the Sinaloa Cartel remains “the most capable,”110 as well
as

the

“the

most

Furthermore,

it

organization

capable

active

appears
of

smuggler

to

be

the

of

cocaine

only

“establish[ing]

[to

Mexican
operations

the

U.S.],” 111

drug-trafficking
in

previously

unknown areas,”112 and is “the most active in diversifying its export
markets[to]…Latin American and European countries.”113 These findings
point to the increase in the DTOs‟ operating capabilities and are a
testament to their power and dominion over the drug industry.
While “El Chapo‟s” Sinaloa cartel is still the biggest threat to
the Mexican government and the other cartels themselves, the Beltran
106
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Leyva organization seems to have risen to a much more prominent role
over the past few years. STRATFOR concludes that they are now “capable
of trafficking drugs and going toe-to-toe with the Sinaloa cartel,” 114
and

that

they

assassinations

have
of

developed

a

high-ranking

penchant

for

“order[ing]

officials.”115

government

targeted

What

is

so

alarming about this activity is that it demonstrates just how little
the DTOs respect or fear the authorities in Mexico. In light of this
reality it seems fair to say that the Mexican government has lost a
certain level of legitimacy if the cartels are free to continue their
heinous crimes and acts of violence against government authorities.
Furthermore, one can assume that it is also an indication of “rule of
law,”

being

called

into

question

if

the

legal

system,

as

an

institution, is not fulfilling its duty.
Just

as

corridors

to

massacre

both

Guzman‟s
the
the

insatiable

United
Juarez

States
and

has

desire
led

Tijuana

to
him

control
to

cartels116,

the

openly
the

primary

engage

Beltran

and

Leyva

cartel‟s desire to compete with and match the Sinaloa Cartel has led to
blatant acts of aggression towards the Mexican government. Both of
these forces are examples that demonstrate a total lack of respect for
human life. Furthermore, this phenomenon becomes abundantly clear in
the 15,273 reported drug-related deaths in 2010.117
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U.S. Involvement; Merida Initiative
Any long-term victory Mexico is to have over the drug-trafficking
industry

that

makes

its

home

within

Mexico‟s

borders

will

depend

significantly on U.S. financial and intelligent support. According to
the

STRATFOR

allowed

a

security

greater

report,

“number

of

shortly
Drug

after

his

Enforcement

election,

Calderón

Administration

(DEA)

offices in Mexico and to acquire[d] new forensic technology from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives to better track
gun purchases.”118 This decision was a risky move on Calderón‟s part,
given

“Mexico‟s

historic

reluctance

to

allow

the

United

States

to

establish a stronger security presence on its territory.”119 As reported
in

The

New

York

Times

in

early

December

2010,

“the

United

States

government provides Mexico with intelligence to pinpoint where top drug
lords

are

hiding

out,

trains

elite

troops,

and

American

officials

discuss strategy to try to quell the violence in Ciudad Juárez, which
has become ground zero in the drug war.”120 Such reports indicate that
the United States is attempting to equip the Mexican authorities with
sufficient

training

so

as

to

get

as

close

as

possible

to

direct

American involvement without actually having to encroach on Mexican
soil, something the Mexican government would simply never allow.
One signs of this plan‟s success, according to the same security
report, is the amount of narcotics and firearms discovered by Mexican
officials.121

As

reported,

“Mexican

Attorney

General

Arturo

Chavez

Chavez…noted that authorities have seized about $11.2-billion worth of
drugs and secured more than $420 million while clamping down on money
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laundering operations during Calderón‟s administration.”122 Two examples
of this took place

in: 1)

2007, “customs officials in Manzanillo,

Colima state, seized 26 tons of cocaine from a Hong Kong-flagged ship
that had sailed from Colombia…the largest in Mexican history,”123 and 2)
2007, “federal police near Guadalajara, Jalisco state, uncovered the
largest synthetic drug production facility ever found in the country,
recovering

some

8,000

barrels

of

ephedrine

and

acetone,

two

key

ingredients in the manufacture of crystal methamphetamine.”124
According to Castañeda, “the Mexican authorities claim-all of the
violence and all of the killing is done with American guns. In fact, we
only know with certainty that about 18 percent of guns come from the
United States.”125 Furthermore, he also claims “the rest is surely coming
from Central America, countries of the former of Soviet Union, and
beyond…you don‟t need a border with the United States to gain easy
access to guns.”126 To Castañeda‟s claim, one must raise a challenge.
STRATFOR research indicates that, in fact, “in 2008…some 3,480 (87
percent) [of guns] were shown to have come from the United States.” 127
Furthermore, this number too, is far from conclusive since it is skewed
by the fact that “the 3,480 guns positively traced to the United States
equals less than 12 percent of the total arms seized in Mexico in 2008
and

less

than

48

percent

of

all

those

submitted

by

the

Mexican

government to the ATF for tracing.”128 While the STRATFOR claims are the
figures to be trusted over those of Castañeda, one must also take away
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that part of the problem is that the precise number of American weapons
that

make

their

way

into

DTO

hands

remains

unclear.

Educated

assumptions can be deduced based on the data at hand, however, at this
point it seems impossible to get a complete understanding of the true
extent of the U.S.-Mexico illegal firearm trade.
The implications of these findings will be discussed in more
detail later in this chapter, however it must briefly be noted that if
Mexico is going to find any way to decrease cartel operations, it seems
as if the proper place to start would be to control illegal firearm
flow to Mexico. How this task is to be carried out will be investigated
later, but based on the information provided by Castañeda and STRATFOR,
it is difficult to imagine such an operation being successful without
American cooperation.129
Another major milestone in the Mexican-U.S. partnership towards a
victory over the cartels and drug-trafficking industry is the signing
of the Merida Initiative. This plan is unique in that the American
contribution is dependent on the needs of the Mexican government.130 As
Bailey discusses, the Merida Initiative was developed “by the executive
branches in both countries (Mexico and the U.S.) in 2007 in response to
Mexico‟s preferences. The US Congress subsequently negotiated specific
provisions,”131; he is quick to note that the Mexican legislative branch
did not partake in the development of the Initiative since it “was
considered an executive agreement and not a treaty.”132 Bailey also notes
that “the Obama administration (2009-2013) maintained the basic thrust
of Merida, but made significant adjustments, e.g., to engage in social

129
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development

programs

and

pilot

projects

in

border

cities.”133

This

demonstrates a continued effort, through the terms of at least two
American Presidents, on behalf of the American government to help the
Mexican government combat the DTOs.
The

Merida

Initiative,

according

to

STRATFOR,

is

“a

U.S.

counternarcotics assistance plan that is projected to give Mexico some
$900 million over two years in the form of equipment and training.” 134
Furthermore, the Initiative is reported to provide “$1.4 Billion…to
combat

the

trans-border

war

on

drugs,

fight

organized

crime,

and

counter terrorism throughout Mexico and Central America.”135 Involved in
the “equipment and training” segment of the Initiative are: “basic
helicopters,

canine

units,

communications

gear,

and

inspection

equipment…training and technical advice on vetting new local police
officers, as well as case-management software to track and carry out
orderly investigations.”136
Another indicator of increased cooperation between Mexico and the
U.S. has been Calderón‟s “increase in extraditions of drug trafficking
suspects to the United States,”137; he had “granted more than 150,” by
December 2008.138 STRATFOR reports that “this approach makes it far more
difficult for drug traffickers to continue operating their businesses
from behind bars.”139
Unfortunately

for

Calderón

and

the

Mexican

government,

while

these are certainly signs of improvement, and indeed minor successes,
133
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they pale in comparison to the reality of the power the DTOs possess.
First, while U.S.-Mexico cooperation is necessary if victory is to be
achieved, the $1.4 Billon of the Merida Initiative are insignificant
when compared to the estimated “$13.8 Billion [of revenue] in 2006,” 140
retained by the cartels and Mexican drug-trafficking industry. To even
suggest

that

a

plan,

which

only

provides

financial

assistance

equivalent to 10% the revenue of the cartels, can make a meaningful
dent in the cartels‟ operations would be foolish. The Initiative is
severely limited in what it is capable of accomplishing, given that
American

involvement

in

Mexico

is

controversial

since

it

carries

consequences for the Mexican president who allows it. 141 However, the
United States will have to play a sizeable role it seems, if the
violence is to cease or the cartels‟ operating abilities are to be
restricted.
Evidence
problem,”

is

ephedrine

and

of
the

the

conflict

aforementioned

acetone,”;

being

more

than

confiscation

products

necessary

of
for

simply

a

“8,000

barrels

of

production

of

the

“Mexican

crystal methamphetamine.142 As reported in a July 2008 STRATFOR security
report,

“methamphetamine

production

is

one

of

the

most

profitable

enterprises in which Mexican drug cartels are involved…responsible for
an estimated 80 percent of the methamphetamine on the streets in the
United States;”143 so long as there is a demand, there will be supply.
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Castañeda also touches on the issue of American demand for a Mexicansupplied

product.

He

writes

“since

then

[1969],

every

American

president has recognized the need to do something about drug demand,
but nothing has happened because it‟s not feasible.”144 Again, one sees a
defeatist attitude from a formerly high ranking member of the Mexican
government. It no longer seems such a mystery how the DTOs managed to
gain so much power.
When

analyzing

Calderón‟s

increase

in

granting

extradition

requests, one can quickly see the problem in calling this a success.
First, while it certainly may affect the prisoner‟s ability to conduct
international drug-trafficking operations from an American prison cell,
it

speaks

much

more

to

the

power

wielded

by

these

individuals

in

Mexico. That is, if they are capable of continuing in their position as
leaders of major cartels while imprisoned in Mexico, they must have
both the respect and power necessary to bypass the obstacles (police,
lack of communication, restricted activity and movement) provided by a
prison environment. This phenomenon also speaks to another stereotyped
problem facing Mexico‟s war on drugs, corruption in the police and
judicial systems. If an individual can continue to run a cartel from
prison, one suspects the police and judicial systems must be somehow
involved,

or

at

the

very

least

indifferent

to

that

individual‟s

activity. Second, this policy of increased extradition to the U.S.
cannot be maintained long term. While it certainly may have an effect
on the cartels‟ operations by imprisoning their leaders in the United
States, one cannot argue successfully that it is acceptable or feasible
for Calderón and his successor to ship all drug-related criminals to
the United States.
144
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Signs of Improvement?
When discussing the level of success that President Calderón‟s
strategy has had against the growing violence between cartels and the
government, one must also look to see the effects that the strategy is
having directly on the operating abilities of the cartels in Mexico. In
terms of this measure, STRATFOR lists two primary means by which one
can analyze the amount of success the Mexican strategy has had: 1)
price of drugs in the United States and 2) types of criminal activity
conducted by cartels.
As STRATFOR reports, “it is, of course, impossible to know the
true amount of illegal drugs entering the country, but one indicator is
the street price of substances.” 145 In a U.S. Office of National Drug
Control Policy report issued in November 2007, “the average price of
powder cocaine in many American cities increased nearly 50 percent over
the year. This suggests that a decreased supply through Mexico has
driven the price up.”146 While this is certainly a plausible explanation
for the reported increase in cocaine prices, it does not seem to be the
likely explanation. That is, while economic theory does suggest that a
decrease in supply leads to an increase in price, this explanation is
far from complete or satisfactory.
The more likely explanation is simply that street prices have
increased since the government offensive against the cartels began due
to an increase in risk to the cartels and producers. Put simply, the
costs

of

production,

not

only

financial

but

also

political,

have

increased tremendously over the past 5 years since Calderón‟s strategy
began. Evidence of this cost of is the change in transportation methods
of the drugs from Latin America, through Mexico, and eventually into
145
146
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the United States. While the preferred method of transport for the
traffickers has long been “airborne,”147 and “maritime,”148 since the
implementation of the current drug policy, the cartels have been forced
to become more creative in their methods in order to counter “the far
greater scrutiny.”149In light of these new challenges, the Mexican DTOs
have turned to more non-conventional methods including “smuggl[ing] on
commercial flights,”150 and “semisubmersible vessels to bring multiton
shipments of cocaine to Mexico‟s shores.”151 It should be noted that the
drug

trafficking

industry

is

a

lucrative

one,

and

that

those

who

benefit from its financial returns (the cartels) are not likely to
decrease supply to the United States so easily. Rather, the fact that
the violence has become so overwhelming should count as evidence in
favor of their continued trafficking activity and continued ability to
provide the necessary quantity of illegal drugs to American consumers.
Furthermore, these organizations seem capable of increasing the
street prices almost entirely at will, knowing that this will likely
increase their total revenue as one would not expect cocaine and other
drug-addicts to respond to a dramatic increase in cost. That is, in my
opinion the demand for

narcotics to

an addict is almost

perfectly

inelastic; it will not be sensitive to or respond highly to changes in
price. Therefore, it would be far from wise to assume that a valid
indication of Calderón‟s success is the street price of drugs in the
United States. However, if a comprehensive and reliable study were to
be

conducted

regarding

the

actual

quantity

or

weight

of

narcotics

entering the United States each year directly due to the Mexican drug

147
148
149
150
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trafficking organizations, one could begin to use it to assess the
success or failure of an anti-drug policy.
The second indicator discussed by the STRATFOR report is that
“many

drug

traffickers

have

turned

to

other

illegal

activities

to

supplement their incomes.”152 This implies that the cartels are doing
several things: 1) new criminal activity and 2) as mentioned earlier,
potentially diversifying their consumer base to “Latin American and
European countries.”153 In terms of the first point, STRATFOR notes that
organizations such as “Los Zetas…have become increasingly involved in
extortion and kidnapping for ransom,”154 and one would certainly have to
agree that this suggests that some organizations have diversified their
criminal activity in order to continue to prosper in the face of “a
more difficult operating environment.”155
When turning to the second point, that of the cartels expanding
their consumer base to include new geographic markets in order to break
from their dependence on American consumers, the Mexican cartels have
quickly become “the central figures in the drug trade in the Western
Hemisphere.”156 The danger in this reality is two-fold: first, if the
cartels

can

diversify

their

clientele,

the

task

of

defeating

them

becomes a multi-national problem, and second, there is the potential
for further growth and strengthening of the cartels themselves. Both of
these issues pose serious threats to the Mexican government and people
as

this

implies

that

the

cartels

have

succeeded

in

becoming

both

wealthy and militarily powerful, international organizations that are
no longer confined by the borders of a single nation. The risk then

152
153
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exists of further cross border violence, that could in turn, spark
further

human

rights

inconceivable.

Again,

violations
one

and

recalls

death
that

rates

at

numbers

still

issues

of

human

rights

violations are used as indicators by the FSI to determine a nation‟s
risk of failing.
Despite the fact that

the DTOs

have

become more complex and

sophisticated organizations, there have been tangible claims of success
made

by

the

Mexican

authorities

in

the

past

year.

For

example,

according to the PGR “more than half of the 37 most wanted crime
bosses…have been captured or killed,” which implies that there has been
concrete

governmental

success

against

the

cartels

and

their

operations.157 President Calderón was quick to celebrate this fact by
noting that it was a significant triumph by exclaiming “19 [cartel
leaders] are no longer in charge of their cartels, [that‟s] more than
half.”158 While Calderón does make a compelling argument, one need not
look very far to see that it does not stand in the face of other
statistics.

For

example,

despite

the

increase

in

captured

cartel

operatives, Calderón still has to stand against the reality that more
than 30,000 Mexicans have died on his watch; the rising death toll
shows no signs of slowing.

157
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U.S. Military Involvement?
Such attacks on the leadership of Mexican DTOs draw parallels to
American

“dealing[s]…with

Silvestre Reyes argues

terrorists

in

Pakistan;”159

Representative

“the U.S. needs to join Mexico‟s fight…[by]

taking out the heads of cartels,” even suggesting that “drone missile
strikes” could potentially be used.160 What is confusing about Rep. Reyes
remarks is that this is precisely what the Mexican strategy has been up
to this point in time, to eliminate the leadership of the cartels, as
evidenced

by

Calderón‟s

aforementioned

statement,

concerning

the

capture of many DTO leaders. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that any
Mexican administration would ever permit American air strikes, manned
or

unmanned,

on

Mexican

soil;

this

would

be

seen

as

an

act

of

aggression and forced involvement by “el gigante del norte,” or the
“giant

of

the

north,”

and

its

government.

Ultimately,

the

Mexican

government would be dealt a catastrophic blow to its credibility and
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens if it were to allow for American
military

operations

using

unmanned

missiles

to

occur

in

Mexico.

Furthermore, any direct U.S. military involvement in Mexico will be a
clear indication that “legitimacy,” and “rule of law,” have been lost
and suspended, respectively, in Mexico. Only in such a case would it be
remotely possible for the United States military to act as an occupying
force in the sovereign Mexican state. That is, Mexico will have failed,
as a state, if the United States decides to intervene.
Despite Carlos Pascual‟s claim that “longstanding impunity, not
Mr. Calderón‟s offensive, should be blamed for the violence,”161 it is

159
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simply

undeniable

that

the

staggering

death

toll

has

occurred

exclusively since Calderón‟s decision to go after the cartels with
force. That is not to say that the tension and conditions for intercartel war were not present prior to Calderón‟s administration, or even
that the violence would not have occurred otherwise, however his policy
is

intrinsically

linked

to

the

outbreak

and

increase

in

violence.

Ultimately, it is a reality that the violence emerged under the antinarcotic policy of Calderón, but that does not excuse those who claim
it was entirely his fault that the war began. In reality, the setting
has been ripe for conflict, all that was needed was the proper offense
to set it off.
One must also be careful when approaching statements made by
Pascual during his tenure as ambassador, especially since particular
comments were recently brought to light and are said to be responsible
for his resignation from the post in March 2011.162 Pascual and his
officials were especially critical of Mexican government in saying that
there was “„widespread corruption‟ in Mexican security agencies.”163 What
is so unusual about this comment is that it is in direct opposition to
his prior statements placing the blame of the violence on “longstanding
impunity.”164 Furthermore, Pascual criticized and “described the Mexican
army as „slow‟ and „risk averse‟,” 165 only serving to further strain his
already damaged relationship with Calderón. Such inconsistency between
public and private statements certainly played a role in Calderón‟s
growing frustrations with American intervention and participation in an
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issue that “does not concern him [Pascual].”166Furthermore, Calderón must
be

careful

after

all,

when

publicly

this

is

a

reprimanding American

Mexican

problem

that

interventions

requires

since,

international

cooperation and assistance as the conflict extends from the U.S.-Mexico
border down to Colombia.

Stronger than the Military?
In order to successfully combat the government‟s anti-narcotic
strategy, the cartels must be extremely well equipped and trained in
warfare, especially in mobile, guerilla tactics. As Camille Rougeron
writes, it is “when individual armaments became increasingly portable
and

easy

to

hide,

regular

armies

benefited

less

than

their

adversaries.”167 As will be seen in the data to be discussed shortly, the
Mexican DTOs have reached a level of fire power and organization that
does rival that of the government, one in which it seems reasonable to
assume that they are capable of conducting problematic and damaging
operations using guerrilla tactics. Precisely as Rougeron writes, the
DTOs stand to gain more than the government from newer, more advanced
technology that allows them to exploit the few advantages they hold
over the military. Quite simply, if they were not capable of this, the
war

could

not

have

been

drawn

out

over

the

last

five

years;

the

military would have quickly dealt with and quieted the cartels.
One way to understand the real capacity of conducting a countergovernment strategy wielded by the cartels is to examine the amount of
weapons confiscated and seized by the Mexican government. One of the
166
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most alarming demonstrations of the cartels‟ military might can be seen
in a July 26, 2009 release by the online Spanish news website Milenio.
The article reports a PGR seizure of cartel weapons under the title of
“PGR takes arsenal with anti-aircraft capabilities from narco.”168 In
this

informative

account,

the

SIEDO 169,

Mexico‟s

organized

crime

specialty unit, claimed they “confiscated foreign made weapons with the
capacity to take down planes, [technology] that we do not have in our
country.”170 The weapons seized included, “18 rocket launchers, five .50
caliber rifles considered to be anti-aircraft capable, 29 .50 caliber
Barrett rifles…two grenade launchers, 49 submachine PS90 guns capable
of

penetrating

any

type

of

armor,

142

Five

Seven

pistols,

called

“copkillers” for their ability to penetrate light armor, on vests and
helmets.”171 Such a find surely calls into question the government‟s
ability

to

“successfully

upholds

a

claim

to

the

monopoly

of

the

legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order,” as
Weber argues is necessary for a state to exist,172 since the cartels are
in some cases better equipped than the government forces.
A seizure of this nature not only provides insight into the sheer
strength of the cartels and their soldiers, but it also sheds light on
the magnitude of the uphill battle the government is facing. One need
not have an extensive understanding of military history and weapons in
order to see just how problematic a seizure such as this one truly is.
As

reported

recognized
168

by

that

Milenio
organized

Online,
crime

is

the

“Attorney

currently

a

General‟s
step

ahead

office
of

the

Milenio Online, “Quita PGR al narco arsenal antiaéreo,” July 26 2009,
http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8614185.
169
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federal government [of Mexico] in terms of weapons and technological
advances used for conducting their illegal activity and that they also
have anti-aircraft capability.”173 Echoing this statement, one police
officer admitted that “the traffickers frequently have far more power
than the police.”174 This reality does bode well for future government
success.
Wielding

such

power

and

capacity

for

violent

response,

the

cartels are in an excellent position to use extortion, laundering, and
other fraudulent enterprises. One can now assume that, amidst several
threats to governors, and other political authorities, the DTOs can
potentially threaten their way out of prosecution and legal troubles.
Given

the

choice

between:

1)

cracking

down

on

the

DTOs

and

their

operations with a very real threat to one‟s life, and 2) turning the
blind eye to their illegal operations in order to survive, it is not
difficult to understand the moral dilemma facing Mexican authorities
today.

They

are

essentially

presented

with

two

options

from

the

cartels: “Door 1, you cooperate; Door 2, we‟re doing it anyway.” 175 This
dilemma will prove to be instrumental in understanding the emotion and
message expressed in Javier Sicilia‟s “Carta abierta a políticos y
criminals,”176 to be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.

173

Milenio Online, “Quita PGR al narco.”
Forero, “Colombia stepping up anti-drug training.”
This quote was directed at the American Government‟s takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, however the sentiment of the expression applies directly to the mentality of Cartel
threats to Mexican authorities and business owners. Taken from Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too
Big To Fail: The inside story of how Wall Street and Washington fought to save the
financial system-and themselves (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 227.
176
Javier Sicilia, “Carta abierta a políticos y criminals,” Proceso.com.mx, April 3, 2011,
http://www.proceso.com.mx/rv/modHome/detalleExclusiva/89858.
174
175

Pinon-Farah 50

Corruption in the ranks?
Mexican politicians and law enforcement have long battled the
stigma of being accused of widespread corruption. However, stereotypes
must originate somewhere and unfortunately, it is true that Mexico is
no stranger to crooked politics and policing. Furthermore, corruption
within the organizations dedicated to battling the DTOs in Mexico is
potentially one of the

biggest obstacles that must be

overcome if

victory is ever to be achieved. That is, ties between the cartels and
government agents pose a serious threat to the possibility of success
for the government and the Mexican people. In order to understand just
how connected the two parties are, and to what extent cartel operations
have

on

confirmed

intra-governmental
examples

of

decision-making

government

agents

one
and

must

look

agencies,

at

and

the
their

complicity in the drug-trafficking industry.
First, Anabel Hernández reports that in testimony given before
the “United States Appellate Court from the 8th District,”177 there had
been

several

occasions

in

which

“federal,

state,

and

municipal,”

officers had engaged “in „illegal killings‟ and…executions conducted by
rival cartels.”178 This claim, if true, is devastating to the credibility
of and faith the Mexican people have in the government‟s ability to
protect them from this domestic danger. Furthermore, it is reasonable
to ask: how can anyone expect the government to succeed in their antiDTO mission if they cannot even maintain a common anti-DTO sentiment
within their own agencies? This further raises the question of the
government‟s legitimacy. Therefore, it becomes clear from examples such
as this one that the government not only faces the task of defeating
the DTOs and their ability to operate, but it also must simultaneously
177
178
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defeat

the

DTOs‟

influence

and

operating

abilities

within

the

government agencies themselves.
Second, Hernández brings up another issue from Guillermo Eduardo
Ramirez Peyro‟s interaction with the aforementioned 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals. As reported by Hernández, Ramirez Peyro “made the accusation
that at all levels within the Mexican police force, there are illegal
connections with drug-trafficking.”179 The most damning statements made
regarding this accusation came when he singled out “the AFI [Agencia
Federal de Investigaciones]180- then led by Genaro García Luna-which he
accused

of

having

revealed

to

the

drug-traffickers

the

names

of

„protected witnesses‟ in order to have them assassinated.”181 However
far-fetched

such

an

accusation

may

seem,

“the

judge

found

Lalo’s

[Ramirez Peyro] testimony to be credible.”182 How can a government be
found to have complete control over the “rule of law,” and maintain
their “legitimacy,” in the face of such alarming discoveries?

Obama‟s Opposition to Stricter Gun Control
The United States has taken a firm stance on gun control as a
means by which to facilitate the Mexican anti-narcotic mission. As
reported by Jorge G. Castañeda and Rubén Aguilar V., “in response to a
reporter‟s question upon his first visit to México, President Barack
Obama
179

was

very

clear:

his

government

would

not

alter

the

Second

Hernández, Los Señores, 395.
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Amendment of United States Constitution…nor would it propose stricter
legislation to regulate its [firearms] purchase through an extension of
the Assault Weapons Ban, which expired in 2004.”183 This statement from
the American President serves to affirm what Castañeda and Aguilar
label one of their chapter headings, “the United States [is capable of,
but] does not want to,” control the illegal firearm trade to Mexico.184
Furthermore, despite “no denial that its [the U.S.] laws concerning
purchasing weapons are permissive,”185 these authors provide three more
examples of what they deem evidence of the United States continued
disregard for their cooperation in the international fight against the
illegal arms trade. They cite the following as examples: [1)] “the
government of the United States has not wanted to ratify the Palermo
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in 2000,186 [2)]
nor has it signed the Interamerican Convention against the Production
of and Illicit Trafficking of arms [ammunition, explosives, and other
related materials]187, ratified by 30 of the 34 member nations of the
OAS.188 [3)] in early 2009, UNODC asked President Obama to place an
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embargo on arms in

order to

restrict

their illegal trafficking

to

Mexico,” which did not occur due to the U.S. citing that it would be
“incompatible with its internal legislation.”189
However,

Secretary

of

Homeland

said that “the U.S. had to

Security,

Janet

Napolitano

has

do a better job stopping the flow of

American guns smuggles south to fuel Mexico‟s drug war.”190 The question
is not then should the United States play a part in bringing about the
end of the drug war in Mexico, but rather how should the U.S. combat
the avenues through which DTOs acquire American weapons? This question
must be asked given the fact that there appears to be at least some
amount of discord between high-ranking American government officials on
the issue.

U.S. Involvement in cartel weapon acquisition
The question: from where the Mexican DTOs have been accumulating
their

arsenals

is

as

of

yet

unclear.

There

have

been

some

links

established between arms dealers and others that remain murky even 5
years into Calderón‟s war against drugs. However, there are indications
that a decent amount of these weapons are coming from the United States
through several sources. One example of the routes the cartels take to
acquire

American

weapons

was

reported

when

“federal

authorities

indicted 20 men Tuesday [January 25, 2011] on charges of buying an

the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and
other related materials, due to the harmful effects of these activities on the security
of each state and the region as a whole, endangering the well-being of peoples, their
social and economic development, and their right to live in peace;” taken from OAS
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189
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estimated 700 weapons in Arizona,” with the apparent intent to deliver
them

to

the

“Sinaloa

drug

cartel.”191

The

report

added

that

this

development is part of a greater investigation, which has discovered
“as

many

as

sources.”192

In

60,000
this

weapons

seized

case, there

was

in

Mexico

the

and

example

of

traced

to

U.S.

one particular

trafficker Uriel Patino who purchased 70 AK-47s from March to August
2010.193 Needless to say, it is becoming apparent that the cartels are
having little, if any, difficulty acquiring the weapons to protect
themselves and their industry. How one is to go about combating the
avenues the cartels take to arm themselves is not a simple question to
answer.

There

are

those

who

argue

for

stricter

U.S.

government

regulation of arms movement, and there are also those who fear any
government regulation would encroach upon their understanding of the
rights protected by the 2nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.194
One
Tobacco,

potential
Firearms

solution

and

proposed

Explosives

by

would

the

involve

Bureau

of

Alcohol,

“include[ing]

long-

barreled weapons in the requirement for gun sellers to report multiple
weapon sales to a single buyer.” 195 Seeing this a potential abuse of
congressional

authority

over

the

2nd

amendment,

the

National

Rifle

Association (NRA) and its supporters have argued that the majority of
American weapons acquired by the cartels were from “weapons stocks
officially supplied by the U.S. government to Mexico.”196 One need not
get into a technical debate concerning the protections afforded to
191
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American citizens under the 2nd amendment in order to discuss the merits
of both sides of the argument.
In order to enter into such a discussion it must be stated that
the process by which these weapons are delivered to the DTOs is known
as

“straw

purchasers[ing],”

and

that

these

individuals

are

“legal

residents of the state who buy the weapons from licensed gun dealers
and certify that they are for their own use, but end up selling the
guns to the drug cartels.” 197 It seems, therefore that the best way to
combat this trade would be to establish a system that prevents these
weapons from getting into the hands of “straw purchasers,” who intend
to sell them to Mexican and other DTOs.
Whichever side of the 2nd amendment debate one falls on is, quite
frankly, irrelevant since the 2nd amendment applies to American citizens
privately owning weapons, not to foreign nationals and organizations.
Therefore, the NRA‟s concerns of an abuse of congressional authority
are unfounded in that the government could regulate the purchasing of
firearms so as to restrict the number of weapons being supplied to
Mexican DTOs without infringing on the American people‟s “right to bear
arms”.

That

is

to

say,

all

can

certainly

agree

that

the

American

government has the obligation to protect its citizens, as well as a
responsibility to those global citizens affected by American weapons,
which

can

be

accomplished

purchased for and supplied

by

not

Murphy, “20 arrested.”

American

weapons

to organized crime and any

organization related to terrorism.

197

allowing

to

be

activity or

Pinon-Farah 56

Crossing the border?
As the violence increases in Mexico, there is also an increase in
the prevalence of the fear that it could potentially spill over into
the United States. Understandably, one should be concerned over the
potential for Mexican DTOs and their violent arms to extend beyond the
border between Mexico and the US in order to further establish their
grip over the continent‟s drug routes. To these concerns, the United
States

has

had

a

very

clear

response,

this

has

not

yet

become

a

reality. Secretary of Homeland Security [Janet] “Napolitano told an
audience, that it‟s „inaccurate to state, as too many have, that the
border is overrun with violence and out of control.‟”198 Furthermore,
Napolitano also noted that “this statement, often made only to score
political points, is just plain wrong.”199 Ultimately, one must take this
concern into account, especially when analyzing the delicate relations
between Mexico and the US.
Should the violence spill over into the southwestern American
states, and the US does in fact provide “an overwhelming response,”200
the situation will have escalated from a primarily domestic conflict
between

cartels

and

Mexican

authorities,

into

one

between

Mexican

cartels, Mexican authorities, and the United States politico-military
machine. Such a scenario is not desirable for any of the three parties.
The cartels do not have the military and financial capacity to carry
out a successful conflict against the Mexican government, each other,
and

the

United

States

military

simultaneously.

Additionally,

one

assumes that the Mexican government does not wish to destabilize the
historically tense relationship and diplomatic balance between asking

198
199
200
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for American assistance without jeopardizing their own sovereignty and
autonomy.
Despite Napolitano‟s claims that border violence is not as bad as
is often reported by the media, it appears that the situation is in
fact deteriorating. The increase in the cross-border nature of the
violence can be seen in two examples: 1) the killing of an American
ICE201

agent

and

2)

a

recent

U.S.

government

sweep

of

DTO

members

operating within the United States. On February 15, 2011, an American
ICE agent, was killed and his partner injured in an attack carried out
by Mexican DTO “Los Zetas”. 202 However, according to a statement made by
Mexican army Col. Ricardo Trevilla “that event occurred because of the
characteristics of the vehicle, given that they (the suspects) thought
it was being used by members of a rival criminal group.” 203 While one
should take into account the potential that this attack was in fact a
misunderstanding as to who was being attacked, the troubling reality is
that crimes against authorities of all backgrounds are taking place
with increasing regularity.
The

second

example

is

related

to

the

first

in

that

it

demonstrates how Napolitano‟s statement that any violence crossing into
the US would be met with “an overwhelming response,”204 may be more than
political rhetoric. While the violence in this case did not take place
on American soil, it did cost the life of an American Government agent,
something

the

U.S.

government

needs

to

maintain

awareness

of

and

sensitivity to. Napolitano‟s words appeared to be followed through on
as “U.S. authorities launched a nationwide sweep of drug trafficking
201
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suspects…[in

which]

more

than

100

suspects

were

arrested

in

nine

cities.”205 What these two examples demonstrate is that five years in,
the US government is actively pursuing the DTOs and their operations
within the United States, as a means by which to facilitate their
demise within Mexico. As Agent Derek Maltz sums it up “if you attack a
U.S. law enforcement officer, we are not going to back down.”206
In a surprising move that echoed Secretary Napolitano‟s earlier
comments, the President “Obama…acknowledged that the U.S. must stem the
flow of cash and guns to Mexico that have aided the cartels.”207 Contrary
to the sentiment expressed earlier by Castañeda and Aguilar, this is a
tremendous

step

in

the

right

direction

for

the

United

States

administration towards recognizing the need for their support if the
cartels are to be defeated. The President went so far as to say that
“we [the U.S.] are very mindful that the battle President Calderón is
fighting inside of Mexico is not just his battle, it‟s also ours.” 208 It
is not surprising that this new vigor for a cooperative effort against
the cartels comes shortly after the death of an American agent in
Mexico as discussed. Furthermore, it is unlikely that this renewed
interest in cooperating with Mexico is unrelated to an event in which
the drug-related violence has directly affected American interests.
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Conclusions
Given the fact that the Mexican military is fully entrenched in
the drug conflict, and there appears to be no slowing of the violence,
how is the Mexican government supposed to continue its strategy of
eliminating the DTOs? First, there must be a consensus between the
government, military, and police as to what exactly the strategy is and
when each phase must be complete. Urgency and understanding are crucial
to the success of the Mexican people over the cartels. Second, the U.S.
does

not

necessarily

have

to

become

extensive

cooperation

with

the

involved

Mexican

military,

mission

is

of

but
the

their
utmost

importance if Mexico is to overcome the growing unrest and violence.
Ultimately,

such

staggering

death

tolls

and

the

increasingly

violent tendencies of the DTOs have created a chaotic existence in the
afflicted areas in Mexico. As mentioned in the introductory chapter,
the violence is concentrated in a few particular regions, however one
must

realize

that

implications,
Calderón

and

which
his

despite

this

cannot

be

successor

is

fact

the

overlooked.
maintaining

issue
The

has

difficulty

government

national
facing

control

over

Mexico. That is, he must find a way to establish and preserve the
citizens‟ confidence and belief in the mission and operations of their
government;
certainly

without

fail

in

such
their

confidence,
role

Constitution and the rights
becomes

increasingly

of

government

protector

afforded

difficult

the

given

and

will

guarantor

to its citizens. Such
the

fact

that

almost
of

the

a task

“analysts

have

implicitly equated the expansion of military functions with greater
political influence, which results in a deterioration of respect for
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civilian authority.”209 Such statements further complicate the situation
facing Mexico and its dangerous approach towards the realm of failed
states.
One must keep in mind that as mentioned earlier in this chapter,
there is no end-all solution for every conflict within a nation that
includes elements of guerrilla warfare. However, there are certainly
several

indicators

as

to

the

level

of

success

that

a

particular

counter-insurgency strategy is having. Galula provides “eight steps,”
towards triumphing over insurgents aiming to destabilize a state.210
While

the

DTOs

are

not

necessarily

attempting

to

overthrow

or

destabilize the Mexican government, some of these steps are useful for
understanding the Mexican conflict. In his book, Galula writes of “The
First Step: Destruction or Expulsion of the Insurgent Forces,”211 which
the Mexican government clearly hopes to achieve in its war against the
DTOs. This is simply one potential step and indicator of success out of
many, however it does seem reasonable to expect that a state engaging
internal enemies would have as its primary goal to eliminate that group
of enemies. This is far from an all-inclusive analysis and discussion
of potential solutions, however the path to success for the government
will almost certainly be dictated by how fervently they pursue Galula‟s
“First Step.”
Ambassador Pascual‟s accusation that Calderón‟s government and
its authorities were both “slow,” and “risk averse,”212 simply does not
stand

against

the

facts.

Calderón

made

the

unimaginably

“risky,”

decision to engage the DTOs by “deploying some 50,000 military and

209
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federal forces,” against them while his presidency was in its infancy. 213
Certainly this campaign has not been “slow,” nor “risk averse;” 35,000
Mexicans have been killed as a result of the Presidential decision.
That is not to place the entirety of the blame on Calderón, only to
note

that

government
industry

it

was

not

formally

in

until

pursued

Mexico.

his

the

However,

administration

elimination

it

is

clear

of

that

the

that

the

Mexican

drug-trafficking

Calderón

and

his

successor must continue to approach the situation with caution and
calm,
deaths

being
and

that

any

further

miscalculation
questions

will

concerning

certainly
the

result

in

more

legitimacy

of

his

government.

213
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Chapter 3: The Catholic Church

The Church as a moral guide
The Catholic Church has been a long-standing political actor in
Mexico, which has served to forcefully influence the moral and ethical
leanings of a majority of Mexican people. Considered one of the most
valued aspects of Mexican life, most Mexicans are religious with “97
percent,

believed

in

God,”

and

“between

81

and

88

percent,”

are

Catholic.214 Furthermore, Roderic Camp found that “contrary to common
beliefs,

younger

people.”215
institution

It

Mexicans

is

that

are

therefore
posed

the

slightly

not

more

surprising

greatest

Catholic

that

ideological

“the

than
one

challenge

older
social
to

the

secular state [was and is]-the Catholic Church.”216 Evidence of the
Catholic Church‟s influence in Mexican life can be seen in the early
electoral success of the PAN party in the late 1980s and early 1990s
have been attributed to their championing of Catholic values.217 One
would then assume that the Church would also have vested interest in
maintaining

civilian

support

and

confidence

in

them

in

order

to

continue wielding the influential political and personal power they
have for centuries.

214
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In a poll conducted in 2009 by the Sistemas de Inteligencia en
Mercado y Opinión, 75 percent of Mexicans claimed to have “much or some
confidence” in the Church; the only institution to receive a higher
percentage of respondents‟ confidence were schools, with 80 percent. 218
Given this data, it is puzzling that the Church, a behemoth of an
institution, has remained all but dormant with regards to the violence
until recently. However even in light of the newer developments, one
asks how much of a difference this new position has made. At first
glance, it seems impossible to envision any sort of victory over the
“narco” without any direct Catholic Church involvement.

CELAM: What Promises Were Made?
In

light

of

the

two

Conferences

of

Latin

American

Bishops

(Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, CELAM)219 held in Medellín and Puebla
in 1968 and 1978, respectively220, several questions arise. First, does
the Catholic Church have an obligation to not only speak out against
the violence but also to physically act in order to relieve some of the
ills caused by the conflict? Furthermore, one must also ask if they are
openly disregarding the promises made at both CELAM conferences, and
consequently becoming indirect contributors to continued human rights
violations in Mexico today. It is my belief that the answer to both of
these questions is yes. The Catholic Church has failed to deliver on
its

promises

to

the

people

of

Latin

America

and,

therefore,

has

worsened the impact the violence is having. While such an answer is
218
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saddening, one must also seek to understand what possible justification
the Church could have for its lack of action and silence.
In the words CELAM, it is the organization of Latin American
Catholic Bishops with “the extremely important mission…of communion and
service,”

in

the

Latin

American

community.221

As

recorded

by

Mons.

Alfonso Lopez Trujillo, with regards to what “CELAM has contributed to
the development of the Kingdom of God,”222:
“g) It has provided a new pastoral dimension, which favors a
greater consciousness of the specific problems of Latin America as well
as

a

greater

understanding

of

the

concrete

realities

within

the

continent, with regards to evangelization.
h) It has raised awareness, in a Christian continent, for a more
just society, for the effectiveness of evangelization.”223
Such

statements

demonstrate

an

interesting

balance

that

the

Church

feels it must maintain. Yes, they are pursuing justice, and specific
Latin American issues, however it appears that this pursuit is based on
the return the Church desires for itself. One wonders, would the Church
pursue

such

ideals,

or

at

least

publicly

claim

to

do

so,

if

evangelization was not feasible under these circumstances?
Turning to the specific discussions and decisions made by the
CELAM conference attendees in Medellín one must understand why, in the
first place, did the Church decide to hold the conference? What purpose
did they hope to achieve? The answer to this question is summed up by
Mons. Lopez Trujillo who explains that “Medellín[is]…the concretion of

221
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an ecclesiastic promise, of

which we

have provided the

vision and

goals, but not a finished map [or blueprint].”224 One of these major
goals was to fulfill the Church‟s relationship to the poor of Latin
America given the reality

that “our

misery,

unjust

oppression

and

people suffer from hunger

dependence,

marginalization

and
and

institutional violence.”225 From such statements it becomes clear that
the Catholic Church is fully aware of the existing social injustices
occurring in Latin America. Furthermore, given this acknowledgement,
one cannot use ignorance as an excuse for inaction; inaction given this
reality is comparable to a direct contribution to the injustice.
It was affirmed at
ignore

the

“profoundly

Medellín

Latin

that

the

American,”

Church could no

violations

of

longer

“peace

and

justice.”226 With respect to these issues of human rights and “peace and
justice,”

the

CELAM

bishops

decided

that

it

was

the

Church‟s

responsibility to “condemn those responsible for gross [human rights]
violations (torturers, kidnappers, and any form of terrorist).” 227 Given
the data presented in prior chapters, there is no doubt that “torture,
and kidnapping,” have taken place frequently at the hands of DTOs.
Therefore, the Church must either deny that such events have taken
place, a claim they likely would not be willing to make, or provide an
explanation for their silence in the face of such realities.
Continuing the mission started at Medellín, the bishops of CELAM
gathered

again

commitment

to

at

Puebla

to

the

ideals

set

further
forth

the
in

development
Colombia

of

roughly

and
a

their
decade

earlier. In a correspondence between Pope John Paul II and the United
Nations, the pontiff stated that “the Church is profoundly grieved to
224
225
226
227
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see „the sometimes massive increase in violations of human rights in
many parts of the world…I refer to such rights as…the right to life…the
right

to

peace,

freedom,

and

social

justice.‟”228

Archbishop

Marcos

McGrath argues that “despite its lack of personnel and resources, the
Church has intensely promoted…defense of human rights.” 229 Furthermore,
in the documentation produced in Puebla it is clear that the Church has
confidence in the power of its parishioners as agents of change. CELAM
issued a statement that “young people…have proved that they can win out
and regain possession of their just rights and claims.”230
An emotional call to action is made in the Puebla document when
the bishops exclaim:
“From the depths of the countries that make up Latin America a
cry is rising to heaven, growing louder and more alarming all the
time. It is the cry of a suffering people who demand justice,
freedom, and respect for the basic rights of human beings and
peoples…The cry might well have seemed muted back then. Today it
is loud and clear, increasing in volume and intensity, and at
times full of menace. The situation of injustice described in the
previous section forces us to reflect on the great challenge our
pastoral work faces in trying to help human beings to move from
less human to more human conditions.”231
This statement provides insight into not only the Church‟s belief that
it does bear the responsibility to defend the rights of all, but also

228
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into how it views its divine mission in Latin America. The imagery
brings God right to the forefront of the argument by showing that, as
mentioned above, the “cry is rising to heaven,” and that God‟s ear is
attentively listening to those who are suffering. One would assume then
that, by extension, those who neglect to care for these individuals and
alleviate such suffering in their communities are acting in opposition
to the will of God. If this is in fact the case, it poses serious
theological and moral implications in light of the Church‟s continued
reluctance to publicly act on behalf of those who cannot.
In a telling narrative, the CELAM conference at Puebla produced
the reaffirmation of the Medellín principles of “the defense of human
rights.”232 It also recognizes the difficulties and shortcomings of their
plan in that there “is insufficient effort invested in discerning the
causes and conditionings of social reality.”233 That is, the Church has
recognized

that

it

must

understanding

the

complex

specifically

Mexico,

finds

dedicate

more

resources

circumstances
itself

in.

Only

that
when

and
Latin
it

time

to

America,

deepens

its

understanding of such phenomena will it be able to adequately address
said issues with practical and appropriate solutions.
After presenting evidence from the documents produced at both
Medellín and Puebla, it will be of value to highlight the statements
and analysis made by commentators and scholars concerning the practical
applications and implications of these documents. W.E. Hewitt comments
regarding the conference at Puebla that “they [the Bishops] met not
only to celebrate their faith but also to translate that faith into
social action, to solve the material problems affecting them, and to

232
233
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help the poor and oppressed to achieve justice and equality.”234 That is,
the Bishops were meeting in order to determine the appropriate ways for
the Church to make practical and tangible moves in the direction of
changing the system, which for so long was exclusive of those who
needed the assistance the most. The question then becomes: why has this
“social action,” still not manifested itself as the standard Church
response to human rights violations?
The

Mexican

Church

made

a

statement

concerning

its

duty

to

protect the rights of all in “„Christian Social and Political Options‟
in

October

1973…that

priests

„as

all

men,

should

denounce

social,

economic, and political injustice.‟”235 Additionally, Thomas G. Sanders
writes that “the Church did have a responsibility to use its influence
to improve society and bring about structural changes,” in light of the
CELAM conference in Puebla.236 Furthermore, it should be noted that the
Catholic Church does believe its mission to include easing “Mexico‟s
transition to democracy.”237
It is important to note that the Mexican Bishops‟ approach to the
CELAM conferences was markedly different than that of its fellow Latin
American Bishops. In the words of Manuel Pérez Gil, “I remember that we
[Mexican

bishops

attending

CELAM]

felt

somewhat

strange

in

the

Colombian environment because our own experiences were so different
from that of the Colombians…the Argentineans and Chileans and even the
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Brazilians.”238 He continues to explain that the Mexican Church suffered
a more serious “period of persecution,” that other Churches simply did
not have to combat239, making a clear reference to the Constitutional
restrictions placed on the Church in the Mexican Constitution of 1917.
Despite this perceived isolation of the Mexican Church at the CELAM
conferences, the Mexican representatives were present at both Medellín
and Puebla. This dedication established a precedent for future members
of

the

Church

concerning

in

“social

Mexico

in

justice,”

terms
and

of

their

human

commitment

rights.

to

issues

Interestingly,

in

Mexico, despite the efforts made at CELAM conferences and “the Pope‟s
visit in 1979,” it was “the religious orders, not the diocesan clergy,
[who]

took

the

lead

in

Mexico‟s

Catholic

human

rights

movement,”

establishing various human rights agencies and programs during 1980s
and 1990s.240
It is alarming that the Church has remained silent concerning the
drug war since, as far back as the early 1990s, they issued formal
statements

proclaiming

“that

„the

promotion

and

defense

of

human

rights, particularly religious liberty, has to be one of our principle
tasks.‟”241 In light of the developments at CELAM and statements such as
the one cited above, the Church itself believes that it not only has
the responsibility, but the obligation, to pursue justice and freedoms
for

all.

This

reality

becomes

clear

when

reading

the

words

of

Archbishop Adalberto Almeida Merino of Chihuahua, who declared “the
Church…is completing its mission, entering into the defense of human
238

Personal interview with Archbishop Manuel Pérez Gil [by Roderic Ai Camp], Tlanepantla
Archdiocese, Tlanepantla, México, February 18, 1991, as quoted in Camp, Crossing Swords,
88.
239
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Swords, 83. For statements made by various Mexican Bishops see Appendix C-1.
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rights.”242 Such a statement is concrete evidence of how the Church
perceives its contribution to the human rights arena as not only one
particular

branch

of

Church

activity,

but

in

fact

as

a

necessary

pursuit for “completing of its mission,” throughout the world. Surely,
with such a mission, one expects the Church to be not only vocal, but
also physically active in protecting and defending the rights of all
people.

Silence? Corruption?
The reality is that the Church has the sphere of influence and
authority to make statements concerning the morality of the war and how
one is to conduct themselves with respect to human life. Furthermore,
this

implies

that

they

have

consciously

chosen

to

remain

almost

entirely invisible. Whether or not people will respond and change their
actions due to Church proclamations is unclear, however that does not
provide a loophole for the Church to remain uninvolved. Why exactly
they have remained silent is not easily deduced. However, there are
several potential explanations that have been suggested and can be
investigated

through

careful

examination.

Of

these

reasons,

the

following seem most compelling: 1) Fear and 2) bribery and corruption
in general. The former being a convincing one, and the latter being a
very serious problem if found to be true.
In the case of fear, one can hardly be surprised by the Church‟s
hesitation to speak out against the violence and drug trade. It has
been seen that the cartels will seemingly stop at nothing to survive

242

Jaime Pérez Mendoza, “Por peticíon de Bartlett El Vaticano ordenó que hubiera misas en
Chihuahua,” citing Archbishop Adalberto Almeida Merino, as quoted in Camp, Crossing
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and to continue to conduct their operations; what would cause them to
stop at the Church? It is a possibility that violent behavior against
the Church would not be completely out of the question when it comes to
the current conflict; however, taking the history of the Church in
Mexico

into

account,

it

seems

that

if

the

violence

were

to

stop

somewhere, it would be at the parish door.
Fr. Edward Cleary of Providence College mentioned in an interview
that the protection the Church may once have had could be disappearing,
citing the death of Juan Jesus Cardinal Posadas Ocampo of Guadalajara.243
As reported in the New York Times (NYT), the Cardinal was killed in
Guadalajara on May 24, 1993 “when gunmen believed to be involved with
drug traffickers opened fire outside the airport.”244 It was reported
that

“the

Cardinal‟s

car…was

riddled

with

26

bullet

holes,” 245

an

excessive amount of ammunition by any standards. This discovery leaves
one to wonder if Fr. Cleary was on to something by asking, “was this a
warning to the Bishops?”246 The investigation now turns to conflicting
theories surrounding Cardinal Posadas Ocampo‟s death.
Phil

Davison

records

the

words

of

“Eduardo

Valle,

a

former

special adviser to the Mexican Attorney-General,”247 who stated that
“whether or not it was deliberate, the killing of Cardinal Posadas was
the first signal of maximum alert that drug lords had become a state
within a state…Mexico has long become a narco-democracy.”248 Such a
reality is a sign of Mexico‟s potential for being classified as a
failed state. This statement, published in 1995, is increasingly true
243
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today, as the cartels continue to gain strength and territory as the
war progresses. Phil Davison, who reported Valle‟s comments, concludes
that the Cardinal‟s death was an “elaborate plot set up by corrupt
policemen, and not by mistake,”249 which leaves him asking “who ordered
the killing of the cardinal and why?” 250 On the other hand, “the PGR 251
believes Posadas Ocampo died in a hail of bullets because he had the
misfortune to be in the wrong place at the wrong time,”252 during a
confrontation between the organizations of “Joaquin „Chapo‟ Guzman and
the Ramón and Benjamin Arrellano Felix brothers.”253
The results of the PGR investigation “rejected the theory put
forward by the Jalisco state government that a plot was hatched to
assassinate…Ocampo.”254

Ultimately,

plausible, which is what
venture.

However,

it

both

theories

are

makes determining the truth so

seems

that

the

PGR

could

certainly
complex

potentially

a

have

incentive to provide evidence of the cardinal‟s death being accidental,
since it would likely be damaging to the government and its judicial
branches if it were to be discovered that one of the highest-ranking
members of the Catholic Church in Mexico has been targeted by the drugtrafficking organizations.
There also exists within
whether

or

not

the

death

of

the Catholic
Ocampo

was

Church a debate

intentional

or

as to

not.

The

Guadalajara Reporter states in a July 2000 article, “Posadas Ocampo‟s
successor, Juan Sandoval Iniguez, says he believes a plot did exist but
249
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251
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other

Roman

Catholic

Church

leaders

are

skeptical.”255

Ultimately,

whether the Cardinal was murdered, or accidentally killed during a
gunfight, may never be fully known. However, it is clear that as early
as the mid-1990s, the cartels had gained enough power as to be able to
survive

being

implicated

in

the

death

of

a

high-profile

clergyman

without ever being convicted of the crime.
Although this particular crime occurred nearly 20 years ago, one
can already see the

trend towards

more gruesome and violent

crime

conducted by members of the DTOs. Is it possible then, that part of the
reason for the Church‟s silence in today‟s context is that there is
fear of retribution from the cartels? This might in fact be the case,
as difficult as it is to accept that the Church has lost all influence
and sway over the Cartels and the Mexican people in general. It looks
like Fr. Cleary‟s initial question is a great starting point; however
it must be amended if it is to allow us to adequately answer the
umbrella question: can the Church do anything to quell the violence and
promote reconciliation? It follows then that the most appropriate way
to

approach

this

issue

is

to

ask

Fr.

Cleary‟s

question

alongside

others: was this [Posadas Ocampo‟s death] a warning to the bishops? Are
the bishops currently at risk of retribution from the cartels should
they choose to speak out against the violence?256 An initial answer to
this question is found in statements made by the Archdiocese of Mexico
City, in which they acknowledge “that some Catholic bishops have been
been threatened by the criminal group known as La Familia,” 257 a DTO

255

Guadalajara Reporter, “No New Light.”
The first half of this questioning comes from personal e-mail correspondence with Fr.
Edward Cleary, O.P., November 22, 2010. The second half is an original asked by myself in
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known for its religious tendencies. However, the archdiocese is quick
to note “that despite the harassment, the bishops have not bowed to the
pressure from these criminals.”258
In this same NYT article, it is reported that “Catholic Church
officials have [in the mid-1990s]often been publicly critical of the
drug trade and its effects on Mexican society [emphasis added].”259 This
outspoken nature of the Church contrasts nicely with their actions
during the current drug-related conflict in which it has been notably
missing from the conversation. If in fact they were more vocal in the
past, why then have they chosen to silence themselves with regards to
the current conflict? The
negative

tone,

“their

author continues to note, in

opposition

has

been

moral

a somewhat

rather

than

practical.”260 What is perplexing about the way in which this statement
is presented is that, it is difficult to imagine how the Church could
issue purely “practical” advice. According to Ivan Vallier, “a bishop
[was]…a moral guarantor of religious values in society.”261 Additionally,
Camp argues that “bishops…argue for „developing a sense of coordination
between religious beliefs and the way people actually live,‟” in a way
that is supportive of “their „official‟ mission statement.”262 Therefore,
one of the Church‟s most important responsibilities is to explicitly
teach and provide spiritual and moral guidance, which both apply to the
context of the drug war.
The

Church

need

not

worry

about

overextending

itself

or

its

boundaries by publicly condemning the violence and the drug-trafficking

http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/archdiocese_of_mexico_rejects_cartel_threats_again
st_bishops/.
258
Staff Writer, “Archdiocese of Mexico rejects cartel threats.”
259
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260
Ibid.
261
Ivan Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control, and Modernization in Latin America
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1970), 87 quoted in Camp, Crossing Swords, 289.
262
Camp, Crossing Swords, 289.

Pinon-Farah 75

industry as a whole, since these are issues that cannot be separated
from morality. When thousands upon thousands are dying as a result of
the drug industry, one cannot escape the fundamental and necessary
presence

of

morality

and

ethics

as

the

driving

forces

behind

the

development of potential solutions. Therefore, it bears repeating, the
Church is not only justified, but obligated by its own mission to speak
out against the violence.
Moving past this possible justification for silence, one arrives
at the potential for bribery in exchange for Church inaction. If this
proves

to

be

repercussions

true,
and

it

is

dangerous

a

truly

alarming

implications.

As

notion
Ted

with

Galen

severe

Carpenter

suggests in a 2005 article with the Cato Institute, there have been
“allegations that the Catholic Church has willingly been the recipient
of contributions from known drug traffickers.”263 If these allegations
proved to be without merit, there would be little cause for concern;
however,

Galen

refers

to

a

specific

case

in

which

the

government

considered the accusation to be serious enough to pursue more complete
criminal

investigations.

He

briefly

mentions

the

case

in

which

“Cardinal Juan Sandoval [Posadas Ocampo‟s successor] of Guadalajara had
his bank records subpoenaed.”264 There is also the statement of Bishop
Ramón Godinez who admitted that the Church did accept contributions
from drug traffickers, but that “it was not the Church‟s responsibility
to investigate the source of donations.”265
One can conclude with absolute certainty that money from the
drug-trafficking industry
263

has and most likely still

does enter and

Ted Galen Carpenter, “Mexico is Becoming the Next Colombia,” CATO Institute Foreign
Policy Briefing no. 87 (November, 2005): 5.
264
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265
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circulate

within

the

Church

walls;

however

whether

or

not

the

individual priests and parishes are fully aware of what money is drug
money is a completely different matter. It is difficult to argue that
the

Church

tainted

should

since

not

that

accept
policy

any

money

would

be

that

could

entirely

potentially

be

self-destructive.

Furthermore, there is an element of truth to Bishop Godinez‟s statement
in that it is not unethical for the Church to accept money that is
potentially drug money so long as they are not knowingly soliciting and
accepting

direct,

non-anonymous

contributions

from

DTOs

or

their

members.
The

controversy

surrounding

the

alleged

murder

of

Cardinal

Posadas Ocampo discussed earlier, does not disappear upon his death.
His

successor,

Cardinal

Juan

Iniguez

Sandoval

is

no

stranger

to

political controversy “in a country in which church leaders hardly
dared speak in public for generations because of harsh anti-clerical
laws.”266 The Cardinal had managed to spark political controversy by
publicly proclaiming that there must have been a conspiracy to kill the
Cardinal and furthermore that, “Cardinal Posadas was killed because he
knew

about

contacts

between

drug

traffickers

and

high-level

politicians.”267 Sandoval is also quoted as saying he is certain that
Ocampo was assassinated because “I [he] knew from people who were very
close (to the shooting) that this had been a murder.”268 Worth noting is
that Cardinal Sandoval was no stranger to legal troubles himself; while
charges were dropped due to “lack of evidence,”269 in 2003 Sandoval was
involved in an “investigation which was sparked by an accusation of
266
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[his] connections with drug trafficking and money laundering.”270 The
reality that this Cardinal was connected to alleged criminal activity
shows that the Church is not as safeguarded as it was initially thought
to be. Furthermore, if a Cardinal can be accused of such crimes, the
potential for corruption and criminal activity at the lower levels of
the clergy in the Mexican Catholic Church must be addressed. This would
require

a

greater

investigation

into

the

financial

and

political

activities of the Mexican clergy in general if their contribution to
the Church‟s silence is to be discovered.

A Political Church? Not Legally
As briefly mentioned earlier, the Church in Mexico has a long
history of tension with the government. The state even went so far as
to establish “anti-clerical laws [that] have limited the role of the
church in public life since the 19 th century.”271 The “anti-clerical,”
laws include:
Article 3: “ Instruction is free; that given in public
institutions
of
learning
shall
be
secular…No
religious
corporation nor minister of any religious creed shall establish
or direct schools of primary instruction.”
Article 24: “Every religious act of public worship shall be
performed strictly within the places of public worship, which
shall be at all times under governmental supervision.”272
Article 27, section II: “The religious institutions known as
churches, irrespective of creed, shall in no case have legal
capacity to acquire, hold, or administer real property…Places of
270

Catholic News Agency, “Mexican Bishops denounce Attorney General‟s Handling of Cardinal
Sandoval‟s innocence,” February 13, 2004,
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public worship are the property of the Nation, as represented by
the Federal Government, which shall determine which of them may
continue to be devoted to their present purposes.”
Article 130: “Marriage is a civil contract…The law recognizes no
juridical personality in the religious institutions known as
churches…No ministers of religious creeds shall, either in public
or private meetings, or in acts of worship or religious
propaganda, criticize the fundamental laws of the country, the
authorities in particular or the Government in general; they
shall have no vote, nor be eligible to office, nor shall they be
entitled to assemble for political purposes.”
Fig. 1 A brief list of the articles pertaining to the Catholic Church was used, to
gain a general understanding of which articles were useful to my thesis, from the
Mexico Church-State Relations website found at, http://www.country-data.com/cgibin/query/r-8728.html. The idea to organize and list the articles being discussed
taken from Plutarco Elias Calles, “Church and State in Mexico,” An Irish Quarterly
Review 15, no. 59 (Sep. 1926):488-492. Calles‟ listing is much more inclusive and
complete, however for the purposes of this section of my thesis, these were the
273
necessary articles.

What is perhaps most bizarre about these provisions which call for a
definite and complete separation of church and state in Mexico, is
found

an

article

Revolution

of

by

Richard

1910-1917

did

Roman,
not

in

start

which

he

writes

that

with

anticlericalism

“the
as

a

significant issue.”274 Why then, were there such major restrictions and
harsh prohibitions against the Catholic Church and its clergy when the
Constitution was written?
Roman suggests that the answer is found in “the Constitutionalist
thrust for a relatively sovereign and cohesive nation-state…expressed
itself in a concern over hegemony, or ideological domination. It is
this

drive

for

Constitutional

liberal
Congress

hegemony

that

to

church-state

see

led

the

delegates
relations

at
as

the
the

fundamental question.”275 It is ultimately this political mentality, says
Roman, which allowed for the dynamic between Church and state to be the

273
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issue that “most animated the delegates at the congress.”276 One can see,
even

with

a

preliminary

reading

over

some

of

the

“anticlerical”

provisions, that Anthony Gill is correct in writing, “„separation of
church

and

state.”277

state‟
Despite

meant,
this

in

legal

practice,

church

separation,

the

subordination
Church

to

the

continued

and

continues to exert significant and quantifiable political influence.
One need only recall that 75% of Mexicans expressed “confidence in the
Church,”278

and

that

“„between

81

and

88

percent[of

Mexicans]‟

are

Catholic.”279
This tension was at least partially relieved when “on January
1992, the Mexican national legislature approved changes to the 1917
Constitution,”280
reconciliation

which

and

would

cooperation

be

a

necessary

between

the

first

church

step

and

towards

state.

After

decades of state-sponsored restriction of the Catholic Church281, the
legislature passed measures that would allow significantly more freedom
to the Church in Mexico. In response, the church was quick to praise
the Mexican government when “Jerónimo Prigione (the papal nuncio)”282
issued

the

following

statement:

“We

[the

Catholic

hierarchy]

are

sincerely appreciative and thankful for…the concern of the President
[Carlos Salinas], a wise statesman,…for opening new horizons in the
relations between the Church and State, channeling the forces of the

276
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two societies towards the service of social and religious peace.” 283
Would this increased harmony between church and state lead to increased
Church activity and visibility in the political arena? Furthermore,
where is the Church in the current pursuit of social peace?
Although many of the early restrictions placed on the Church have
been eased in the past 30 years, there still exists a delicate balance
that the Church and State both must maintain when interacting with and
allowing each other to exert any influence over the other. As Camp
notes “the most significant one [church-state issue] for Mexicans is
the

role

of

the

Catholic

Church

in

secular

affairs,

specifically

politics,”284 with most individuals believing that the Church‟s least
important responsibility is to become involved in politics directly.285

Silence Broken and Government Pleas
Despite the apparent silence of the Church during the current
anti-drug strategy of the Mexican government, they have in fact made
several

statements

several

notable

concerning

priests

who

the
have

violence.
raised

Furthermore,

their

voices

there

are

against

the

violence and human rights violations in Mexico today. In the final
weeks of 2010,

from the CEM (Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano),

Bishop Constancio Miranda of Chihuahua pleaded with the cartels and
asked them to once and for all say “no to weapons, no to drugs, no to

283
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money earned through immoral means, no to vengeance, and no to shortlived power.”286
In

this

statement,

this

Church

leader

and

his

colleagues

fulfilled their role as “moral authorities,” and publicly condemned all
involved in the violence and drug trade in general. It is certainly an
important

step

that

could

potentially

lead

to

a

renewed

surge

of

Mexican unity against the DTOs. Bishop Miranda used powerful language
in describing the effect that the violence and DTOs have had in Mexico,
referring to them as a “poison to Mexican society.” His contemporary in
Saltillo287 commented that “the Mexican people „are victims, they are
hurt and injured by the war (against organized crime), by injustice,
corruption, negligence, violence and impunity.”288 Further commenting on
the issue is Archbishop of Acapulco Carlos Garfias289 who asked for
“peace” and stated that “[people] have the greatness of humility to
recognize that they have followed dark paths…but that they repent.”290
Similar statements have been issued by other major Church figures
from various Mexican states. The President of the CEM, Carlos Aguiar,
recognized that the government‟s decision to engage the cartels “is a
necessary fight and we should accept it in order to confront organized
crime, because it simply cannot be allowed…that this [organized crime]
takes control.”291 Aguiar went on to praise Calderón and his strategy for
its ability to be conducted “with intelligence,” as it aims to defeat

286
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the

DTOs.292

Furthermore,

he

proclaimed

“we

should

not

be

afraid,

although violent acts scare us; as a society we will succeed. The
Church knows that good defeats evil and we are convinced that this will
happen sooner or later…even though they threaten us.” 293 Unfortunately,
even

the

“civilian

leader

of

CEM

deaths…is

the

had

to

cost

concede
that

that

must

death,

be

specifically

paid,

given

the

circumstances.”294 Such statements are encouraging examples of the Church
standing tall in the face of fear, anxiety, and chaos as a “beacon,” of
hope and strength for the Mexican people; this is precisely what it
promises to be.
The Church has not only been critical of the cartels, but they
have also urged the government to examine themselves given the alarming
death

tolls.

reconsider

In

its

2010,

CEM

urged

strategy…[since]

Calderón‟s

„with

the

administration

passage

of

time,

“to
the

participation of the armed forces in the fight against organized crime
has

provoked

statement

uncertainty

issued

claimed

in
that

the

population.‟”295

“this

environment

Furthermore,

the

of

and

violence

insecurity in which we are living denotes a sense of the loss of God,” 296
indicating that it is because of the spiritual crisis connected to the
violence that the Church wishes to become involved. The Church has gone
so far as to criticize the government for “prefer[ring] to acquiesce to
extortion rather than see the security of their businesses or families
subjected to extortion.”297
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Despite

these

criticisms,

the

Church

has

sided

with

the

government and has “offered its support to the federal government.”298 In
this

same

proclamation,

Laredo…expressed

“Bishop

embarrassment

Gustavo

that

Rodriguez

„there

are

Vega

of

baptized

Nuevo

men

and

women…in the ranks of organized crime,‟” before recognizing the fact
that the Church has not followed through on behalf of those affected as
well as it should have.299 Furthermore, Cardinal Norberto Rivera Carrera
recognized the need for the Church to become involved, stating “that
the Church has the obligation to help because „society expects that the
Church contribute to solving such a grave problem.‟”300
The Church in Mexico has not been the only Catholic body to
publicly denounce the DTOs and their operations. In the “International
Seminar on Corruption,” held by CELAM in Ecuador in 2010, those present
published that “there has been a „geometric‟ growth [in Latin American
corruption] in the last period. We find this in the growth of the
organized

webs

of

drug-trafficking

organizations.”301

This

group,

sponsored by CELAM, also identified a major “challenge that faces us,” 302
which can be applied to the Mexican struggle against DTOs:
“The laws must be clear in order to disrupt money laundering
operations

by

drug-traffickers,

the

market

for

weapons,

trafficking of people, or any other offense that affects the
dignity

of

the

people,

and

of

the

town,

which

are

often

associated with corruption.”303
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The findings and suggestions made by CELAM at the “Seminar” in Ecuador
have major implications in the Mexican fight against its DTOs in that
it provides important ideas for improving the system so that it does
not foster corruption. After all, it appears that a corrupt system is
one in which there are few consequences for dishonest government, and
furthermore one in which the setting is perfect for organized crime to
develop into an influential force.
In late 2010, President Calderón made a plea to the religious
leaders in Mexico, “Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant”, asking them for
help in combating the cartels‟ growing influence over the country. 304
Calderón believes that “their involvement will facilitate the repair of
the social fabric [what holds society together], not only maintaining
the youth within a positive frame of values with

regards to their

contribution to society, but also keeping them away from the reach of
organized crime.”305 This plea seemingly affirms the original hypothesis
of this chapter, which maintained that it seems impossible to envision
any sort of victory over the “narco” without any direct Catholic Church
involvement.

Conclusions
Why then did the Church remain relatively silent for so long?
Furthermore,

why

were

the

statements

made

by

certain

priests

and

organizations so few and far between? Ultimately, it does appear that
there were very real threats of retribution and harm being made to the
Church as a whole by the DTOs themselves, however, as seen in this
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chapter, the Church was

quick to

stand

firm against such

threats.

Despite a rejection of these threats, they could still have tremendous
impact on the actions made by individual priests as to their public
stance

on

the

drug

trade.

That

is,

while

publicly

the

Church

may

condemn such threats, the individual priests and bishops may still fear
the

potential

consequences

for

condemning

the

drug

war

openly,

in

letters, or even sermons at their local parishes. Perhaps the silence
may even have been partially caused by a level of uncertainty as to the
expected

duration

and

nature

of

the

conflict.

It

would

have

been

difficult for anyone in 2006 to conceive of a conflict, which five
years later had claimed the lives of 35,000 people. One hopes that if
the reality of the situation had been fully grasped from its onset, the
Church would have been the leading institution to speak out and condemn
the violence; they still can be.
Statements such as those made by specific priests, bishops, and
councils are precisely what the Church must do to combat the spreading
indifference and tolerance of the expanding operating abilities of the
Mexican DTOs. It is encouraging to see a moral authority such as the
Catholic Church making beginning to make formal pleas to the people of
Mexico, those involved with and those not involved with DTOs alike.
Ultimately, I believe that their message of “repentance” and secondchances is the safest way they can make statements without alienating
the cartels and therefore exposing the Church to acts of violence. That
being

said,

it

is

apparent

from

my

research

and

findings

that

my

hypothesis concerning the Catholic Church‟s ability to influence the
actual

violence

between

cartels

and

the

government

proved

to

be

incorrect. That is, I was proposing an idea under the assumption that
the

Catholic

Church

was

still

seen

as

impenetrable

and

perfectly
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removed from the DTOs and the drug industry. After investigation I have
come to the conclusion that the Catholic Church should become more
vocal

about

parishioners

the
and

violence
humanity

out
in

of

its

general,

responsibilities
however

in

light

to

its

of

the

increasingly gruesome nature of the conflict and the extension of DTO
spheres of influence what impact their statements would have remains
unclear.
This leads one to the question of why, if Mexicans identify as
Catholic in such high numbers, is the Church‟s stance no longer seen as
authoritative in Mexico? I believe the answer lies in the words of a
well-known Mexican actor, Gael García Bernal: Mexico has become an
increasingly
Catholic

are

secular
in

nation

reality

in

which

“„culturally

many

people

Catholic‟

who
and

identify

as

„spiritually

agnostic‟.”306 The implications of such a phenomenon demonstrate how
Mexico, a nation whose history is intrinsically linked to the efforts
and

advances

of

the

Catholic

Church

under

Spanish

rule,

and

her

citizens are beginning to turn to other mediums as a source for their
understanding and action in the political sphere. No longer is the
Church the absolute and final authority on all issues moral, but rather
this younger Mexican generation is becoming more inquisitive in its
pursuits while simultaneously preserving their cultural and religious
heritage within the Catholic Church.
Finally, the promises made at CELAM conferences call for the
Church to stand by all people, wealthy or poor, and defend those who
are suffering from human rights violations. It is in this particular
issue that one finds a major source of tension between the Mexican
government and the Church, since often times the Church‟s actions in
306
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pursuit of the CELAM ideals, clashes with the desires of those bearing
political power. This conflict manifests itself best in the Camp‟s
writing that one “view of the Church…stresses its role as a builder of
human

values

rather

than

as

an

advocate

of

the

interests

fortunate Mexicans.”307 This view is in direct opposition

of

less

to former

Mexican President Luis Echeverría‟s, who argued that the Church‟s role
in politics is to be “an institution focusing on societal morality…the
Church lives with political and economic power, but Christianity is for
the poor.”308
Perhaps its decision to remain relatively silent in the face of
growing violence and crime in Mexico since the beginning of the drug
war has to do with the threats made against them by the cartels. Fear
of retribution from the DTOs could stem from the fact that the Church‟s
“interpretations

associate

his

[Cardinal

Posadas

Ocampo]

with

his

denunciation of drug trafficking.”309 However, these potential threats
and acts of aggression towards the Church are not adequate excuses for
inaction. That is, certainly the Church was aware of these possible
outcomes when they made the decision to combat the very systems that
fostered them. By choosing to take on violations of social justice and
freedom, they inherently were taking on a system in which aggression
and violence were the norm; they chose to be the voice for those who
are too often forgotten and unheard, as Mons Lopez Trujillo worded it
“de ser voz de los sin voz.”310 Ultimately, the responsibility of the
Church under its own decisions made at Puebla and Medellín obligate it
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to “advocate [for] the interests,”311 of all people regardless of the
potential for retribution and regardless of whether or not this action
is in line with that of the ruling parties in Mexico.
Despite

these

words

and

proclamations

of

dedication

to

the

protection of the rights of all people, the Church‟s actions do not
fully line up with their public stances. How can the Church remain
relatively silent in the face of not only a growing death toll, which
has

eclipsed

the

35,000

mark

in

years312,

6

but

also

increasingly

gruesome and indisputable violations of human rights? For example, the
recent discovery of “a collection of pits holding 59 [Mexican] bodies,”
in Tamaulipas, where in 2010 “drug cartel gunmen…massacred 72 migrants
from Central and South America.” 313 Furthermore, the murder of Javier
Sicilia‟s, “a poet and columnist,” son caused the elder to publish a
letter

publicly

government.314

condemning

This

murder

the
and

violence
the

fact

between
that

cartels

Sicilia

and

the

“called

for

protests,” provided “a key catalyst for organizing nationwide protests
set for Wednesday [April 6, 2011] against crime and violence.”315 Why did
it take “a poet” to motivate people to rise up and act against the
DTOs? Why did it take a scholar to begin the work that the Church
claims to be its very mission?
In light of these clear violations of the same human rights the
Church

so

strongly

embraced

starting

the

late

20th

century,

it

is

alarming and perplexing to see that there has been little in the way of
311
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concrete Church action to encourage dialogue and denounce the DTOs and
violence in general. Could it be that Calderón and this author‟s belief
that the Catholic Church could still exert a real influence over the
hearts

and

minds

of

the

Mexican

citizens,

specifically

the

drug-

trafficker, is nothing more than a pipe dream; a remnant of an older
time in Mexican history when the pulpit was the source of moral wisdom
and truth?
Regardless, as the Puebla writings state, “much remains to be
done,

of

course,

if

the

Church

is

to

display

greater

oneness

and

solidarity;”316 unity and consensus will be necessary if the Church, the
State, and the People are to overcome the ills posed by the drug war
and bring peace and safety back into Mexican life. The Church must
continue to “confront the concrete reality of drugs through pastoral
work that reclaims family values and supports the region‟s poor,” 317 in
order to maintain its place as a defender of human rights and supporter
of peace. Bishop Raul Vera added that “confronting the violence…is the
responsibility of all Mexicans. We must all act now.”318 The Church has
begun to reiterate old as well as make new promises to the people of
Mexico concerning the defense of human rights, the question remains as
to whether or not Bishop Vera‟s words will become a reality.
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Chapter 4: El Narcocorrido

“After the zeta, there is nothing”319
“Soy el Jefe de Jefes señores, me respetan a todos niveles, y mi nombre
y

mi

fotografia,

nunca

van

a

mirar

en

papeles,

porque

a

mi

el

periodista me quiere, y si no mi amistad se la pierde.”320

These

words

provide

a

glimpse

into

the

world

of

the

cartel

leaders and how they operate. The lyrics above issue a chilling threat
in saying “the journalist loves me, and if he doesn‟t he loses my
friendship.”321 While the words may not explicitly make violent threats,
one only needs little knowledge of the major themes and ideas espoused
by cartels in Mexico. Few things are as valued as loyalty, dedication,
and

honor;

to

violate

any

of

these

ideals

can

lead

to

serious

consequences. In fact, one of the most notable things about the “narcocorrido” genre is the genuine affection it shows to its protagonists,
men like “El Chapo,” and his fictitious contemporary “Emilio Varela”.
Anabel Hernández writes that when the lyrics do not show the cartels in
a positive life, “the musicians can pay for the trespass with their
life…[like the case of] Valentin Elizalde.”322 To demonstrate just how
important the genre is to Mexican culture today, one only need know
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that the government sees it to be such a threat as to offer to its
soldiers a course titled “Analysis of the content of narcocorridos.”323
Hernández

opens

a

chapter

in

her

book

with

the

lyrics

of

a

popular narcocorrido dedicated to the criminal organization known as
Los

Zetas

escort”.324

titled
The

“Escolta

Zetas,

as

suicida,”
mentioned

which

earlier

translates
in

the

to

“suicide

chapter

on

the

military, were initially the armed force of the Gulf cartel. The lyrics
reflect an oath of sorts taken by the members of the organization to
dedicate themselves to their trade. The lyrics include “I am one of the
Zetas who protects the chief, we are the twenty man escort, nothing but
loyal and courageous, we are willing to lay down our lives, to serve
the boss,”325 and “we are twenty men in the Zetas, united as a family,
the twenty of us are the force, with diplomas for suicide.” 326 These
words reflect the determination and disregard for human life possessed
by the individuals who make up the DTOs in Mexico. The sole objective
is

to

deliver

the

product

and

protect

the

leader.

How

does

an

organization like los Zetas come to achieve a level of such power as to
be worthy of commemoration in a song? According to Hernández, they are
primarily made up of “former members of the Mexican military…then they
recruited

members

of

the

elite

Guatemalan

military

force

known

as

kaibiles.”327
Needless to say, it is not surprising that this organization is
militarily able seeing as it is comprised of former highly trained
military men. To understand just how committed these individuals are
expected to be upon inclusion in los Zetas, one need only read the
323
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words of one of the original members of the group, Heriberto Lazcano
Lazcano.328 Lazcano, when responding to questions concerning the origin
of the name of the organization, stated that it was because “after the
zeta [letter z] there is nothing.”329 Furthermore, the inclusion of such
a violent, murderous group of individuals into Mexican folklore and
history

through

entrenched

the

the

avenue

DTOs

and

of

“drug

the

“narcocorrido”

culture”

in

demonstrates

general

have

just

become

in

Mexican society.

El Narcocorrido is “Mexico”
In order to fully understand the impact that the narcocorrido has
on the Mexican people and their relationship to the drug-trafficking
organizations one has to understand where the genre fits into current
Mexican life and culture. Furthermore, one must take this understanding
into

account

interest

to

when
ban,

determining
or

regulate

if
the

it

is

in

the

consumption

of

government‟s
this

best

particular

cultural expression. To appreciate the place that this unique cultural
indicator has in the context of the drug-war, one must turn to the
history and rise of the “corrido,” as an outlet that “narrates the
Mexican epic.”330 As one expert puts it, it is an outlet for expression
and transmission of information that comes from “the people‟s need to
know things.”331
Additionally, Professor Juan Carlos Ramirez-Pimienta added that
recently, “since 2006, the so-called war against the narco, the most
328
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important change in my opinion, is that there is a return to the
„epic‟.”332 The use of the word “epic” to the professor means a return to
stories concerning conflict “between drug-traffickers and police.”333 He
explains that prior to this development the narcocorrido had turned
into a “festive song that spoke of women, being with women, having
expensive cars, expensive trucks, drinking the best alcohol, taking
drugs, partying,” and that this occurred since there was a period of
“relative peace between the different factions of drug trafficking, the
different cartels, as well as between these and the government.”334 One
can quickly see the social effect that such a medium can potentially
have. If an individual is faced with the opportunity to partake in an
extravagant, low-risk lifestyle, why would they not take it?
The narcocorrido is not a new development or style of music, but
rather it is a continuation, a new phase in the “Mexican epic,” that
like its umbrella genre (corrido) is born out of “the corrido of the
Mexican revolution, which is the people‟s need to tell stories.”335
Furthermore, as Ramón Gerónimo Olvera states, this need is derived from
the government‟s inability to provide “satisfactory answers, if there
were satisfactory answers, there would be no need for the corrido or
narcocorrido.”336 What Olvera means by this is that, “on the hand it [the
government] censors, but on the other it benefits from this genre.”337 He
believes

that

despite

the

fact

that

“politicians

always

come

against,” the narcocorrido, their behavior is often contradictory.338
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Olvera provides two concrete examples from politicians in the
state

of

Chihuahua,

Mexico:

1)

Carlos

Borruel,

PAN

gubernatorial

candidate in 2010, and 2) Jose Reyes Baeza, PRI governor of Chihuahua
2004-2010.

In

the

case

of

Borruel,

the

candidate

made

the

“moral

accusation,”339 that it was “music free from values…but at his campaign
closing party he brought the Tucanes de Tijuana,” a well-known band in
the narcocorrido genre.340 In the second example, Reyes Baeza, also a fan
of the “moral accusation, on the „dia del grito‟ [Mexican Independence
Day] had two bands who exclusively played „narcocorridos‟.”341 These two
examples begin to show the conflicted nature of the genre and those who
consume

it:

while

the

message

may

be

controversial,

it

is

deeply

entrenched in Mexican life.
Before proceeding to a discussion of potential bans of the genre,
it is worth mentioning data concerning the spread of the narcocorrido
and Mexican society‟s opinion of it. According to studies conducted by
Parametría in 2011, a Mexican research and analysis firm342, “only 2 out
of 10 Mexicans are not familiar with narcocorridos.”343 Furthermore, the
report indicated that roughly 70 percent of respondents “who knew of
narcocorridos believed that they reflected reality, whereas 24% felt
that these songs distort real events.” This data is important to keep
in mind given the eventual analysis of “truth” in narcocorridos, to be
discussed later in this chapter.
One of the most revealing pieces of data provided in the study is
that “one third of the population (33%), does not consider the drug-
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trafficking leaders to be criminals.”344 While this is not a majority, it
is significant that this many people see no problem with the activities
and operations of the cartels and their leaders. Finally, the study
provided concrete data on 1) why the cartels have gained so much power
and 2) how they have managed to maintain a portion of the population at
the very least indifferent to them. In the final data presented in the
study, it is reported that “at the national level, 27%[of respondents
felt

that]…were

it

not

for

the

violence,

trafficking

would

be

a

beneficial activity for the state.”345 Such findings demonstrate that not
only

are

many

Mexicans

indifferent

to

the

DTOs

and

their

illegal

activity, but also that nearly 30% of Mexicans believe that they are in
fact a positive addition to the country, the violence notwithstanding.

What good will a ban do?
With recent attempts to ban the narcocorrido from the radio in
Mexico, one wonders what impact such a reality could have on Mexican
social and political sentiments towards the drug-trafficking industry.
The first example of such a ban took place in 2002 in Michoacan when
“the president of the Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Radio y la
Televisión

(CIRT),

Arturo

Herrera

Cornejo,

stated

that

42

radio

stations in the state had decided to discontinue their circulation of
the

narcocorrido.”346

Another

example

took

place

in

the

state

of

Chihuahua, home to two of the deadliest cities in Mexico, Juarez and
Chihuahua. In this case, it was the “[local] Congress, in 2002, who

344

Parametría, Los narcocorridos en México.
Ibid.
346
Juan Carlos Ramirez-Pimienta, “Del corrido de narcotráfico al narcocorrido: Orígenes y
desarollo del canto a los traficantes,” Studies in Latin American Popular Culture XXIII
(2004): 21.
345

Pinon-Farah 96

issued a decree, which banned the broadcasting of narcocorridos on
state

radio

stations.” 347

These

are

two

very

powerful

examples

of

government intervention in a popular cultural form of expression that
has been a vital component to Mexican history.
Before analyzing these potential outcomes, it must be debated
whether or not the ban will serve any purpose in the first place. As
Rubén Tinajero Medina states, “to ban or not ban it, well, is not very
clear to me, because the corrido is a form of expression that is
entirely Mexican. It would be as if we banned the tortilla. The corrido
is born with „mexicanidad‟.”348 This concept is said to “be relatively
recent, since it was during and after independence [1821] that it began
to develop conceptually, and people were beginning to become aware of
it.”349 Like the corrido is said to have contributed to the formation of
a Mexican identity post-Revolution, Carlos Valbuena Esteban argues that
“the narcocorrido demonstrates the
culture

that

seeks

its

identity

life and existence of a popular
and

symbolic

construction

of

the

heroic, in the sphere of illegality…to exalt a different model of a
hero.”350 This genre and its narratives has manifested itself so deeply
within the heart of Mexican culture as to reach “all the way to the
marrow [of Mexico‟s bones], all the way to the core of Mexican popular
culture; we cannot rid ourselves of it.”351
Here lies the first problem; the corrido is a fundamental part of
Mexican history. How then can banning it create any positive outcome
that
347

brings

the

general

population

together

against

the

drug-
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trafficking organizations? As Olvera points out, the ban may have had a
greater

effect

in

the

past,

but

that

“today

with

all

the

digital

outlets, the internet, youtube, well, the ban helps the „narcocorrido‟
industry…the

top

selling

cds

today

carry

the

label

„censored

narcocorridos‟.”352 Ramirez-Pimienta echoes these comments by adding that
“banning the narcocorrido from the radio, really would not serve a
purpose…it gives credibility to the narcocorrido.”353 He also provides
the example of a marketing scheme in which a “cd was advertised using
the title „the songs you can‟t hear on the radio.‟”354
Ultimately, Ramirez-Pimienta also stated that “the way in which
these corridos are disseminated is the internet…the power that the
radio has to disseminate music is really small.”355 Therefore, it can be
said that this opposition to the consumption and production of the
genre

is,

in

fact,

its

most

powerful

marketing

campaign.

This

is

precisely what Luis Omar Montoya Arias and Gabriel Medrano de Luna
express when they write

that “prohibiting it [the genre]

does not

address the root of the problem, it only creates demand,” 356 for the
controversial

music.

Luis

Astorga

agrees,

adding

that

a

ban

“may

multiply the amount of material that can be censored, it fails to solve
the real problems.”357 It seems that many scholars are in agreement that
a ban would serve little purpose, and perhaps it could be best viewed
as a ploy by a frustrated government looking for any tangible sign of
their gaining control over the situation.

352

Interview with Ramón Gerónimo Olvera.
Personal correspondence with Professor Juan Carlos Ramirez-Pimienta.
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Additionally,

during

an

interview

with

Professor

Ramirez-

Pimienta, Enrique Franco argued that a widespread ban of the genre
“affects the weak [bands], the groups without a name…who is going to
ban the strong groups?” 358 That is, it seems what Franco is implying is
that certain groups are already so well known that a ban would not
prevent anyone from knowing who they are or what songs they perform.
Therefore, the idea that a ban could actually serve as a marketing
scheme in order to further advance one‟s career is certainly plausible,
and

in

fact

likely

for

those

bands

that

have

already

established

themselves within the genre.

How to Combat the Narcocorrido?
If anything should is to be done about the popularity and impact
of the narcocorrido in Mexico, one must be fully prepared to alienate a
significant portion of the Mexican population. Attacking the corrido,
as

a

means

for

historical

storytelling

and

preservation

could

be

politically catastrophic to the individual daring, or foolish enough to
take on this task. Furthermore, attempting to restrict this cultural
phenomenon would involve going after an insitution, the corrido, that
has “existed since the beginning of „mexicanidad‟.”359 Ultimately, it
would

be

irresponsible

and

dismissive

to

place

any

blame

for

the

increase in violence and drug-related activity on the narcocorrido.
That is, as Tinajero Medina states “the essence of the problem is found
in drug-trafficking itself…[the narcocorrido] is a reflection of that
358
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reality.”360 How does one continue from this point then? There are two
overarching ideas that have been suggested as driving forces behind the
development of a potential compromise and solution: 1) discussion, and
2) long-term societal and cultural change.
In terms of the first idea of discussion, Tinajero Medina argues
that a ban would create problems of “freedom of speech,” and that
instead

there

should

a

be

a

movement

towards,

“serious

discussion

forums, academically sustained in order to provide an answer…it is not
black

and

white.”361

While

this

notion

is

surely

driven

by

good

intentions, it is unclear how much good it could do in practice. Debate
and

intellectual

conversation

are

necessary

in

order

to

deepen

understanding and awareness of a particular issue, but they do little
in terms of providing a real, functional, solution. This however, would
certainly be an appropriate and long-overdue starting point.
Turning to the second issue, which is inescapably tied to the
first, is long-term societal and cultural change. Tinajero Medina‟s
contemporary Ramón Gerónimo Olvera discusses the dilemma Mexican people
find themselves in, in terms of their musical expressions. He states,
“if we want the popular songs to focus on other subject matter, it is
necessary that the singer has a different reality to exist in…he sings
what he sees…why don‟t societies like Switzerland, Sweden,[sic]develop
the narcocorrido? Well, because they don‟t see that reality.”362 As Los
Tigres del Norte have stated, “in Mexico, you can no longer produce
corridos about Pancho Villa or even of the Mexican Revolution, because
we live in different times, with different dramas, events, and moments

360
361
362
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that

cannot

be

avoided

nor

hidden.” 363

Ultimately,

Los

Tigres

and

Gerónimo Olvera are correct, one cannot expect the musical reflection
of a reality to change until the reality itself had started changing.
However, this change has to start somewhere before it can be reflected
in

cultural

expressions,

herein

lies

the

appropriate

place

for

intellectual debate. The conversation should not focus so much on why
the current situation is wrong or unfavorable, but rather it should be
geared towards answering the questions of “what specifically needs to
change?” and “How do we, as a people, go about pursuing this new
vision?”
A variety of arguments in favor of a ban have been made, of these
perhaps

the

most

convincing

and

worthy

of

attention

is

that

of

a

concern for “the ethical obligation to protect children and youths,”
from a particular type

of “music

which they [local government

and

branches of CIRT] consider to be harmful.”364 While these concerns are
certainly valid, they can be successfully countered with the belief of
Tinajero Medina, already quoted and presented in this chapter, that the
genre is a fictional representation of reality. Therefore, the harm to
the youth actually comes from the drug industry itself, not from the
music alone, and such a ban loses a significant portion of its merit.
Luis Astorga raises the question of what a ban will eventually
lead to in terms of freedoms afforded to Mexicans. He argues that a ban
or any type of censoring due to the illegal nature of DTOs, could
snowball and quickly develop into a “red scare,” of the genre, so to
speak. Astorga asks “will a time come when they will have to imprison

363
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composers

and

performers

of

corridos

about

traffickers…Those

who

compose, perform or listen to that music: will they be accused of
partaking in organized crime?”365 Such legislation has been suggested by
“PANista Óscar Marín Arce, who proposed[„in 2008‟] jail time for those
who

reproduced

initiative
legislation

was
are

or

distributed

songs

that

not

approved.”366

While

Astorga‟s

extreme

and

highly

unlikely

exalt

criminals.

fears

and

scenarios,

The

Arce‟s

they

are

important to take into account when discussing potential government
action

against

any

cultural

form

of

expression.

How

far

is

the

government allowed to go in order to combat an evil if its actions
control the musical and cultural preferences of its citizens? According
to its constitution, no such power exists for the Mexican government to
dictate individual tastes.
Before proceeding to the next issue, I pause to reflect on the
fact that until this point my discussion has focused exclusively on a
scenario in which the government should act against the narcocorrido.
It is at this juncture that I would like to return to Tinajero Medina‟s
concern of government action posing a problem to Mexicans‟ ability to
express themselves. Furthermore, I would like to introduce the idea
that any attempt by Mexican officials to ban or censor the genre is a
violation of their own constitution and also that it could ultimately
result in promoting the music more than restricting it.
The Mexican Constitution, as written in 1917, states in Article
6: “The expression of ideas shall not be subject to any judicial or
administrative investigation, unless if offends good morals, infringes

365
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the rights of others, incites to crime, or disturbs the public order.” 367
Immediately,

one

misunderstanding

as

can
the

see

the

wording

of

potential
the

for

confusion

Constitutional

and

provision

is

extremely vague. While it protects the ability to express oneself and
one‟s beliefs, it does leave significant room for the government to
intervene and restrict that right, rather arbitrarily. For one, what is
the measure for determining if something “offends good morals?” Second,
how does one attribute “crime,” to any particular form of expression?
In

the

case

of

the

Mexican

drug

war,

the

narcocorrido

is

certainly an “expression of ideas” that should be protected by the
Constitution of Mexico. However one could argue that it is guilty of
“offending good morals,” as well as contributing to the rise of crime
in Mexico. Ultimately, one must concede that the narcocorrido is a
protected form of expression in Mexico and that it is not in violation
of any of the contingencies presented in Article 6. Certainly, one
cannot restrict or prohibit a medium of expression for simply being a
“reflection of that [drug-trafficking] reality,”368 and not the actual
reality itself.

The Narcocorrido and the search for truth
Professor

Ramirez-Pimienta

comments

that

the

genre

should

be

maintained because there exists a market among “some professionals[who]
consume

(some)

narcocorridos

because

we

distinguish

between

the

different messages of the song and we focus on the positive values of

367
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368
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the

protagonist,

courage,

loyalty,

generosity.”369

Ramirez-Pimienta‟s

thoughts are valid in that they demonstrate how a ban or restriction of
the music in any way is to severely limit the understanding one can
gain from studying such an important and relevant cultural indicator.
Furthermore, he points out the danger of a government ban since he
believes the genre is a necessary “narrator,” of Mexican history; it
counteracts the “state‟s monopoly on the portrayal of what has taken
place.”370 In a strongly critical statement, Ramirez-Pimienta continues
by noting that the government‟s view of the conflict “is not reliable.
Its narratives (the government‟s) are sometimes as fantastic as the
most fantastic narcocorrido.”371
This statement from Ramirez-Pimienta brings to mind another famed
narcocorrido, “El Jefe de Jefes,” also performed by Los Tigres del
Norte. During the first few seconds of the song, the following exchange
takes place:
“I like corridos because they are the real deeds of our people.”
“Yeah I like them too because they sing the pure truth.”372
This constant search for truth is becoming an increasingly difficult
task given the chaotic nature of Mexico‟s drug war. However, it is
clear that both the government and the DTOs are conscious of the way
they

are

portrayed

to

the

general

public;

such

a

recognition

demonstrates the importance that a positive view in the eyes of the
people is a crucial component for either side to emerge victorious.
369
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371
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372
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Furthermore, as Professors Jose Pablo Villalobos and Ramirez-Pimienta
wrote, even though there is a journalistic and government provided
account

of

historical

events

“the

corrido

traditionally

offers

a

contesting rendition of these same events…thought skewed by the lens of
hegemonic political power.”373
Adding to the role that the narcocorrido plays in pursuing truth,
Ramirez-Pimienta

and

Villalobos

“continues to speak and

argue

create memory

that

the

narcocorrido

for the voiceless,

genre

albeit

a

violently powerful contingency that is anything but downtrodden.”374 Here
one can see that the people, and the DTOs share a common enemy, so to
speak,

the

government.

Both

have

been

targeted

as

outcasts

and

undesirables in a sense. One can therefore, assume that perhaps this
contributes

to

the

lack

of

public

condemnation

of

the

genre.

Furthermore, as these two authors continue to demonstrate, “the drug
lord,

therefore,

is

a

victim

of

society,

whose

only

recourse

for

survival and full-fledged participation in consumer culture is to enter
the illicit underworld of trafficking.” 375 Viewed from this perspective,
as flawed as it may be, there are few people who would be as quick to
condemn the drug-trafficker as many government officials in Mexico have
been thus far.
The veracity of the claims made by various narcocorridos is an
important issue to discuss and take into account given that the genre
is

said

to

provide

a

counterweight

to

the

government‟s

claims

of

factual accuracy. However, even within the community of artists there
is uncertainty as to the level of truth presented in the individual
corridos as well as the necessary amount of embellishment needed to

373
374
375
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effectively share the message of the song. Ramirez-Pimienta points out
how Los Tigres del Norte have given contradictory accounts of truth and
its relation to the narcocorrido. He writes that Los Tigres have said
both

that

“narcocorridos-

are

imaginary,”376

and

“that

it

is

the

narcocorrido that relates real events.”377 One can only imagine the
difficulty in determining the proper role for the genre as a historical
narrative, given that there is confusion on the part of performers as
to its truthfulness.
Historical truth is said to be written by the victors, however I
would venture to say that in the case of the narcocorrido, history and
truth are written by those who can afford to have it written. In their
article, Ramirez-Pimienta and Villalobos cite Helena Simonett‟s finding
that,

“the

business

of

the

narcocorrido

has

become

an

industry

sponsored and financed, in part, by the drug trafficker-and having a
corrido telling of your exploits has become a marker for success in the
drug underworld.”378 Ramirez-Pimienta and Villalobos argue that “la pura
verdad

as

an

ideal

begins

to

fade

and

is

corrupted

by

the

self-

fashioning fancies of the underwriter financing the project.”379 That is
to say that the cartel leaders can have a significant impact on what
events or ideas are portrayed as truth in narcocorridos by financially

376
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supporting and rewarding individuals who produce songs in the genre
that depict the drug-trafficker in a positive, almost heroic light.
One example of such
Villalobos‟

article

is

a case

that

of

is found

well-known

in

Ramirez-Pimienta and

Mexican

singer,

Lupillo

Rivera. According to an interview with the singer, he answered yes to
the

question

of

whether

or

not

“he

had

ever

been

commissioned

to

compose corridos for traffickers…[and] that in return for these songs
he

received

expensive

watches

and

gold

plated

guns

and

rifles.” 380

Furthermore, despite his desire to have his stories told through this
medium, the drug trafficker

made it

clear that such singers

could

relate the event “but no personal names,” could be used. Ultimately,
this reality reinforces the importance that silence and respect play in
the DTO world; it is a trait and value of the utmost importance.
Interestingly, Franco would disagree with labeling songs written
and performed without specific details, like those of Rivera, as part
of the greater corrido genre. He states that “in the first place, the
corrido has names, dates, places and a song does not;” 381 effectively he
argues that the corrido, by definition, requires factual, historical
truth in order for it to exist as part of the genre. Furthermore,
Franco believes that it the fundamental change in the corrido to the
narcocorrido is found in the point of view from which the story is
told: “corridos weren‟t all about me and me. It was a narrative,” of
people and events.382 Ramirez-Pimienta follows up by saying that the

380
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381
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transition

has

been

from

a

more

“third

person…[to]

first

person,”

narrative.383

“El Narco”: The Mexican Robin Hood or “Jack the Ripper?”
The

corrido

has

a

long

history

in

Mexico,

however

the

narcocorrido specifically is a more recent development, one that Franco
feels

corresponds

to

the

time

of

“Mexican

Drug

King

Rafael

Caro

Quintero.”384 Caro Quintero is perhaps best known for a famous statement
of his, in which he said “just let me be and I will pay off Mexico‟s
foreign debt.”385 It is during this period, the 1980s, that Caro Quintero
was

one

of

the

most

powerful

cartel

leaders

and

subsequently

was

arrested in Costa Rica as he hid from authorities.386 Franco indicates
that

it

was

at

this

point

that

the

corrido

changed

and

the

drug

trafficker “was made almost a hero, anything he said,” was no longer
reprehensible, but rather valuable and worthy of admiration. 387 Such a
transformation in the nature of the genre would eventually lead to
major changes in the way in which individuals and society in general
viewed the drug-trafficker and the drug industry.
Olvera

has

stated

that

“before

this

whole

war

against

the

„narco‟, which has been a disgrace for Mexico, all of these [sic]
narrate the story of a drug trafficker seen as Robin Hood. That does,
that does sell drugs and everything, but who also helps the people, who
has a code of values.”388 Furthermore, Olvera ventured to argue, that the
modern view of the drug trafficker is “entrenched with the imaginary
383
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musical

construction

that

was

made

of

Pancho

Villa,”

in

that

one

struggles with the moral dilemma of supporting the glamorization of the
“narco,” and simultaneously condemning his actions.389 Ramirez-Pimienta
argued that part of the power of “el narco,” is that he is depicted in
“the corrido of the generous bandit. This is the corrido of someone who
opposes the unjust government.”390
Olvera goes on to note that this image of the drug trafficker
would eventually change as “at the end of the day, along with the
significant increase in violent crimes being committed since the major
cartel splits, there came about the notion “of the narcotraficante as
merciless, someone without principles, someone who tortures…this also
something that was happening in reality, the codes were broken…there
used to be certain codes that were respected among the cartels.” 391
Olvera provides a partial list of such codes: 1) “don‟t kill in front
of the general population [civilians],” 2) “don‟t kill civilians,” 3)
“don‟t

go

after

each

other‟s

families,”

4)

“don‟t

involve

your

family…my wife and kids are not a part of this game, they are not to be
touched.”392
Olvera reflected and referenced the lyrics of what is perhaps the
quintessential “narco-corrido,” made famous by Los Tigres del Norte,
“Traición

y

Contrabando,”

(Betrayal

and

Contraband). 393

The

line

referenced reads, “la traición y contrabando, son cosas incompartidas,”
which translates to “betrayal and contraband are mutually exclusive.” 394
The understanding gained from this classic line is that the cartels
recognized the incompatibility of their business and “backstabbing,” at
389
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least

until

Guzman‟s

betrayal.

Put

simply,

Guzman

and

his

contemporaries‟ actions completely violate the understanding and decree
issued in the words of “Traición and Contrabando.” It has also been
reported that “the rules of the game are becoming stricter. Now the
boss will kill their soldiers for minor offenses, in order to prevent
betrayal.”395 No longer is loyalty a trump card in the face of an angered
cartel leader. In light of this, it is not surprising that the death
toll in Mexico due to DTOs continues to rise; if a cartel member is
expendable

for

a

minor

offense,

why

wouldn‟t

an

enemy

or

even

a

civilian be?
Such

conflicting

realities

concerning the

person,

“el

narco,”

raises a very serious moral dilemma for the Mexican people: can they
continue to support and enjoy music that carries a positive message
concerning an increasingly evil industry? It seems that it is in this
dilemma

that

one

finds

a

major

reason

for

the

difficulty

in

the

government‟s current strategy, the people seem to have taken a long
time to choose a side. That is not to imply that the Mexican people
support the drug industry, however it becomes increasingly evident that
there

is

a

certain

level

of

loyalty

to

the

idea

of

“victimized

trafficker,” felt by the general population. Why this is the case is
best explained by Ramirez-Pimienta who expressed that:
“the people are capable of distinguishing between the different
messages of the narcocorrido. To me, the narcocorrido works…not
because most listeners are drug traffickers or sympathize with
drug

trafficking,

but

rather

because

the

message

narcocorrido is one of empowerment.”396

395
396
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From this statement, one can understand that it is not so much the case
that the population is indifferent, as it is that they see highly
valued qualities present in the world of the drug trafficker. These
qualities can provide hope and strength to those who feel they are
often neglected or abused by their own country; characteristics and
traits

like

those

mentioned

by

Ramirez-Pimienta

earlier

in

the

chapter.397

“Narcocultura”, Lucha Libre as a metaphor for Mexican politics
The narcocorrido is not the only major Mexican cultural indicator
that can be viewed
reality.

There

is

internationally,

as a

reflection or fictional representation of

another

through

medium,

which

which

Mexican

is

perhaps

identity

better

and

known

culture

is

established and expressed, lucha libre.
Mexican wrestling is distinguished by bouts involving “burly combatants
in

bikini

briefs

and

colorful

masks,”

who

perform

a

carefully

orchestrated sequence of moves set to resemble a genuine fight between
individuals.398Like the narcocorrido, Lucha libre is a tremendous popular
force in Mexico today, however it has been free from DTO influence in a
country

where

“„narcocultura‟…has

penetrated

every

other

element

of

Mexican pop culture, from movies and music to TV and religion.”399 This
reality is simply perplexing, there does not appear to be an apparent
reason as to why this is the case; however Sandra Granados of the World
Council of Lucha Libre suggests that it could possibly be “that lucha

397
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is more innocent.”400 What Granados means by this is not clear as she
does not provide further comment.
Jorge

Chabat

argues

that

the

reason

is

far

simpler:

“the

government has told them they cannot.”401 Chabat continues by saying that
“„the lucha is a very powerful weapon in the popular culture‟” and that
he doesn‟t believe the government of Mexico would ever allow wrestlers
to use names and themes suggestive of drug culture.402 To such a claim
arises a single devastating response: if the government is capable of
preventing drug culture from entering the wrestling arena, why can they
do no such thing in the musical world as well? Seeing the prevalence of
the “narcocorrido” in Mexican music, it appears to be evident that the
government is simply not able to prevent the spread of drug culture
into everyday Mexican cultural expression. Chabat then poses a chilling
question to the observer about the potential threat he sees to the
government‟s mission should wrestlers embrace the drug culture: “what
if

the

audiences

really

applaud?”403

This

question

is

tremendously

alarming and if such a wrestler were indeed cheered for, the Mexican
government would rightfully have reason to be fearful.
Ultimately, it seems that Heather Levi404 makes one of the most
compelling arguments regarding the role of lucha libre in a society
that is increasingly affected by the drug culture. She explains that
while lucha is representative of Mexican culture in that because it
“does offer a window into the country‟s soul but not as a direct social
commentary on the daily news,” 405 it is not as powerful an indicator as

400
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commentators have suggested the narcocorrido to be. Furthermore, she
provides an excellent explanation as to why lucha is such a beloved
tradition in Mexico by referring to it as “the joke that everyone
gets…it is a subtle parody of the system as a whole-the masks, the
secrecy,

double-crossing,

official

corruption.”406

This

microcosm

of

Mexican government and societal interactions appears then to provide
brief respite from the tiring and constant accusations of corruption
and dishonesty against Mexican institutions and officials who do not
live up to people‟s expectations.

El Narcocorrido as a cultural indicator
It

is

important

to

gain

a

greater

understanding

of

the

“narcocorrido,” and its role in Mexican society in order to better
comprehend the complex relationship maintained between the government,
the people, and the “narco.” The genre is invaluable to the student of
Mexican politics, not just of the drug war, in that, as Olvera states,
“at the end of the day, it continues to be a thermometer for how much
the theme of „el narco‟ has varied.” 407 Furthermore, it is important for
the government to understand the manner in which its citizens interact
with and respond to the music, lyrics, and ideology presented in this
genre of Mexican folk music. As one author suggested, “the government
has, what I will call, a problem of schizophrenia. It confuses reality
and fiction. A „narcocorrido‟, at the end of the day, is fiction.” 408
Additionally, Olvera believes that a potential solution to the drug

406
407
408
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problem in Mexico would be “if the farmers [and the poor] could live
off the land with dignity, honor, and without problems.”409
Taking a critical stance towards Calderón‟s government‟s current
strategy, it has been suggested that “the government forget about that
foolish idea of censoring that which takes place in fiction, and focus
on that which occurs in reality, it‟s evasive.”410 Certainly Olvera is
correct in pushing for the government to address the issue based on the
reality of the violence committed and power wielded by the cartels,
however it seems far-fetched to suggest that the government is in fact
ignoring this in favor or fantasy. However, it is necessary that the
government recognize the importance of understanding the causes of and
sentiments expressed in such a cultural phenomenon as the narcocorrido.
Howard Campbell concludes that “drug trafficking…even though it is not
fully accepted, it is not considered an unusual form of life.” 411 To
demonstrate just to what extent the industry has infiltrated everyday
Mexican life, he writes that “drug traffickers are students in middle
school,

high

grandparents…waiters,

school,

universities,

professors,

and

manual

government

laborers,
employees.”412

Campbell‟s findings echo the data provided by Parametría in that it
shows how there is a significant portion of the Mexican population that
is accustomed to and may even look favorably upon the drug-trafficking
industry. Again, to reiterate Parametría‟s study, this did not include
a support for the violent aspect of the industry.
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“El Tamal”
There

are

many

examples

of

narcocorridos

that

depict

the

government agencies as corrupt entities and the drug-trafficker as the
“misunderstood,” and “abused,” hero. However, I would like to provide
just one example and focus in on the words and implications of such a
song. “El Tamal,” by Los Tigres del Norte tells the story of a drugtrafficker, Juan, who finds himself caught by the police. Instead of
being arrested and taken away, Juan is told to hand over his “tamal” of
cocaine to the police chief. To this request, Juan responds with the
following:
“I don‟t regret carrying it. I know that you also enjoy it, I am
happy to share it with you. But if you want all of it, with your
men, I will kill myself.”413
Clearly, Juan is committing an illegal act; however it is the police
chief who ends up looking corrupt by demanding the cocaine for his own
personal use. Furthermore, in this narrative Juan is demonstrating two
important

qualities:

a

willingness

to

die

for

his

trade,

and

a

willingness to share with the authorities in order to further implicate
them in his business. Through these words, Juan turns the listener‟s
anger and disapproval away from him and onto the police chief. This
phenomenon can contribute significantly, consciously or not, to the
general

population‟s

opinion

of

the

drug-trafficking

industry

by

blurring the lines between right and wrong, and good and evil.
The ending of the song tells of the chief‟s decision to threaten
Juan and Juan‟s reaction is as follows:
“Before he [the chief] could continue, Juan shot him. The agents
shot at Juan, but not with precision. They did not catch Juan, he
413
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got away from them that day. The chief is dead because of a tamal
that he wanted.”414
Again,

the

listener

is

presented

with

a

drug-trafficker

who

has

committed a blatantly violent, illegal, and evil act in killing the
police chief in order to escape. However, the listener is conflicted as
the story reflects poorly on Mexican authorities by depicting them as
selfish, and corrupt individuals who abuse their power. Furthermore,
drawing on th idea

of the

drug-trafficker as a “victim”

discussed

earlier, Juan can be seen as an honest man who is forced to participate
in

the

drug

trade

as

his

only

way

of

earning

a

living

in

an

increasingly corrupt world.
A final point of note ties together the story of Juan in El Tamal
and that of the song quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Jefe de
Jefes. Both of these songs were made famous by the same band, Los
Tigres del Norte, and as one begins to listen to a greater quantity of
the groups songs, it becomes apparent that they are telling one large
narrative

with

a

variety

of

recurring

characters

and

story

lines.

Catherine Héau Lambert and Gilberto Giménez make the astute observation
that “in corridos about drug trafficking the lines between police and
criminal are blurred, since both groups are obedient and subservient to
the same mysterious man: el jefe de jefes.”415

414
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Conclusions
The “Narcocorrido,” is an invaluable piece of evidence, which
brings to life the inner conflict facing many Mexicans today. Through
this social medium of expression, one can begin to understand why the
conflict with the DTOs has been one that has drawn tremendous criticism
from the Mexican people as the death toll rises. Furthermore, it‟s
ability to maintain the sentiment as an anonymous one, in that it is
not directly attributed to any one individual, provides a safe and open
forum from which Mexicans can express their fears, hopes, and desires.
The narcocorrido is a medium through which an opposing interpretation
of

reality

and

history

can

be

population.

The

genre

government,

the

drug-trafficker,

itself

preserved
acts

as

and

and

an
the

disseminated

indicator
people

of

are

to

the

how

the

constantly

interacting with and in spite of each other. Ultimately, the government
seeks

to

put

narcocorrido,

down
while

the
“el

individuals
narco,”

glorified

desires

a

and

promoted

positive

view

in

the

of

his

qualities and attributes. The final, and perhaps most important, actor
in the drama is the general population who identify with the trafficker
as an outcast, as someone who is often abused and persecuted by the
government while simultaneously refusing to accept the trafficker as an
exemplary, model citizen.
It is important to

take into

account

that bands who

perform

narcocorridos often include a variety of different genres in their
performances and repertoire. Ramirez-Pimienta cites the fact that “many
of the Tucanes‟ hits are cumbias. Los Tigres del Norte have had hits
with corridos about politics, of migrants, just as they have had hits
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with

songs

narcocorrido

about
is

falling
just

in

one

and

of

of

love.”416

Ultimately,

styles

and

of

out

many

forms

the

musical

expression, however due to the prevalent nature of the drug conflict
today in Mexico it is not surprising to see an increasing tendency of
individuals to analyze the narcocorrido. That is not to say that it is
not a profitable or highly demanded commodity, quite the opposite. The
corrido, as a major medium for the transmission of the “Mexican epic,”
as various scholars refer to it, cannot be ignored as a force in
influencing

the

attitudes

and

pursuits

of

the

Mexican

people.

It

becomes quite apparent that a ban on the genre would serve little, if
any,

purpose.

In

fact,

it

would

only

serve

to

strengthen

the

marketability and legend surrounding these individuals who have created
so much controversy. Certainly, the Mexican people would prefer that
the government focus its energies on perfecting its strategy in order
to bring about a swift end to the violence and a return to peace,
instead of spending time debating the merits of banning or restricting
a single form of cultural expression.
Finally, it is the case that the narcocorrido is not the reality
in and of itself, but rather one of many ways in which that reality can
be expressed. To the concern that the “narcocorrido is the origin of
the problem,” Olvera strongly responds by adding “no! The origin of the
problem is impunity and the infiltration of drug trafficking in [sic]
the government.”417 Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that the
Mexican people are supportive of any strategy that has already claimed
the lives of 35,000 of their compatriots. While they may be vehemently
against

the

drug

industry

and

the

cartel

violence,

it

is

not

necessarily the case that they are fully behind the military option. As
416
417
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Olvera expressed, the war against the DTOs, and the narrative developed
through the narcocorrido tell of a “war that, by the way, we didn‟t ask
for and we don‟t understand.”418

418

Interview with Ramón Gerónimo Olvera.

Chapter 5: Findings, implications, and conclusions

Initial Findings and Thoughts
More

than

35,000

Mexican

people

killed

from

drug-related

violence, a Church struggling to find its voice, a government plan that
incites more violence, and a social medium glamorizing the lives of the
so-called “narcos.” These are the realities facing Mexico today; these
are

the

obstacles

to

a

Mexican

success

against

the

cartels.

This

examination has been brief, yet informative in that it provides an
initial glimpse into the complex relationships that currently exist in
the

Mexican

ineptitude,

state.
the

Long

Presidency

accused
seems

to

of

government

corruption

be

fighting

constant

a

and

uphill

battle for the support and confidence of the people. As evidenced by a
poll

taken

in

2010,

“60

percent

of

respondents

said

violence

had

increased over the past six months, and 56 percent of respondents said
the federal government‟s crackdown on narcotics trafficking had made
the country „less secure‟.” 419 This complex poker game over the trust of
the Mexican public is one which impacts the role of the Church in the
political world and is often expressed and analyzed via the social
medium of the narcocorrido.
From this research several initial findings were made. First, the
government‟s decision to pursue the DTOs with full military force has
created

419

a

war

with

guerrilla-like

features,

very

similar

to

that

Data compiled “by the Mexico City polling firm Buendia y Laredo” as stated in David
Agren, “Bishops ask Mexico to reconsider strategy against drug cartels,” Catholic News
Service, February 16, 2010, http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/1000667.htm.
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formerly encountered by Colombia. While the administration of Calderón
certainly has the responsibility to its people to protect them and
provide for a safe, free environment within the country, it is beyond
doubt that the military option has created more chaos and conflict than
tangible success. This being said, one must recall that the nature of
the violence in Mexico is concentrated and could even be referred to as
a “regional,” conflict. However, that in no way implies that the issue
is not one that afflicts the entire nation, or even other states since
the drug-trafficking industry has now crossed borders from Mexico all
the way down to Colombia. Furthermore, it must be noted that there has
been a historical wariness of granting the military greater involvement
in political issues, given that Mexico is one of a handful of Latin
American

countries

to

have

successfully

avoided

military

rule.

Ultimately, the military option has failed in its purpose, ridding
Mexico of the cartels.
Certainly Calderón and his administration would and have argued
that they have gained significant ground by having captured “more than
half,” of the major Mexican drug lords.420 Unfortunately, what Calderón
fails to comment on, is that despite such “successes,” the violence
continues to rise, with death tolls showing no sign of declining in the
near future. The simple reality is that, given the lucrative nature of
the drug trade, there exists an almost endless pool of applicants for
the job. Enrique Franco feels the key to supplying this pool is to
capitalize on disenfranchised youth, as many other illegal movements
have.421

420
421

He

states,

“they[DTOs]

use

young

Proceso Staff Writer, “Presume Calderón.”
Ramirez-Pimienta and Pimienta, “Todavía es el corrido,” 45.

kids.

Only

a

young
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[impressionable] kid shoots a Cardinal. Only a kid is capable of what
you can barely fathom. Someone my age thinks twice.”422
For every leader captured, at least one new individual rises to
replace

them.

If

is

this

were

not

the

case,

one

would

find

a

significant decrease in the operating abilities of the DTOs, which the
data simply does not support. If the capture of high-level “narcos” was
truly having an impact on the war, it would be difficult to imagine
that the cartels could not only continue to operate, but also that they
could

have

operations

diversified
to

new

their

countries.

crimes
Surely

and

expanded

operating

their

solely

in

base

of

Mexico

is

becoming increasingly difficult and high-risk, but that alone does not
suggest that the government is triumphing.
Second, when investigating the silence of the Church in the face
of severe violations of human rights, it was demonstrated that there
has been a significant amount of speaking out by various priests and
bishops, however there remained widespread silence within the Church.
It became apparent that there were a variety of reasons for its silence
and lack of unified nationwide action. Initially, there came the claim
of corruption, which proved to be true in the cases of a couple major
authorities

within

the

Mexican

Catholic

hierarchy.

However,

it

is

difficult to confirm, let alone imagine, that any significant portion
of the Church was in the employ or under the influence of the DTOs.
Quite simply, the accusations of corruption are minor stumbling blocks
when compared to the great power for good wielded by the Church.
The investigation also shed light on the way in which the Church
has lost its power as supreme and sole moral guide in Mexico. This
reality is best reflected by the fact that the Church and individuals
422
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within the Church have been openly threatened by the DTOs. To these
threats, not surprisingly, the Church has stood strong and called for
their

parishioners

and

their

clergy

to

reject

fear

tactics

as

a

legitimate means by which the DTOs seek to accomplish their goals.
While such threats do demonstrate that the Church is no longer as
“untouchable,” as once thought,

their

defiance in the

face of

the

cartels‟ demands equally show that they have not completely fallen from
their

place
Given

the

at
gross

the
violations

top
of

of
human

Mexican

rights,

and

life.
widespread

violence, the Church most definitely does have a responsibility to
speak up and act on behalf of those afflicted and those who are often
neglected by society at large. These were the promises made in the
post-Vatican

II

Church

at

both

CELAM

conferences

in

Medellín

and

Puebla. Such hesitation from the Church when it comes to representing
those they claim to speak for is a clear violation of their own mission
and words made nearly 50 years ago. The initial hypothesis of the
chapter, it seems impossible to envision any sort of victory over the
“narco” without any direct Catholic Church involvement, proved to be
false given the decreased influence and role of the Church in Mexican
thought. However, it does appear that the government, the Church, and
the people all recognize that the Church still has a responsibility as
a moral guide to become involved in the conflict and pursue a peaceful
solution in which death is no longer commonplace in Mexico and the
people are free to live.
Finally, in the case of the narcocorrido, the investigation found
that the genre is a major force in Mexican culture. Through this genre
Mexican history is recorded and shared with various generations. Many
scholars have argued that the genre is often too harshly criticized by
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government officials as a way of ignoring the real issues plaguing the
nation. By placing the blame for the violence and corruption on the
music, many problems are forgotten and the government is able to paint
itself in a much better light. However, it is noteworthy that this
genre, which for so long has been critical to the preservation of
Mexican history, is now viewed as a threat by an administration who is
struggling to find a way to defeat the cartels. Despite attempted and
successful bans, the narcocorrido is thriving and has also benefitted
from the prohibitions placed on it.
It seems that the “narco,” as depicted in these narratives, is
one who identifies with a large portion of the Mexican people because
of their common claim to being outcast and abused by the government.
Furthermore, some of the qualities exhibited by the drug-trafficker are
highly valued and desired in Mexican society. For example, one scholar
mentioned

that

the

“courage,

loyalty,

narratives

and

generosity.”423

tell
Such

of

individuals

traits

portray

who
the

have
drug-

trafficker in an even better light, given that these are often seen as
absent in government authorities. Such interpretations of the genre
present an obstacle to the government plan in that they simply do not
have the full support of the people. While most Mexicans want peace and
are against illegal activity, the situation is far from black and white
in a country where the government is still recovering from nearly 70
years often ignoring the demands of its people. The genre cannot be
blamed for the violence; such an accusation is foolish and naïve. To
reiterate Don Olvera and Tinajero Medina‟s thoughts, the real problem

423
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is found elsewhere, while

the narcocorrido is nothing more

than

a

“reflection of that reality.”424
It seems then that the Church is no longer the sole moral compass
and guide in Mexico, the people themselves have accepted this role.
Through their social expressions and cultural understanding of their
surroundings they are capable not only of moving with greater consensus
towards a more fluid understanding of right and wrong, but also of
providing an environment in which the government does not hold sole
possession of claims to truth. The narcocorrido finds a great source of
strength

in

its

pursuit

of

truthful

and

historically

accurate

representations of government-cartel engagements. It is the people who
are capable of facilitating an end to the drug war in Mexico, in fact
they are the largest missing factor from the conflict. It will be the
Mexican

people

rising

together

as

one

and

proclaiming

“no

more

violence, no more death, no more drug-trafficking,” which will create a
new Mexico. One in which the government and the drug trafficker are
both held accountable for their flaws as well as their virtues.

“Narcoterrorism?”
It has been suggested that a possible way to more effectively
combat the cartels would be through a somewhat controversial process of
officially giving them a label of “terrorist.” Although Representative
Michael McCaul is correct in stating that “Mexico is in danger of
becoming a failed state controlled by criminals,”425 his call to label

424
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Mexican DTOs as “foreign terrorist organizations,”426 would be a naïve
and poor policy choice for both the U.S. and Mexico. The argument
behind such a legislative move is that it would facilitate the takedown of both cartels and their American arms suppliers by “expose[ing
them]…to charges of supporting terrorism,” a very serious offense.427
According to McCaul‟s legislation, this label would permit the U.S. “to
levy up to 15 additional years…and a federal death sentence if deaths
resulted from the cartels‟ actions.”428
Joining McCaul‟s call for harsher labeling of DTOs, STRATFOR has
also suggested that the cartels be “categorized as „narcoterrorist‟
organizations…[„such a label‟] could reduce public tolerance for many
of their activities in the country.”429 What is most revealing from such
a statement is that STRATFOR and others have recognized the role that
public

opinion

population

at

plays
large,

in
the

the
war

conflict.
simply

Without

cannot

be

the

support

of

won

by

Mexican

the

the

authorities, success will only come if Mexicans as a whole embrace the
government mission and support them wholeheartedly. While this type of
legislation could certainly deter American arms producers and suppliers
from providing weapons to the DTOs in Mexico, although it is doubtful
that it will be enough to completely eliminate the lucrative trade, it
still comes laden with its own shortcomings and problems.
First, it must be noted that the United States State Department
were

clear

to

state

that

“no

known

international

terrorist

troops-to-fight-mexican-drug-war.ece. According to this article, “McCaul, [is] an Austin
Republican.”
426
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organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist
incidents

targeting

U.S.

interests

and

personnel

occurred

on

or

originated from Mexican territory.” 430 Certainly, the violence in Mexico
is trending towards more heinous and gruesome incidents, however to
label

them

in

the

same

league

as

the

international

terrorist

organizations would be problematic and plainly, incorrect.
Second, as Senator John Cornyn of Texas argued, DTOs are not like
terrorist organizations in that

“cartels are in it

money.”431 Furthermore, it is necessary to be

for one

thing-

exercise caution

when

considering how to label the international beast that the Mexican DTOs
have become in the past 10 years. As stated by the Mexican Embassy in
Washington, echoing Cornyn‟s words, “let‟s call it like it is: truly
violent, transnational organized crime, operating on both sides of our
border, that pursue neither an ideological or political agenda but
rather seek a simple but powerful objective: profit.”432 Ultimately, one
would be remiss to ignore the reality that the ideological pursuit of
an organization is crucial to determining what its purpose and identity
are. Mexican DTOs are nothing more than a profit pursuing industry that
is not hesitant to use force, and violence to achieve their goals. To
say that they have some sort of political pursuit would simply be
false.
Third, Mexico would not allow an American ground troop presence
on Mexican soil. It would be seen by the Mexican people as an act of
submission

and

government

is

weakness
already

of

the

combating

Mexican

government,

as

finds

it

itself

an

issue

the

increasingly

entrenched in a war it cannot win. Finally, with two ongoing wars, a

430
431
432
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staggering

deficit,

and

an

increasingly

polarized

government,

the

United States is not in a position to become actively involved in what
they for so long have deemed a Mexican problem.

Estamos metidos?
Calderón‟s strategy, at the surface, appears to be part of the
problem
conducted

of

worsening

and

more

conditions.

time

must

However,

pass

in

more

order

to

research
make

a

must

be

conclusive

decision on whether or not the president‟s strategy was in any way
truly successful in the long-term. That being said, it is clear that
Calderón underestimated the nature
trafficking industry, and

of

the beast that

is the

drug-

furthermore, that he was ill equipped to

develop and implement a successful anti-drug policy in Mexico. Perhaps
Castañeda says it best, that Calderón “thinking it was a problem of
appendicitis,

he

opened

the

patient

up

and

found

that

the

entire

abdominal cavity was invaded by cancer. He had no option other than to
go in with everything he had to fix it.”433 As extreme as his language
may sound, it is a spot on declaration of the problem of Calderón‟s
strategy. Not only were the size and extent of the cartels‟ operations
overwhelming, but also its resistance to any treatment was difficult to
have conceived of in advance.
Calderón decided to engage in a battle with the intent of using
brute

force

to

achieve

situation is far more

his

desired

complex than

outcome.

One

can

see

this, and therefore

that

the

requires

a

careful understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the DTOs if
any positive outcome will be achieved. As a doctor treating the patient
433
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described by Castañeda must plan and develop the perfect treatment
needed to solve this unique case, the Mexican government must carefully
craft the correct strategy that attacks the cartels at their foundation
so

that

their

operating

abilities

are

severely

weakened

before

considering an outright military war against these organizations. To
continue

the

surgeon

analogy,

operating

should

have

been

the

last

choice of treatment once all other less invasive strategies proved
ineffective. Furthermore, Calderón and future Mexican presidents find
themselves facing the following dilemma: can they change their strategy
this far into the conflict? That is, have they invested too much time,
energy, and resources to change course now? One could argue that a
change in course would provide the cartels with a “moral victory,” of
sorts and in effect deliver the decisive blow to an already struggling
government strategy. However, the argument can also be made that, since
the current strategy is not yielding the expected results, a change in
course is necessary. At what point do they cut their losses, so to
speak?

Where do we go from here? Lessons from Colombia
If the Mexican government is to triumph over the drug-trafficking
industry

in

Mexico

they

must

find

a

strategy

in

which

they

can

successfully, in the words of Bailey, “at some undetermined point, the
armed

forces

would

return

to

a

secondary,

back-up

role

in

police

functions and the reformed police-justice system would take the lead.” 434
That is, so long as the military continues to be the primary opponent
of the cartels and primary actor on behalf of the government, the
434

Bailey, “Combating Organized Crime,” 4.

Pinon-Farah 129

Mexican

government

legitimacy.

will

continue

Understandably,

a

to

take

nation‟s

a

hit

on

citizens

its

lose

claim
faith

to
and

confidence in a government that depends on military intervention within
its own state. Therefore, Bailey is correct, a tell-tale sign of the
Mexican government‟s success will be whether or not they find a way to
disengage the military and formally pass authority down to federal and
local police, whose purpose includes preserving and maintaining the
“rule

of

law.”

Furthermore,

it

will

be

at

this

point

that

the

government can fully function as it was designed to: the executive and
legislative

establish

law,

the

judicial

interprets,

and

the

police

enforce and defend.
The conflict in Mexico will call for extraordinary effort from
the police given that the criminals in this case are heavily armed and
extremely well financed. It would be irresponsible to assume that,
under any circumstances, the government could potentially expel the
entire drug industry from within its borders. However, there certainly
exist ways in which they can regain the upper hand and control the
violence that has taken place as a result of the cartel-government
conflict. In one of the wisest moves made by Calderón‟s government, a
partnership has been made between Mexico, Colombia, and the United
States involving “training thousands of Mexican policemen as well as
soldiers and court officers to help contain drug gangs.”435 This is an
encouraging reality, given that Colombia just recently began to emerge
from a bloody battle against “cocaine cartels and Marxist guerillas…now
in its 47th year.”436 Such a partnership is an example of the common bond
felt by Latin American nations who understand the suffering that drugtrafficking
435
436

can

bring

upon

a

nation.

In

Forero, “Colombia stepping up anti-drug training.”
Ibid.

the

words

of

Colombia‟s
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President, Juan Manuel Santos, “Mexico has what we had some years ago,
which are very powerful cartels. What we can provide is the experience
that we have had dismantling those cartels.”437
This

new

approach

to

equip

the

Mexican

authorities

with

the

necessary knowledge and skills to properly combat the DTOs comes in the
shadow of a delicate history of Mexican-American relations. Camp points
out that “the Colombians are the logical proxy,” given the reluctance
from

Mexico

to

allow

the

U.S.

greater

military

and

political

involvement in the issue438, which has been explored in detail throughout
this investigation. He adds that this cooperative effort allows the
United States to “indirectly do a lot more through the Colombians than
they politically could do directly.”439 The purpose of this effort is not
only

to

train

Mexican

authorities

in

their

response

to

increased

violence, but also to “discuss legal reforms that Mexico can implement
to give the state more leverage in seizing assets tainted by drugs.”440
One can assume that such reforms would also aim to facilitate the
government‟s attempt to maintain rule of law and political legitimacy.
This type of united international front against the Mexican drug
war

is

just

one

example

of

the

power

of

sharing

intelligence

and

lessons learned, which will be necessary for success. In the words of
William R. Brownfield “they just have experience in stuff that others
don‟t

have:

explosives,

experience
experience

organizations.”441
Mexico
437

since

in

2006

These
and

dealing
in

specific
are

with

taking

down

issues

extremely

kidnappings,

have

complex

experience

powerful
become

narcotics

commonplace

problems

in

that

in

require

Forero, “Colombia stepping up anti-drug training.”
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439
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440
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carefully crafted plans of action in order to resist the power wielded
by the cartels through such methods of violence. One thing is certain,
Mexico cannot succeed if it is abandoned by its neighbors and allies,
the drug war never has been and never will be simply a Mexican problem,
it is by nature an international one.
Worth noting are potential strategies for developing a solution
to the drug-war in Mexico. Before proceeding to the next section, I
would like to briefly mention suggestions made by George W. Grayson: 1)
“Continue

the

War

on

Drugs,”

until

a

decisive

victory

has

been

achieved, 2) “Reach a Modus Vivendi with the Cartels,” 3) “Focus on
Demand

Side:

Unthinkable:

Education

and

Treatment,”

Decriminalization.”442

While

and
the

4)

“Thinking

first

two

about

the

ideas

are

relatively self-explanatory, the latter two are more abstract. Grayson
states, with regards to point 3, that “only when U.S. officials accept
co-responsibility with Mexico by placing as much weight on curtailing
consumption as they do on reducing supply will progress take place.” 443
With regards to his final point, he mentions the widespread “off-therecord,” support for the “decriminalizing, if not legalizing,[of] the
possession of marijuana for personal use by adults,” as well as the
idea of “treating cocaine and heroin addiction as a health concern-not
as criminal behavior.”444 Each of these suggestions comes along with a
plethora of flaws, however they each have meaningful ways in which they
can contribute to a more peaceful, healthy environment for Mexicans and
Americans

impacted

by

drug

use

or

Mexican

drug-related

violence.

Ultimately, it seems that it will only be through some combination of

442
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443
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444
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Grayson‟s suggestions, as well as those of others, that true victory
will be achieved by the Mexican people.

Have the people had enough? Javier Sicilia‟s emotional plea
A major sign of a potential swing in a new direction for the
government and its strategy can be seen in the wave of protests that
took place in Mexico shortly after the publication of Javier Sicilia‟s
“Carta abierta,” or open letter. Sicilia‟s son was murdered by DTOs,
which triggered an angry and emotional response from the well-known
Mexican writer. He writes that:
“I do not, in this letter, want to talk about the virtues of my
son, which were immense, nor do I wish to speak of those of the
other

young

men

I

saw

flourish

by

his

side…

that

you

have

destroyed… For that kind of pain there are no words-only poetry
is capable of coming close to it, and you know nothing of poetry.”445
Sicilia continues by adding that his motivation for writing is not a
complicated one, he argues that “we are quite simply sick and tired, we
have had enough.”446
In

his

letter,

the

author

does

not

take

the

side

of

the

government in order to condemn the DTOs, but rather his letter is an
emotional condemnation of the entire situation; it reads like a plea
for Mexicans to reclaim their country and reject the false notions that
they are a nation plagued by corruption and evil. Quick to condemn the
government, he starts by lecturing the authorities by writing:

445
446
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“we have had enough of you, politicians…because in your fight for
power

you

because

in

have
the

destroyed
middle

of

the

social

this

war,

fabric

of

which

has

the

country,

been

poorly

formulated, poorly carried out, poorly driven, this war that has
put the country in a state of emergency, you have been incapable
of…creating the consensus the nation needs to find unity, without
which there is no exit [from the war].”447
Sicilia‟s words are strongly critical of what he sees as a government
failing to do its job. They have failed to protect their people, they
have failed to do the good they promised, and they are doing nothing
but hurting and dividing the people of Mexico. In Sicilia‟s letter it
becomes apparent that the author is demonstrating the widespread lack
of trust that many Mexicans feel towards their political system. He
writes the letter as a Mexican, not as a scholar, or author. His focus
is to encourage his fellow Mexicans to rise up and fight for what they
deserve: freedom, safety, opportunity, and political transparency.
He is equally critical, if not more, of the cartels and their
actions since the beginning of the war. In this portion of the letter
he launches into a tirade against the growing levels of violence and
lack of respect for human life. He writes:
“We have had enough of you, criminals, of your violence, of your
loss of honor, your cruelty, your nonsense. You used to have
codes of honor. You were not so cruel about account balances and
you did not touch civilians or their families. Now you make no
distinction…You have even lost the dignity to kill…We have had
enough

because

your

violence

has

become

infrahuman,

not

animalistic-animals don’t do what you do-, but rather subhuman,
447
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demonic, senseless. We have had enough because your desire for
power and riches humiliate our children and destroy them and
produce fear and terror.”448 (Emphasis added).
In this tirade, Sicilia goes so far as to compare the DTOs to the
“Sonderkommandos nazis,” in their use of violence.449 His words express
the confusion and pain felt by Mexicans all over the nation who have
been affected and hurt by the violence plaguing their homeland. His
anger

is

not

directed

solely

at

the

government,

but

also

at

the

cartels, both of which he blames for bringing pain and suffering into
Mexico.
While

Sicilia‟s

representations

of

the

comments
sentiments

are
felt

perfectly
by

many

appropriate

Mexicans

today,

including this author‟s, it is difficult to stand behind his opinion of
what the government should do given their failure to eliminate the
presence of DTOs in Mexico. He continues his letter by saying “in the
wise words of [Jose] Martí to those who govern: „If you can‟t do it,
resign‟.”450 Surely the government stepping down is not the solution
needed in Mexico today; in fact it would only drive Mexico further into
chaos and the grip of the DTOs. Despite this outburst of his, one can
agree with his declaration that such a “statement should be accompanied
by large civilian movements that force them [the government], in these
times of national emergency, to get together to create an agenda that
unifies the nation and creates a state of true governance.”451
As

a

result

of

Sicilia‟s

publication,

Mexico

has

seen

the

reinvigoration of Mexican unity against the violence in the nation,
unity against the actions of both government and cartels. This energy,
448
449
450
451
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provided

initially

by

Sicilia,

has

brought

forth

“a

new

movement

sweeping the nation[and] is demanding an end to criminal impunity as
well as a fundamental change of course in the so-called drug war.” 452
Sicilia‟s words have clearly struck a nerve in the collective heart of
Mexico, as there have been numerous protests throughout the country
since his letter was released. Evidence of this new direction can be
seen in the fact that “as many as 40,000 people staged an April 6 march
through the streets of Cuernavaca,” and that “on the same day…[there
was] a Mexico City demonstration of 10,000 people,” with various others
occurring

throughout

the

country

on

a

lesser

scale.453

Such

mass

mobilization on the part of everyday Mexican citizens calling for an
immediate end to the violence is an encouraging development, one that
will hopefully drive the government officials to be more honest and be
held accountable for their actions. I must pause to speak candidly as a
Mexican at this point. Finally, someone put our feelings, our fears,
our pain, our suffering, our joys, our desires, our confusion, and our
resolve to reclaim Mexico into words.

Future US Involvement; more questions than answers
As a result of this investigation it has become clear that the
United States is willing to assist Mexico in a few specific ways, such
as financing and training. The lack of past cooperation on the issue is
not so much a result of the U.S. having no desire to help, although
this must be called in to question, but rather that Mexico is unwilling
to allow an increased American presence on their soil. They view the

452
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drug war simultaneously as a purely Mexican problem when they need to
explain their wariness of American involvement, and as an international
issue when they need greater assistance. One can quickly disregard the
idea

of

American

predator

drone

strikes

over

Mexico

as

folly.

No

Mexican administration would permit American military explosives to be
detonated in Mexico, especially in light of growing concerns over the
accuracy of these strikes and the potential for civilian casualties.
The question then becomes how does the U.S. contribute meaningfully
without alienating or offending the Mexican government?
The idea of labeling the cartels as “narcoterrorists,” seems to
be gaining support across borders and could certainly contribute to
forming

a

more

government,

one

comprehensive
which

and

includes

complete
the

plan

of

cooperation

action
of

for

the

legislative,

executive, judicial, police, and civilian authorities. Such a label
could potentially play a role in international support for the Mexican
cause, in that it could push certain nations with similar “terrorist,”
threats to contribute with financial and training support to Mexico.
Much like the case of Colombia‟s assistance, an international front
advocating for the sharing of experience and knowledge in dealing with
non-conventional armed forces would be invaluable for countries with
security situations

like that

of

Mexico. The question here

is how

obligated would world powers, namely the U.S., feel to Mexico and to
assisting them in the war against the drug industry?
A
implement

recent
a

development

cross

border

in

U.S.-Mexico

trucking

Relations

agreement

that

has
was

been

to

initially

discussed “under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement,”.454 This
plan has been a contentious issue since its inception; however the new
454
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agreement has been attributed to both administrations being “eager to
show signs of a productive partnership,”455 and can be a step in the
direction of greater understanding and cooperation in other areas of
controversy and strain in Mexican-American relations. Before lavishing
this idea with praises it is important to note two particular issues:
1) the access such a plan grants to DTOs and the drug-trafficking
industry, and 2) the question of why now?
The first issue is

that, given

the power, money, and access

already exhibited by the cartels, why would one not expect them to
capitalize on this new avenue through which to transport drugs across
the American border? Certainly, these trucks will be under extreme
scrutiny if the plan is to take effect, however the very fact that the
DTOs

have

managed

to

and

cars

submarines,

transport
should

their

product

demonstrate

using

their

planes,

boats,

resilience

and

competency. Furthermore, this appears to potentially be creating an
easier route for them to move the product, they simply need to continue
to threaten, pay off, and kill all who stand in the way of their
industry and their profit.
The second issue is a question of timing. Why did the U.S. and
Mexico

come

to

this

agreement

16

years

after

it

was

originally

proposed? Perhaps it was simply two administrations that finally saw
the mutual benefit of such a plan and decided to push forward on it.
However, this seems highly unlikely, rather I believe the timing has
more to do with, as Stephen Johnson argued, the fact that “it was
critical

that

Obama

and

Calderón

meet

before

tensions

escalated

further.”456 That is, given the recent death of an American agent, the
rising death toll due to the drug war, and the clear need for American
455
456
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assistance, the two nations had to come to a mutual agreement on at
least one major issue in order to save face.
Furthermore,

in

a

somewhat

suspicious

stance,

this

author

believes that the concession was made by the American government in
order to counter

their reluctance to take responsibility for their

contribution to the growing drug trade in Mexico. That is, the U.S. was
eager to assist their neighbor Mexico, given that they have not been
able to contribute as much as the Mexican government expects of them
with regards to combating DTOs. By this understanding the agreement
loses its political meaning in that it becomes nothing more than a red
herring, so to speak, that distracts from the reality that the U.S. has
been perceived by scholars and Mexican government officials as not
pulling its own weight in the drug war taking place in Mexico. This
complex

and

at

times

inconsistent

relationship

between

the

two

countries seems to create more questions than any concrete answers. One
can only wonder what will happen when a new administration, likely to
be from a party other than the PAN, takes over in Mexico in 2013.

Failed States Index
When comparing Mexico‟s standing on the FSI to countries with
higher overall scores, one encounters a baffling piece of evidence:
Mexico has higher death tolls (intentional homicide rates) than most of
the top nations. However, despite this violence that is largely brought
about by the drug war, Mexico still receives lower scores on categories
I-7 and I-9, “Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State,”
(I-7) and “Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and
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Widespread

Violation

of

Human

Rights.”457

While

economic

and

social

categories are important indicators of a state‟s propensity to failing,
it is irresponsible to ignore the political factors.
Using Weber‟s understanding of what being a state entails, surely
categories I-7 and I-9 are the most accurate and informative ones as to
whether or not a state is or has failed. That is not to say that these
other categories are unimportant, but rather that a distinction must be
made between a nation that is failed in the economic sense and one that
has failed politically. In the case of economic failure, it has not
truly failed as a state, it has simply become an impoverished one,
which is a tragedy nonetheless. However, if a nation fails politically
and militarily it has lost its right and ability to rule, govern, and
defend its citizens.
I have chosen 6 of the top 10 nations on the FSI in order to
compare them with Mexico based on their death tolls and rates. These
nations are Somalia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan (1st, 2nd,
3rd, 6th, and 7th).458 The countries chosen for comparison had rates as
follows

(I-7

and

I-9

scores,

respectively)459:

Somalia

3.2/100,000 460

(10.0, 9.9), Zimbabwe 8.44/100,000461 (9.8, 9.9), Sudan 27.2/100,000 462
(9.8, 9.8), Iraq 7.3/100,000463 (9.0, 9.3), and Afghanistan 3.4/100,000 464
(9.8, 8.8). It is important to note that the data from these countries
has

457

been

hard

to

confirm

recently

as

they

are

war

torn

nations
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struggling

to

establish

any

semblance

of

legitimate

government.

As

mentioned in an earlier chapter, Mexico currently has a death rate of
18/100,000 and has suffered the deaths of 35,000 people due to drugrelated violence and has received I-7 and I-9 scores of 6.8 and 5.5,
respectively.
Before comparing the scores I offer a disclaimer, this analysis
is not aimed at proving that Mexico is somehow worse off than any of
the nations listed. Rather, the purpose is to see if Mexico‟s ratings
are fair and appropriate given how the data stands up to that of other
notoriously struggling states. Surely, it would be foolish to suggest
that the Mexican government is less legitimate than that of Somalia, a
country

with

no

official

government,

run

by

warlords

and

pirates.

However, it is questionable how a country with such a staggering death
toll and conflict such as that of Mexico can be given scores as low as
half

and

two

thirds

of

those

received

by

the

FSI‟s

highest

rated

nations.
The death rates certainly appear to have risen in these other
nations since the last confirmed data was released however, without a
doubt Mexico remains a nation with one of the most alarming death rates
due

to

one

particular

form

of

violence

in

the

western

world.

Furthermore, the I-7 and I-9 categories have to do with government
legitimacy, rule of law, and human rights, all of which are severely
suspect in Mexico at this moment. As has been seen, the DTOs have
severely damaged the already weak image of the Mexican government in
the eyes of the people by proving themselves able to compete and at
times outgun the government.
The

government‟s

legitimacy

is

still

strong

in

terms

of

its

ability to remain in power and effect policy, however its legitimacy as
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the representative and defender of the people is beginning to crumble.
Rule of law, in the regions most affected (Juarez, Chihuahua, Sinaloa),
is effectively suspended. Although the police and military still exist
and operate to prevent illegal activity, the DTOs quite simply can
often act as they please with little fear of punishment or even of
discovery. Finally, a death toll of 35,000 which shows no signs of
stopping is certainly a violation of human rights, in the very least of
“the right to life” as discussed by various scholars throughout this
investigation. This combination of factors and realities demonstrate
that the situation in Mexico may still appear to be under control,
however below the surface it does seem that the Mexican government is
losing control over the nation and the criminals who terrorize it.
Despite the lack of up to date information concerning death tolls
and rates in the five countries mentioned, the fact is that even in
2004 when the last data was available for these nations, Mexico still
had a higher rate than four of them. In 2004, Mexico had an intentional
homicide rate of 11.2/100,000465, the highest of the nations in question,
save Sudan‟s. This rate has continued to climb along with the overall
drug-related death toll, and continues to increase every year. While
the nature of the war is still guerrilla-like, soon will come a time
when it falls under the title of a full-fledged civil war. If this
proves to become Mexico‟s reality, one will find it extremely difficult
to maintain that the state has not failed. It is not that these scores
need be altered in order to unfairly criticize the Mexican government,
whose

intentions

certainly

appear

to

be

honorable,

or

equate

the

situation in Mexico to other tragic global realities, but rather it is
important in order to ensure that the situation in Mexico is given the
465
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attention

it

deserves.

Hopefully,

with

the

world

watching,

other

nations will continue to step in to assist the Mexican government in
its pursuit of a Mexico free of DTOs. Mexican state failure could prove
catastrophic to the Central American region, as Mexico remains one of
its economic and political giants.

Conclusion
Given the findings of this project one can begin to develop an
answer to the original question posed of “will Mexico become a failed
state by the end of Calderón‟s presidency in 2012?” Surely, the answer
to the question of whether or not Mexico is currently a failed state is
no. However, it is certainly slipping closer to obtaining that status.
How can such a statement be made given comments, such as those made by
Paredes

Rangel,

in

which

infrastructure

exists

constitution.466

She

in

cites

she

states

Mexico
the

to

frequency

that

the

protect
of

and

institutions

and

guarantee

success

of

and
the

holding

elections in Mexico, as well as the relationships and balances between
the

judicial,

government.467

legislative,
While

Ms.

and

executive

Paredes

Rangel

branches
is

of

correct

the

Mexican

that

this

infrastructure does exist in Mexico and has shown signs of improvement
and greater transparency since the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, it
would be foolish to assume that their mere existence is sufficient
evidence to declare Mexico a fully functioning state. That is, the
institutions certainly may exist and operate well, however that does
not

by

any

means

indicate

whether

or

corruption and ineffectiveness.
466
467
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not

they

have

emerged

from
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The Mexican government is losing its ability to rule and govern
the

nation

increasing
Church‟s

effectively
ability

to

decreasing

due

to

the

perfect

storm

of

a)

the

outgun

the

Mexican

military

forces,

influence

and

sway

a

guide

as

moral

DTOs

b)

the

over

the

nation, c) the moral dilemma facing Mexicans as to their ability and
desire to stomach more violence and death as seen in the rise of the
narcocorrido,

and

d)

the

struggle

to

maintain

legitimacy

and

credibility in a nation where the government and authorities have long
had their integrity and aptitude questioned and challenged. Without a
doubt,

the

Mexican

government

under

Calderón

has

failed

to

“successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force in the enforcement of its order.”468
The expansion of the Mexican cartels‟ operations, particularly
their

“presence…in

noteworthy

Central

shift,”469

in

America,”
the

has

structure

to

date

and

been

function

“the
of

most
these

organizations. Furthermore, as STRATFOR reports, in a region that was
formerly dominated by Colombian drug organizations, “it is the Mexican
traffickers…who are conquering new turf and even expanding to other
markets.”470 What makes this so alarming is that it is clear proof of the
tremendous financial and military might that the cartels wield since
they are capable of “conquering” land outside of their home country and
conducting business from foreign soil. It is developments such as these
that have led many to grow frustrated and cynical with regards to the
future

of

the

conflict.

Castañeda

voices

this

sentiment

at

the

conclusion of his article stating, “Mexico is paying an enormous price

468

Idea taken from José Antonio Ortega Sánchez, México: ¿Rumbo al Estado Fallido? (México,
D.F.: Editorial Planeta, 2010), 19. Quote taken from Max Weber, The Theory of Social and
Economic Organizations, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 154.
469
STRATFOR, “Mexican Drug Cartels,” 13.
470
Ibid., 14.
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to fight a war which is going nowhere, which we are not winning, which
we cannot win.”471 Such a pessimistic view of the conflict leads one to
believe

that

the

cartels

are

so

overwhelmingly

powerful

that

they

simply cannot be defeated. It is precisely this defeatist approach,
already discussed in this investigation, which provides the DTOs with
license to act as they wish with little, if any, fear of repercussions.
The future of the conflict in Mexico is not improving in any
quantifiable way. In the words of the previously quoted Mr. Gutiérrez,
“we [Mexican government] have 18 months [from “October 2009”]and if we
do not produce a tangible success that is recognizable to the Mexican
people, it will be difficult to sustain the confrontation into the next
administration.”472 If the Mexican government does not find a way to curb
the climbing death toll, soon will come the day when Mexico has to
stomach a total that could climb as high as 100,000 or more. Such a
number is years, perhaps even a decade, away at the current

rate;

however it is a potential reality nonetheless. If this does in fact
manifest

itself

the

result

is

simply

politically. Mexico will undoubtedly

unacceptable

have to take on

morally

and

the label

of

“failed state,” and be known as a nation that is incapable of providing
the basic human rights of “life” and opportunity to its citizens. How
then will they be able to prevent such a dismal future given that the
cartels have become so powerful that, as Anabel Hernández reports, “El
Chapo’s [and by extension, the drug industry‟s] era will last as long
as he wants it to?”473 Calderón and his administration‟s time is running
out.

471

Castañeda, “Mexico‟s Failed Drug War,” 3.
Gerónimo Gutierrez was “a deputy secretary in the ministry in charge of domestic
security.” His statement and background from Malkin, “U.S. Aided Mexican Drug War.”
473
Hernández, Los Señores, 587.
472

APPENDICES

Appendix A
A-1

FAILED

STATES

INDEX

taken

from

FFP

website

at:

http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=102&Itemid=327#3.
What does "state failure" mean?
A: A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most
common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly
on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure
include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective
decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the
inability to interact with other states as a full member of the
international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of state
failure risk elements such as extensive corruption and criminal
behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen
support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp
economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution
or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and
environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through
explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time
periods.

Methodology

of

FSI

taken

from

Foreign

Policy

website

at:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_ind
ex_faq_methodology.
Q: What methodology was used to generate the scores?
A: The Fund for Peace uses its Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST),
an original methodology it has developed and tested over the past
decade. CAST is a flexible model that has the capability to employ a
four-step trend-line analysis, consisting of (1) rating 12 social,
economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the
capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for
sustaining
security;
(3)
identifying
idiosyncratic
factors
and
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surprises; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that shows the
risk history of countries being analyzed.
For the Failed States Index, the FfP focused solely on the first step,
which provides snapshots of state vulnerability or risk of violence for
one time period each year. The data used in each index are collected
from May to December of the preceding year. The CAST software indexed
and scanned more than 90,000 open-source articles and reports using
Boolean logic, which consists of key phrases designed to capture the
variables measured.
Full-text data are electronically gathered from a range of publicly
available print, radio, television and Internet sources from all over
the world, including international and local media reports, essays,
interviews, polling and survey data, government documents, independent
studies from think tanks, NGOs and universities, and even corporate
financial filings. The software determines the salience of the 12
indicators as well as hundreds of sub-indicators by calculating the
number of "hits" as a proportion of the sample for a given time period.
Quantitative data is also included, when available. Subject-matter
experts then review each score for every country and indicator, as well
as consult the original documents, when necessary, to ensure accuracy.
Q: What are the 12 indicators of state vulnerability?
A: The 12 indicators are: Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group
Grievance,
Human
Flight,
Uneven
Development,
Economic
Decline,
Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security
Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.

A-2 BREAKDOWN OF MEXICO‟S SCORES IN 12 FSI CATEGORIES taken from FFP
website
at:
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=99&Itemid=140.
MEXICO (98th rank on FSI)
Social Indicators
I-1 Mounting Demographic Pressures-7.0
I-2 Massive movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons
creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies-4.3
I-3 Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia-5.9
I-4 Chronic and Sustained Human Flight-7.0
Economic Indicators
I-5 Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines-8.2
I-6 Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline-6.1
Political Indicators
I-7 Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State-6.8
I-8 Progressive Deterioration of Public Services-6.0
I-9 Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and
Widespread Violation of Human Rights-5.5
I-10 Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”-7.0
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I-11 Rise of Factionalized Elites-5.0
I-12 Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors-6.6
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Appendix B

B-1
PGR
Most
Wanted
List
(taken
http://www.puentelibre.com.mx/not_detalle.php?id_n=14839.)

from

“A. Cártel del Golfo-Zetas
1. Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, alias "El Lazca"; "Z-14"; "Z-3"; "El
Verdugo"; "El Bronce"; "El Pitirijas"
2. Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sánchez, alias "El Coss"
3. Ezequiel Cárdenas Guillén, alias "Tony Tormenta"
4. Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, alias "L-40"; "Comandante 40"; "La
Mona"
5. Omar Treviño Morales, alias "L-42"
6. Iván Velázquez Caballero, alias "El Talibán"; "L-50"
7. Gregorio Sauceda Gamboa, alias "El Goyo"; "Metro-2"; "Caramuela"
B. Cártel del Pacífico
1. Joaquín Guzmán Loera y/o Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera, alias "El
Chapo"
2. Ismael Zambada García, alias "El Mayo Zambada"
3. Ignacio Coronel Villarreal, alias "Nacho Coronel"
4. Juan José Esparragoza Moreno, alias "El Azul"
5. Vicente Zambada Niebla, alias "El Vicentillo"
C. Cártel Beltrán Leyva
1. Arturo Beltrán Leyva, alias "El Barbas"
2. Mario Alberto Beltrán Leyva y/o Héctor Beltrán Leyva, alias "El
General"
3. Sergio Villarreal Barragán, alias "El Grande"
4. Edgar Valdez Villarreal, alias "La Barbie"
D. Cártel de los Carrillo Fuentes
1. Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, alias "El Viceroy"; "El General"
2. Vicente Carrillo Leyva
E.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Cártel "La Familia"
Nazario Moreno González, alias "El
Servando Gómez Martínez, alias "El
José de Jesús Méndez Vargas, alias
Dionicio Loya Plancarte, alias "El

Chayo"
Profe"; "El Tuta"
"El Chango"
Tío"

F. Cártel Arellano Félix
1. Teodoro García Simental, alias "El Teo"; "El Lalo"; "El 68"; "El K1"; "El Alamo 6"; "El Tres Letras"
2. Fernando Sánchez Arellano, alias "El Ingeniero"
II. Hasta de $15'000,000.00 (Quince Millones de Pesos 00/100 Moneda
Nacional), a quien o quienes proporcionen información útil, veraz y
oportuna que auxilie eficientemente a la localización y detención
efectiva por cada una de las personas siguientes
A. Cártel del Golfo-Zetas:
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1. Sigifredo Nájera Talamantes, alias "El Canicón"
2. Ricardo Almanza Morales, alias "El Gori"
3. Eduardo Almanza Morales, alias "El Gori"
4. Raymundo Almanza Morales, alias "El Gori"
5. Flavio Méndez Santiago, alias "El Amarillo"
6. Sergio Peña Solís y/o René Solís Carlos, alias "El Concord"; "El
Colosio"
7. Raúl Lucio Fernández Lechuga, alias "El Lucky"
8. Sergio Enrique Ruíz Tlapanco, alias "El Tlapa"
B.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Cártel Beltrán Leyva
Francisco Hernández García, alias "El 2000"; "El Panchillo"
Alberto Pineda Villa, alias "El Borrado"
Marco Antonio Pineda Villa, alias "El MP"
Héctor Huerta Ríos, alias "La Burra"; "El Junior"

C. Cártel de Juárez y/o de los Carrillo Fuentes
1. Juan Pablo Ledesma y/o Eduardo Ledesma, alias "El JL"
Las recompensas que se ofrecen conforme a las fracciones a quien o
quienes proporcionen información relevante y útil, que auxilie
eficientemente para la localización y detención de las personas
anteriores, se entienden por cada una de las personas señaladas. Todas
cuentan con orden de aprehensión librada en su contra por autoridades
judiciales del orden federal, o bien, con orden de localización y
presentación emitida por el Ministerio Público de la Federación. Por
razones de seguridad, a fin de evitar filtraciones que pongan en riesgo
las investigaciones, así como las acciones de coordinación entre las
autoridades competentes, se omiten en el presente Acuerdo los datos de
identificación de los procedimientos penales en que se han librado las
órdenes judiciales y ministeriales respectivas, así como de las
autoridades correspondientes.

B-2 Assault Weapons Ban (taken from Library of Congress Website at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?c103:1:./temp/~c1032m1Ijc:e643945:.)
H.R.3355
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Enrolled Bill
[Final as Passed Both House and Senate] - ENR)

Subtitle A--Assault Weapons

SEC. 110101. SHORT TITLE.
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This subtitle may be cited as the `Public Safety and Recreational
Firearms Use Protection Act'.

SEC. 110102. RESTRICTION ON MANUFACTURE, TRANSFER, AND POSSESSION OF
CERTAIN SEMIAUTOMATIC ASSAULT WEAPONS.

(a) RESTRICTION- Section 922 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

`(v)(1) It shall be unlawful for a person to manufacture, transfer, or
possess a semiautomatic assault weapon.

`(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the possession or transfer of
any semiautomatic assault weapon otherwise lawfully possessed
under Federal law on the date of the enactment of this
subsection.

`(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to--

`(A) any of the firearms, or replicas or duplicates of the firearms,
specified in Appendix A to this section, as such firearms
were manufactured on October 1, 1993;

`(B) any firearm that--

`(i) is manually operated by bolt, pump, lever, or slide action;

`(ii) has been rendered permanently inoperable; or

`(iii) is an antique firearm;

`(C)

any semiautomatic rifle that cannot accept a detachable
magazine that holds more than 5 rounds of ammunition; or

`(D) any semiautomatic shotgun that cannot hold more than 5 rounds
of ammunition in a fixed or detachable magazine.

The fact that a firearm is not listed in Appendix A shall not be
construed to mean that paragraph (1) applies to such firearm. No
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firearm exempted by this subsection may be deleted from Appendix
A so long as this subsection is in effect.

`(4) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to--

`(A) the manufacture for, transfer to, or possession by the United
States or a department or agency of the United States or a
State or a department, agency, or political subdivision of
a State, or a transfer to or possession by a law
enforcement officer employed by such an entity for purposes
of law enforcement (whether on or off duty);

`(B) the transfer to a licensee under title I of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 for purposes of establishing and maintaining an
on-site
physical
protection
system
and
security
organization required by Federal law, or possession by an
employee or contractor of such licensee on-site for such
purposes or off-site for purposes of licensee-authorized
training or transportation of nuclear materials;

`(C) the possession, by an individual who is retired from service
with a law enforcement agency and is not otherwise
prohibited from receiving a firearm, of a semiautomatic
assault weapon transferred to the individual by the agency
upon such retirement; or

`(D) the manufacture, transfer, or possession of a semiautomatic
assault weapon by a licensed manufacturer or licensed
importer for the purposes of testing or experimentation
authorized by the Secretary.'.

(b) DEFINITION OF SEMIAUTOMATIC ASSAULT WEAPON- Section 921(a) of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:

`(30) The term `semiautomatic assault weapon' means--

`(A) any of the firearms, or copies or duplicates of the firearms in
any caliber, known as--

`(i) Norinco, Mitchell, and Poly Technologies Avtomat Kalashnikovs
(all models);
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`(ii) Action Arms Israeli Military Industries UZI and Galil;

`(iii) Beretta Ar70 (SC-70);

`(iv) Colt AR-15;

`(v) Fabrique National FN/FAL, FN/LAR, and FNC;

`(vi) SWD M-10, M-11, M-11/9, and M-12;

`(vii) Steyr AUG;

`(viii) INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9 and TEC-22; and

`(ix)

`(B)

revolving cylinder shotguns, such as
Street Sweeper and Striker 12;

a

(or

similar

semiautomatic rifle that has an ability
detachable magazine and has at least 2 of--

to

to)

the

accept

a

`(i) a folding or telescoping stock;

`(ii) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action
of the weapon;

`(iii) a bayonet mount;

`(iv) a flash suppressor or threaded barrel designed to accommodate
a flash suppressor; and

`(v) a grenade launcher;

`(C)

a

semiautomatic pistol that has an ability
detachable magazine and has at least 2 of--

to

accept

a

`(i) an ammunition magazine that attaches to the pistol outside of
the pistol grip;
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`(ii) a threaded barrel capable of accepting a barrel extender,
flash suppressor, forward handgrip, or silencer;

`(iii) a shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely
encircles, the barrel and that permits the shooter to
hold the firearm with the nontrigger hand without
being burned;

`(iv) a manufactured weight of 50 ounces or more when the pistol is
unloaded; and

`(v) a semiautomatic version of an automatic firearm; and

`(D) a semiautomatic shotgun that has at least 2 of--

`(i) a folding or telescoping stock;

`(ii) a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action
of the weapon;

`(iii) a fixed magazine capacity in excess of 5 rounds; and

`(iv) an ability to accept a detachable magazine.'.
(c) PENALTIES-

(1) VIOLATION OF SECTION 922(v)- Section 924(a)(1)(B) of such title
is amended by striking `or (q) of section 922' and
inserting `(r), or (v) of section 922'.

(2) USE OR POSSESSION DURING CRIME OF VIOLENCE OR DRUG TRAFFICKING
CRIME- Section 924(c)(1) of such title is amended in the
first sentence by inserting `, or semiautomatic assault
weapon,' after `short-barreled shotgun,'.

(d) IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS FOR SEMIAUTOMATIC ASSAULT WEAPONS- Section
923(i) of such title is amended by adding at the end the following:
`The serial number of any semiautomatic assault weapon manufactured
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after the date of the enactment of this sentence shall clearly show the
date on which the weapon was manufactured.'.
B-3 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
and

its

Protocols

(taken

from

the

UNODC

website

at:

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html):
“The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000, is
the main international instrument in the fight against transnational
organized crime. It opened for signature by Member States at a Highlevel Political Conference convened for that purpose in Palermo, Italy,
on 12-15 December 2000 and entered into force on 29 September 2003. The
Convention is further supplemented by three Protocols, which target
specific areas and manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
Countries must become parties to the Convention itself before they can
become parties to any of the Protocols.
The Convention represents a major step forward in the fight against
transnational organized crime and signifies the recognition by Member
States of the seriousness of the problems posed by it, as well as the
need to foster and enhance close international cooperation in order to
tackle those problems. States that ratify this instrument commit
themselves to taking a series of measures against transnational
organized crime, including the creation of domestic criminal offences
(participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering,
corruption and obstruction of justice); the adoption of new and
sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law
enforcement cooperation; and the promotion of training and technical
assistance for building or upgrading the necessary capacity of national
authorities.
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children, was adopted by General Assembly
resolution 55/25. It entered into force on 25 December 2003. It is the
first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on
trafficking in persons. The intention behind this definition is to
facilitate convergence in national approaches with regard to the
establishment of domestic criminal offences that would support
efficient international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting
trafficking in persons cases. An additional objective of the Protocol
is to protect and assist the victims of trafficking in persons with
full respect for their human rights.
The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,
adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25, entered into force on 28
January 2004. It deals with the growing problem of organized criminal
groups who smuggle migrants, often at high risk to the migrants and at
great profit for the offenders. A major achievement of the Protocol was
that, for the first time in a global international instrument, a
definition of smuggling of migrants was developed and agreed upon. The
Protocol aims at preventing and combating the smuggling of migrants, as
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well as promoting cooperation among States parties, while protecting
the rights of smuggled migrants and preventing the worst forms of their
exploitation which often characterize the smuggling process.
The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition was adopted by
General Assembly resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001. It entered into
force on 3 July 2005. The objective of the Protocol, which is the first
legally binding instrument on small arms that has been adopted at the
global level, is to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation
among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the
illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and
components and ammunition. By ratifying the Protocol, States make a
commitment to adopt a series of crime-control measures and implement in
their domestic legal order three sets of normative provisions: the
first one relates to the establishment of criminal offences related to
illegal manufacturing of, and trafficking in, firearms on the basis of
the Protocol requirements and definitions; the second to a system of
government authorizations or licensing intending to ensure legitimate
manufacturing of, and trafficking in, firearms; and the third one to
the marking and tracing of firearms.”
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B-4 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking
Materials

in

Firearms,
(taken

Ammunitions, Explosives,
from

OAS

and

Other

website

Related
at:

http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html):
THE STATES PARTIES,
AWARE of the urgent need to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives,
and other related materials, due to the harmful effects of these
activities on the security of each state and the region as a whole,
endangering the well-being of peoples, their social and economic
development, and their right to live in peace;
CONCERNED by the increase, at the international level, in the illicit
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives,
and other related materials and by the serious problems resulting
therefrom;
REAFFIRMING that States Parties give priority to preventing,
combating,
and
eradicating
the
illicit
manufacturing
of
and
trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related
materials because of the links of such activities with drug
trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and mercenary
and other criminal activities;
CONCERNED about the illicit manufacture of explosives from substances
and articles that in and of themselves are not explosives--and that
are not addressed by this Convention due to their other lawful uses-for activities related to drug trafficking, terrorism, transnational
organized crime and mercenary and other criminal activities;
CONSIDERING the urgent need for all states, and especially those
states that produce, export, and import arms, to take the necessary
measures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing
of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other
related materials;
CONVINCED that combating the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking
in firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials calls
for international cooperation, exchange of information, and other
appropriate measures at the national, regional, and international
levels, and desiring to set a precedent for the international
community in this regard;
STRESSING the need, in peace processes and post-conflict situations,
to achieve effective control of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and
other related materials in order to prevent their entry into the
illicit market;
MINDFUL of the pertinent resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly on measures to eradicate the illicit transfer of conventional
weapons and on the need for all states to guarantee their security,
and of the efforts carried out in the framework of the Inter-American
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD);
RECOGNIZING the importance of strengthening existing international law
enforcement support mechanisms such as the International Weapons and
Explosives Tracking System (IWETS) of the International Criminal

Pinon-Farah 157

Police Organization (INTERPOL), to prevent, combat, and eradicate the
illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition,
explosives, and other related materials;
RECOGNIZING that international trade in firearms is particularly
vulnerable to abuses by criminal elements and that a "know-yourcustomer" policy for dealers in, and producers, exporters, and
importers of, firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related
materials is crucial for combating this scourge;
RECOGNIZING that states have developed different cultural and
historical uses for firearms, and that the purpose of enhancing
international
cooperation
to
eradicate
illicit
transnational
trafficking in firearms is not intended to discourage or diminish
lawful leisure or recreational activities such as travel or tourism
for sport shooting, hunting, and other forms of lawful ownership and
use recognized by the States Parties;
RECALLING that States Parties have their respective domestic laws and
regulations in the areas of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and
other related materials, and recognizing that this Convention does not
commit States Parties to enact legislation or regulations pertaining
to firearms ownership, possession, or trade of a wholly domestic
character, and recognizing that States Parties will apply their
respective laws and regulations in a manner consistent with this
Convention;
REAFFIRMING the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, and the
juridical equality of states,
HAVE DECIDED TO ADOPT THIS INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST THE
ILLICIT MANUFACTURING OF AND TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS, AMMUNITION,
EXPLOSIVES, AND OTHER RELATED MATERIALS:
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Appendix C
C-1 Statements from Mexican Bishops made concerning the Church‟s role
in human rights defense. Taken from Roderic Camp, Crossing Swords, 83.
“All bishops, in my opinion, believe that it is the obligation of
the Church to protect human rights. Many times these abuses are
contrary to our constitution, and these too have to be
regularized in terms of theory versus practice….I don‟t think
there‟s any bishop who doesn‟t believe in these rights.”
Cardinal of Guadalajara
Personal interview with Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo
[by Roderic Ai Camp], Guadalajara Archdiocese, Guadalajara,
Jalisco, Mexico City, February 20, 1991, as quoted in Camp,
Crossing Swords, 83.
“When we defend human rights we are defending liberty and human
dignity independently of the posture of political parties. This
is part of the Church‟s mission, because he who doesn‟t encounter
God in man will not encounter him anywhere. We are the children
of God, we are brothers, and to attack the dignity of man is to
offend God. For this reason, the Church, with complete rights, is
completing its mission, entering into the defense of human
rights.”
Archbishop of Chihuahua
Jaime Pérez Mendoza, “Por peticíon de Bartlett El Vaticano
ordenó que hubiera misas en Chihuahua,” citing Archbishop
Adalberto Almeida Merino, as quoted in Camp, Crossing
Swords, 83.
“I think the role of the Church in this area of human rights is
definitive. They are defending the rights of God in the
realization of human welfare against the abuses and excessive
behavior of others. Our position would be firm on the moral
issues but in politics, no.”
Bishop of Texcoco
Personal interview with Bishop Magín Camarino Torreblanca
Reyes [by Roderic Ai Camp], Texcoco Diocese, Texcoco,
México, July 12, 1993, as quoted in Camp, Crossing Swords,
83.
“I think the motivation for human rights is stronger today, but
it always has been a traditional role of the Church in the past.
The right of association, social justice, and other concepts,
these are part of the evangelical function. We are now
cooperating with other civil institutions and the United Nations‟
organizations. We must help people in a transcendental sense to
focus on all human values.”
Bishop of Aguascalientes
Personal interview with Bishop Rafael Muñoz [by Roderic Ai
Camp],
Aguascalientes
Archdiocese,
Aguascalientes,

Pinon-Farah 159

Aguascalientes, Mexico City, July 15, 1993, as quoted in
Camp, Crossing Swords, 83.
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Appendix D
D-1
Taken from http://www.proceso.com.mx/rv/modHome/detalleExclusiva/89858.
Javier
Javier

Sicilia:

Carta

abierta

a

políticos

y

criminales
Sicilia

MÉXICO, DF., 3 de abril (Proceso).- El brutal asesinato de mi hijo Juan
Francisco, de Julio César Romero Jaime, de Luis Antonio Romero Jaime y
de Gabriel Anejo Escalera, se suma a los de tantos otros muchachos y
muchachas que han sido igualmente asesinados a lo largo y ancho del
país a causa no sólo de la guerra desatada por el gobierno de Calderón
contra el crimen organizado, sino del pudrimiento del corazón que se ha
apoderado de la mal llamada clase política y de la clase criminal, que
ha roto sus códigos de honor.
No quiero, en esta carta, hablarles de las virtudes de mi hijo, que
eran inmensas, ni de las de los otros muchachos que vi florecer a su
lado, estudiando, jugando, amando, creciendo, para servir, como tantos
otros muchachos, a este país que ustedes han desgarrado. Hablar de ello
no serviría más que para conmover lo que ya de por sí conmueve el
corazón de la ciudadanía hasta la indignación. No quiero tampoco hablar
del dolor de mi familia y de la familia de cada uno de los muchachos
destruidos. Para ese dolor no hay palabras –sólo la poesía puede
acercarse un poco a él, y ustedes no saben de poesía–. Lo que hoy
quiero decirles desde esas vidas mutiladas, desde ese dolor que carece
de nombre porque es fruto de lo que no pertenece a la naturaleza –la
muerte de un hijo es siempre antinatural y por ello carece de nombre:
entonces no se es huérfano ni viudo, se es simple y dolorosamente nada–
, desde esas vidas mutiladas, repito, desde ese sufrimiento, desde la
indignación que esas muertes han provocado, es simplemente que estamos
hasta la madre.
Estamos hasta la madre de ustedes, políticos –y cuando digo políticos
no me refiero a ninguno en particular, sino a una buena parte de
ustedes, incluyendo a quienes componen los partidos–, porque en sus
luchas por el poder han desgarrado el tejido de la nación, porque en
medio de esta guerra mal planteada, mal hecha, mal dirigida, de esta
guerra que ha puesto al país en estado de emergencia, han sido
incapaces –a causa de sus mezquindades, de sus pugnas, de su miserable
grilla, de su lucha por el poder– de crear los consensos que la nación
necesita para encontrar la unidad sin la cual este país no tendrá
salida; estamos hasta la madre, porque la corrupción de las
instituciones judiciales genera la complicidad con el crimen y la
impunidad para cometerlo; porque, en medio de esa corrupción que
muestra el fracaso del Estado, cada ciudadano de este país ha sido
reducido a lo que el filósofo Giorgio Agamben llamó, con palabra
griega, zoe: la vida no protegida, la vida de un animal, de un ser que
puede ser violentado, secuestrado, vejado y asesinado impunemente;
estamos hasta la madre porque sólo tienen imaginación para la
violencia, para las armas, para el insulto y, con ello, un profundo
desprecio por la educación, la cultura y las oportunidades de trabajo

Pinon-Farah 161

honrado y bueno, que es lo que hace a las buenas naciones; estamos
hasta la madre porque esa corta imaginación está permitiendo que
nuestros muchachos, nuestros hijos, no sólo sean asesinados sino,
después, criminalizados, vueltos falsamente culpables para satisfacer
el ánimo de esa imaginación; estamos hasta la madre porque otra parte
de nuestros muchachos, a causa de la ausencia de un buen plan de
gobierno, no tienen oportunidades para educarse, para encontrar un
trabajo digno y, arrojados a las periferias, son posibles reclutas para
el crimen organizado y la violencia; estamos hasta la madre porque a
causa de todo ello la ciudadanía ha perdido confianza en sus
gobernantes, en sus policías, en su Ejército, y tiene miedo y dolor;
estamos hasta la madre porque lo único que les importa, además de un
poder impotente que sólo sirve para administrar la desgracia, es el
dinero, el fomento de la competencia, de su pinche “competitividad” y
del consumo desmesurado, que son otros nombres de la violencia.
De ustedes, criminales, estamos hasta la madre, de su violencia, de su
pérdida de honorabilidad, de su crueldad, de su sinsentido.
Antiguamente ustedes tenían códigos de honor. No eran tan crueles en
sus ajustes de cuentas y no tocaban ni a los ciudadanos ni a sus
familias. Ahora ya no distinguen. Su violencia ya no puede ser nombrada
porque ni siquiera, como el dolor y el sufrimiento que provocan, tiene
un nombre y un sentido. Han perdido incluso la dignidad para matar. Se
han vuelto cobardes como los miserables Sonderkommandos nazis que
asesinaban sin ningún sentido de lo humano a niños, muchachos,
muchachas, mujeres, hombres y ancianos, es decir, inocentes. Estamos
hasta la madre porque su violencia se ha vuelto infrahumana, no animal
–los animales no hacen lo que ustedes hacen–, sino subhumana,
demoniaca, imbécil. Estamos hasta la madre porque en su afán de poder y
de enriquecimiento humillan a nuestros hijos y los destrozan y producen
miedo y espanto.
Ustedes, “señores” políticos, y ustedes, “señores” criminales –lo
entrecomillo porque ese epíteto se otorga sólo a la gente honorable–,
están con sus omisiones, sus pleitos y sus actos envileciendo a la
nación. La muerte de mi hijo Juan Francisco ha levantado la solidaridad
y el grito de indignación –que mi familia y yo agradecemos desde el
fondo de nuestros corazones– de la ciudadanía y de los medios. Esa
indignación vuelve de nuevo a poner ante nuestros oídos esa
acertadísima frase que Martí dirigió a los gobernantes: “Si no pueden,
renuncien”. Al volverla a poner ante nuestros oídos –después de los
miles de cadáveres anónimos y no anónimos que llevamos a nuestras
espaldas, es decir, de tantos inocentes asesinados y envilecidos–, esa
frase debe ir acompañada de grandes movilizaciones ciudadanas que los
obliguen, en estos momentos de emergencia nacional, a unirse para crear
una agenda que unifique a la nación y cree un estado de gobernabilidad
real. Las redes ciudadanas de Morelos están convocando a una marcha
nacional el miércoles 6 de abril que saldrá a las 5:00 PM del monumento
de la Paloma de la Paz para llegar hasta el Palacio de Gobierno,
exigiendo justicia y paz. Si los ciudadanos no nos unimos a ella y la
reproducimos constantemente en todas las ciudades, en todos los
municipios o delegaciones del país, si no somos capaces de eso para
obligarlos a ustedes, “señores” políticos, a gobernar con justicia y
dignidad, y a ustedes, “señores” criminales, a retornar a sus códigos
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de honor y a limitar su salvajismo, la espiral de violencia que han
generando nos llevará a un camino de horror sin retorno. Si ustedes,
“señores” políticos, no gobiernan bien y no toman en serio que vivimos
un estado de emergencia nacional que requiere su unidad, y ustedes,
“señores” criminales, no limitan sus acciones, terminarán por triunfar
y tener el poder, pero gobernarán o reinarán sobre un montón de osarios
y de seres amedrentados y destruidos en su alma. Un sueño que ninguno
de nosotros les envidia.
No hay vida, escribía Albert Camus, sin persuasión y sin paz, y la
historia del México de hoy sólo conoce la intimidación, el sufrimiento,
la desconfianza y el temor de que un día otro hijo o hija de alguna
otra familia sea envilecido y masacrado, sólo conoce que lo que ustedes
nos piden es que la muerte, como ya está sucediendo hoy, se convierta
en un asunto de estadística y de administración al que todos debemos
acostumbrarnos.
Porque no queremos eso, el próximo miércoles saldremos a la calle;
porque no queremos un muchacho más, un hijo nuestro, asesinado, las
redes ciudadanas de Morelos están convocando a una unidad nacional
ciudadana que debemos mantener viva para romper el miedo y el
aislamiento que la incapacidad de ustedes, “señores” políticos, y la
crueldad de ustedes, “señores” criminales, nos quieren meter en el
cuerpo y en el alma.
Recuerdo, en este sentido, unos versos de Bertolt Brecht cuando el
horror del nazismo, es decir, el horror de la instalación del crimen en
la vida cotidiana de una nación, se anunciaba: “Un día vinieron por los
negros y no dije nada; otro día vinieron por los judíos y no dije nada;
un día llegaron por mí (o por un hijo mío) y no tuve nada que decir”.
Hoy, después de tantos crímenes soportados, cuando el cuerpo destrozado
de mi hijo y de sus amigos ha hecho movilizarse de nuevo a la
ciudadanía y a los medios, debemos hablar con nuestros cuerpos, con
nuestro caminar, con nuestro grito de indignación para que los versos
de Brecht no se hagan una realidad en nuestro país.
Además opino que hay que devolverle la dignidad a esta nación.

Esta carta se publica en la edición 1976 de la revista Proceso, ya en
circulación.

Javier Sicilia: Open letter to politicians and criminals. Translated by
Marco
Antonio
Pinon-Farah
with
the
minor
assistance
from
www.translate.google.com.
Mexico, DF., April 3, 2011 (Proceso)-The brutal murder of my son Juan
Francisco, of Julio César Romero Jaime, of Luis Antonio Romero Jaime
and of Gabriel Anejo Escalera, adds to the many other young men and
women who have similarly been murdered throughout the country as a
result not only of the war brought about by Calderón‟s government
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against organized crime, but also the rotting of the heart that has
gained control over the poorly name political and criminal classes,
that has broken its codes of honor.
I do not, in this letter, want to talk about the virtues of my son,
which were immense, nor do I wish to speak of those of the other young
men I saw flourish by his side, studying, playing, loving, growing, to
serve, like so many other youths, this country that you have destroyed.
Speaking of such things would not serve any purpose other than to move
that which has already been moved within the heart of the people to the
point of indignation. I don‟t want to talk about the pain of my family
and of the family of each of those young men. For that kind of pain
there are no words-only poetry is capable of coming close to it, and
you know nothing of poetry-. What I do want to tell you today from
those mutilated lives, from that pain that doesn‟t even have a name
because it is the product of that which doesn‟t pertain to nature-the
death of a child is always unnatural and for that reason it lacks a
name: therefore it isn‟t an orphan nor widower, it is simply and
painfully nothing-, from these mutilated lives, I repeat, from that
suffering, from the indignation that these deaths have provoked, it
quite simply is the case that we have had enough.
We have had enough of you, politicians-and when I say politicians I do
not mean any one in particular, but rather a good portion of you,
including those who make up the parties-because in your fight for power
you have destroyed the social fabric of the country, because in the
middle of this war, which has been poorly formulated, poorly carried
out, poorly driven, this war that has put the country in a state of
emergency, you have been incapable-because of your pettiness, your
struggles, your lack of judgment474, of your fight for power-of creating
the consensus that this country needs in order to find unity, without
which this country will not find the way out; we have had enough,
because
the
corruption
of
the
judicial
institutions
generates
complicity with crime and the impunity to commit it; because,
throughout this corruption that shows the failure of the State, each
citizen of this country has resigned themselves to what the philosopher
Giorgio Agamben called, with the Greek word, zoe: unprotected life, the
life of an animal, of a being who can be subjected to violence,
kidnapped, abused and murdered with impunity; we have had enough
because you only have the imagination for violence, for weapons, for
insults and, with this, a profound hatred for education, culture and
the opportunities for honorable and good work, which is what makes
countries good; we have had enough because this weak imagination is
allowing our young men, our children, to not only be murdered, but
also, afterwards, criminalized, falsely blamed in order to satisfy that
imagination; we have had enough because another part of our youth,
because of the absence of an adequate government plan, don‟t have
opportunities to educate themselves, to find dignified work and, thrown
to the periphery, they are potential recruits for organized crime and
violence; we have had enough because as a result of this the people has
lost confidence in their government, in their police, in the military,
and they are scared and hurting; we have had enough because the only
thing that matters to you, besides impotent power that only serves the
474

This word translated using the Spanish definition of “grillarse,” from
www.wordreference.com.
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purpose to administer disgrace, is money, fostering competition, your
fucking “competitiveness” and of limitless consumption, which are other
names for violence.
We have had enough of you, criminals, of your violence, of your loss of
honor, your cruelty, your nonsense.
You used to have codes of honor. You were not so cruel about account
balances and you did not touch civilians or their families. Now you
make no distinction. Your violence can no longer be identified because
it doesn‟t even, like the pain and suffering it causes, have a name or
reason. You have even lost the dignity to kill. You have become cowards
like the miserable Sonderkommandos Nazis who murdered, for no human
reason, children, young men, young women, women, men and the elderly,
that is, the innocent. We have had enough because your violence has
become infrahuman, not animalistic-animals don‟t do what you do-, but
rather subhuman, demonic, senseless. We have had enough because your
desire for power and riches humiliate our children and destroy them and
produce fear and terror.
You, “gentlemen,” politicians, and you, “gentlemen,” criminals-I use
quotes because this epithet is reserved only for honorable people-,
have your omissions, your arguments and your acts that vilify the
country. The death of my son Juan Francisco has raised solidarity and
the cry of indignation- that my family and I appreciate from the bottom
of our hearts- of the people and the mediums. That indignation again
brings the wise words, that Martí directed to those who govern, to our
ears: “If you cannot do it, resign”. By bringing it to our attention
again-after the thousands of anonymous and non-anonymous bodies that we
carry on our backs, that is, of so many innocent who have been murdered
and vilified-, those words should be accompanied by large civilian
movements that force them, in these times of national emergency, to
come together in order to create an agenda that unifies the nation and
creates a state of true governance. The civilian networks of Morelos
are planning a national march Wednesday April 6 that will start at 5:00
PM from the Paloma de la Paz monument all the way to Government Palace,
demanding justice and peace. If the citizens do not unite and imitate
them constantly in all cities, in all municipalities or delegations of
the country, if we are incapable of doing so in order to obligate you,
“gentlemen,” politicians to govern with justice and dignity, and you,
“gentlemen,” criminals, to return to your codes of honor, and limit
your savagery, the spiral of violence which you have generated will
take us down a horrific path of no return. If you, “gentlemen,”
politicians do not govern well and don‟t take it seriously that we live
in a state of national emergency that requires your unity, and you
“gentlemen,” criminals, don‟t limit your actions, will end up
triumphing and gaining power, but you will govern or reign over a bunch
of caskets and frightened beings whose souls have been destroyed. A
dream that none of us envy you for.
Albert Camus wrote that there is no life without persuasion and peace,
and Mexico‟s history of today only knows intimidation, suffering, lack
of trust and fear that one day another son or daughter of another
family will be vilified and massacred. We only know that what you ask
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of us is death, as this is happening now, it becomes an issue of
statistics and administration to which we should all get used to.
Because we do not want that, next Wednesday we will go out to the
street; because we do not one more youth, a son of ours, murdered, the
civilian networks of Morelos are planning for national civilian unity
that we should maintain alive in order to break through the fear and
isolation that your inability, “gentlemen,” politicians, and your
cruelty, “gentlemen,” criminals, wish to instill in our bodies and
souls.
I remember, in this sense, a few of Bertolt Brecht‟s verses about the
horror of Nazism, that is, the horror of the installation of crime in
the everyday life of a nation, it was announced: “One day they came for
the blacks and I said nothing; another day they came for the Jews and I
said nothing; one day they came for me (or for a child of mine) and I
had nothing to say”. Today, after so many supported crimes, when the
destroyed body of my son and of his friends has made the people and the
media mobilize again, we should speak with our bodies, with our
walking, with our cry of indignation so that Brecht‟s verses do not
become a reality in our country.
I also believe we must return dignity to this country.
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